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Abstract
This dissertation examines the global crisis of protection through the lens of the Syrian refugee
crisis and the particular experiences of refugees’ journeys to Sweden.
In doing so, the dissertation challenges the dominant narratives that represent refugees either as
victims who deserve aid in their regions, or as threats when they exert their agency and journey
towards the global north. In the same vein, the dissertation problematizes the dominant narrative
of the “European crisis of migration” and proposes that the “unauthorized” arrivals of refugees in
Europe are reflections of a global crisis of protection, a crisis that develops as a result of a failing
protection regime and bordering practices against refugees from the global south. These practices
are based to a large degree on government policies designed to contain refugees in their regions
and deter them from reaching the states of the global north where they believe they can have
better access to rights. The dissertation proposes that such practices do not deter desperate
refugees from arriving in the global north, but rather increase the “human cost” (Spijkerboer,
2007) of their journeys by reducing the legal and safe pathways and forcing refugees into
illegality and precarity.
The dissertation examines the journeys of refugees from Syria towards Sweden. These refugees
escaped the war in their homeland, only to find themselves trapped between a failing protection
regime and a global system of border controls. Those who decide to journey towards other
destinations are transformed from being refugees, who deserve protection, into “irregular
migrants”, who are criminalized for challenging the regime of borders. Due to such precarity and
illegality, refugees arrive at their intended destinations with a heavy load of pain, fear, and
confusion, which influences their sense of identity and belonging and affects their ability to
integrate into their new localities.
Informed by the knowledge of refugees and through their stories, the dissertation develops a
conceptual framework of the refugee journey. It addresses the journey as an act of survival and
resistance that is messy and complex and involves high degrees of agency but also precarity,
which entails a transformative impact on a refugee’s role, positionality, and identity.
The dissertation centralizes refugees as the prime source of knowledge and presents them as real
individuals with various backgrounds and aspirations. It focuses on people’s own experiences
and stories which are often left out of policymaking, and absent from high-level discussions
between government leaders, policymakers, and international organizations including the United
Nations.
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Introduction
َ َ َونَحْ نُ نُ ِحبُّ ال َحيَاة َ إذَا َما ا ْست
َسبِيل
َ ط ْعنَا إِلَ ْي َها
َسجِ بَ ْي َن ُه َما أَ ْو ن َِخيل
َ َص بَيْن
ُ َُون َْرق
َ ْين ن َْرفَ ُع ِمئْذَنَةً ِل ْلبَنَ ْف
ِ ش ِهيد
َ َ نُ ِحبُّ ال َحيَاة َ إِذَا َما ا ْست
َسبِيل
َ ط ْعنَا إِلَ ْي َها
َالر ِحيل
َّ س َما ًء لَنَا َونُ َسيِ َج َهذَا
َ َونَس ِْر ُق ِم ْن د ُودَةِ القَ ِز َخيْطا ً ِلنَ ْبنِي
ُّ س ِمينُ إِلَى ال
َت نَ َهارا ً َج ِميل
ِ ط ُرقَا
َ ََونَ ْفت َ ُح ب
َ اب ال َحدِيقَ ِة َك ْي يَ ْخ ُر َج اليَا
َ َ نُ ِحبُّ ال َح َياة َ ِإذَا َما ا ْست
َس ِبيل
َ ط ْعنَا ِإلَ ْي َها
ُ  َونَحْ صدْ َحي،سري َع ال ُّن ُم ِو
ُ ع َحي
َْث أَقَ ْمنَا قَ ِتيل
ُ َون َْز َر
ْ َْث أ
َ ً قمنَا َن َباتا
َص ِهيل
ُ  َون َْر،َِونَ ْنفُ ُخ ِفي النَّاي ِ لَ ْونَ ال َب ِعي ِد ال َب ِعيد
ِ س ُم فَ ْوقَ تُرا
َ ب ال َم َم َّر
َض ْح قَ ِليل
ِ ض ْح لَنَا اللَّ ْي َل’ أ َ ْو
ِ َونَ ْكتُبُ أ َ ْس َما َءنَا َح َجرا ً ’أَيُّ َها ال َب ْر ُق أ َ ْو
َ َ نُ ِحبُّ ال َح َياة َ ِإذا َما ا ْست
…س ِبيل
َ ط ْعنَا ِإلَ ْي َها
And we love life whenever we can… We dance and throw up a minaret or raise palm trees for
the violets growing between two martyrs.

We love life whenever we can… We steal a thread from a silk-worm to weave a sky and a fence
for our journey.

We open the garden gate for the jasmine to walk into the street as a beautiful day.

We love life whenever we can… Wherever we settle we grow fast-growing plants, wherever we
settle we harvest a murdered man.

We blow into the flute the color of far away, of far away, we draw on the dust in the passage the
neighing of a horse… And we write our names in the form of stones.
Lightning, brighten the night for us, brighten the night a little.
We love life whenever we can. (Mahmoud Darwish)

1

Research Overview
It was July 2012 when I heard my mother’s broken voice over the phone, telling me about her
escape with my father from our house in the Yarmouk neighbourhood of Damascus. My mother,
who is in her mid-seventies, had been collecting the laundry from the balcony that morning when
the fighting approached the house and forced her and my eighty-year-old father to leave. I could
not stop my tears while listening to the details of their frantic rush from one street to another in
Yarmouk until they found a car that took them to my brother’s house in the west of Damascus.
My mother ended the phone call weeping, “The house came under fire… We had to run away …
We had to leave ... We became refugees.”

As I was born and raised in Yarmouk, where I lived among Palestinian refugees and
studied in UNRWA schools,1 I have always been surrounded by stories of war, statelessness,
displacement, and journeys, and yet also by resilience and agency. Through these stories, I learnt
that refugeehood is an emotional and political state of being as well as a label or legal status. I
was exposed constantly to the pain of loss and uprootedness in my daily interactions with my
Palestinian neighbours and friends, and with my own family.
I was reminded of my mother’s words of July 2012 and all the stories I had heard over the
years about uprootedness while I watched the faces of exhausted men, women, and children
arriving at Lesvos in overcrowded, inflatable boats. The images of these arrivals summarized the
tears and broken voices of millions of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes in
search of protection – unable to find it in their own regions. But it was one image – that of Alan
Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian boy whose body was found washed up on the Turkish coast in

1

UNRWA is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Neat East.
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September 2015, as he and his family journeyed to Greece seeking asylum - that captured the
world’s attention, if only temporarily.

Despite the tragedies of these people and their need for protection, politicians and far-right
representatives across Europe perceived the arrivals as constituting a “European crisis of
migration” that needed to be managed and controlled (BBC, 2015; European Parliament, 2017).
Some politicians referred to refugees as “others,” who threatened the political, social, and
cultural identity of Europe. These types of fear-mongers railed against the newcomers and what
they perceived as the “open door” policies implemented temporarily by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel during the summer and autumn of 2015. The British National Party, for example,
accused Chancellor Merkel of committing “a genocide against Europeans” (US News, 2015),
while British Home Secretary at the time, Theresa May announced her reluctance to assist the
refugees, whom she considered “the ones who are strong and rich enough to come to Europe”
(Spiegel Online, 2015). Certain eastern and central European governments explicitly challenged
the European Union’s (EU) relocation scheme for 160,000 refugees who were in Greece and
Italy in 2015, a project that was advocated mainly by Germany. The Slovakian prime minister,
Robert Fico, announced that his country would accept only Christian refugees (New York Times,
2015), and his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orbán, described the arrival of refugees as a
“rebellion by illegal migrants” (ibid.). The Director of National Intelligence in the United States
went so far as to term the situation in Europe “a disaster of biblical proportions” (Fox News
Politics, 2015), questioning the background of refugees arriving from Syria and Iraq and linking
them to possible future terrorist activities.

3

Informed by my personal knowledge of refugees’ experiences during war and displacement,
and inspired by stories I heard from refugees about their journeys in search of protection, in this
dissertation I challenge this negative type of official narrative and argue rather that the arrivals of
refugees along Europe’s shores, as well as of the bodies of those who did not survive the
journey, reflect in fact an underlying, structural crisis. This is a crisis of protection that is caused
by the failure of the international refugee regime to protect refugees fleeing from war in their
homelands, forcing them instead to experience sometimes extreme conditions of precarity as
they seek refuge in other destiantions.
In this dissertation, I focus on people’s own experiences and their stories, which are more
often left out of the policy-making process and largely absent from high-level reports and
discussions between government leaders, policy makers, and international organizations
responding to the crisis. I propose that it is critical to examine the crisis of protection by listening
to and understanding refugees’ stories about their own experiences of fleeing war, encountering
borders, and undertaking difficult, even tragic journeys in search of protection. By undertaking
these journeys, refugees have refused to wait passively for borders to open and third-country
resettlement to provide them with the promised protection from the international refugee system.
Instead, refugees have made myriad decisions to improve their situation, sometimes making
dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, thus engaging the world as
political subjects.
By focusing on the journeys of refugees from Syria, this dissertation examines refugees’
decisions to undertake such journeys as acts of survival and resistance, thus also resisting the
dehumanizing conditions of displacement in the neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, and

4

Turkey and choosing instead to risk their lives by undertaking life-threatening journeys towards
destinations in northern Europe, where they believe they can find protection and access to rights.
It is against the background of the failure of the international refugee regime that this dissertation
explores the journeys of these refugees so that we can grasp the untold impact the global crisis of
protection has on refugees’ lives and their future trajectories. The chapters of this dissertation
aim to uncover the actual “human cost” (Spijkerboer, 2007) of the crisis by addressing the
following questions:

-

Why is this a “crisis of protection” and not a “crisis of migration”?

-

How did this crisis develop despite the existence of the international refugee regime?

-

How does the refugee journey reflect the “human cost” of this crisis, and what are the
implications for the lives and choices of refugees? What are the conditions of the journey,
and how do refugees create their own spaces and passages, and at what cost?

To answer these questions, I address the failure of the international refugee regime and the
limitations of official policies of containment and deterrence. I illustrate how deterrence policies,
imposed by several states of the global north, do not deter refugees but rather eliminate legal
routes and safe pathways for them towards destinations such as Europe, where they may seek
access to the structures of international protection. I reflect on the way refugees challenge these
deterrence policies by deciding to leave and undertaking their escapes. In other words, I look in
detail at the global crisis of protection through the lens of the Syrian refugee crisis and the
individual experiences of refugees from Syria, including Palestinian refugees, in their search of
protection.

5

Background and Context
The War in Syria
In mid-March 2011, peaceful protests against the regime started in Syria, which escalated
within months into a devastating war. The protests were inspired by the wave of uprisings in the
Middle East that began in Tunisia in December 2010 as an expression of the frustration of
marginalized and oppressed people (Hinnebusch, 2015). Despite the differences that existed
between socio-economic policies in Syria and those of other countries in the region, such as
Tunisia and Egypt, in the early 2000s the Syrian government adopted neoliberal economic
policies. Combined with chronic institutional corruption and severe political oppression, these
policies exacerbated economic and social inequalities between Syrians. Economic development
was centralized around the urban centers of Damascus and Aleppo, with little for large rural
communities. These trends increased demographic pressures on major cities and created poverty
and marginalization in their outskirts (Azmeh, 2016). When peaceful protests started in some of
these neglected areas in March 2011, protestors demanded the overthrow of President Bashar
Alassad and his oppressive regime, which has controlled the country with an iron fist since the
early seventies, when the current president’s father, Hafez Alassad, took power. The regime
responded brutally to these protests. Government security forces attacked protesters with batons,
and later with open gunfire. Thousands were detained and tortured, and dozens were killed, on
the streets and inside the prisons, during the first few weeks of the protests (Human Rights
Watch, 2012; International Crisis, 2011).2

2

In addition to the cited resources, this section is based also on my personal observations during my time in
Damascus and during my work as a senior trade officer at the British embassy there.
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Most of the protests in Syria in the spring of 2011 started in areas with Sunni Muslim
majorities, which added a sectarian dimension to the uprising.3 Protesters initially began their
activities after Friday prayers at major mosques -- the only spaces where spontaneous public
gatherings were allowed. The regime used this sectarian element to support its accusation that
the protestors were extremists who threatened the country’s national security and the safety of
other minorities, such as Christians and Alawites. These government claims were reinforced by
slogans and statements issued by some opposition leaders inside and outside the country, which
targeted mainly Syria’s Alawites, including the president and his family. The sectarian nature of
the uprising was also exacerbated by the immediate sympathy and support the uprising received
from several regional states, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, with close links to
political Islamist groups (Hinnebusch, 2015). Many Western states announced their support for
the uprisings in Syria. Foreign diplomats in Damascus, including the French, British, and
American ambassadors, participated in public activities in support of the protesters, including
Friday demonstrations and Saturday funeral visitations (Van Dam, 2017).

The protests expanded to other Syrian cities and towns, and the regime continued to respond
brutally.4 In less than six months, peaceful protests turned into armed clashes between the Syrian
army and armed fighting groups, and the country was dragged into a destructive war (Fisk,
Cockburn, and Sengupta, 2016). Since then, Syrians have been trapped between a ruthless
regime struggling for its existence and a fragmented armed militia, controlled mainly by

3

The Assad family are Alawites, members of a sect that branched out from and broke with Shia Islam.
Due to official restrictions on media and lack of independent resources in Syria, it was difficult to document the
actual numbers of people killed and detained during the first months of the conflict. In its 2012 report on Syria,
Human Rights Watch admitted such challenges and used (unidentified) local groups’ estimates of deaths, which it
documented at 3,500 as of 15 November 2011 (https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/syria).
4
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extremists who are loyal to regional powers. This opposition force includes Islamic State fighters
(ISIS), Al Nusra Front, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and some Salafi-Jihadi militias with no clear
structure or leadership. These groups have often fought with each other as well as against the
regime. Groups such as Hezbollah, from Lebanon, which Iran supports, and the Kurdish militia,
which aims for autonomy in northeastern Syria and has U.S. backing, are also active in this
conflict. Countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates back
various armed militias in their battles against the Syrian regime, which receives support from
Iran and Russia (Perra, 2016). The United States, France, Britain, and a number of other
countries became engaged in an international coalition against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. These
interventions turned the Syrian conflict into a complex, vicious war, where multiple and
opposing agendas have made any political settlement or attempts at de-escalation unattainable to
date.

The war worsened throughout most of the country and turned major towns into rubble. Many
parts of Syria have been destroyed, and large communities still remain beyond the reach of aid
and are therefore experiencing acute shortages of basic supplies for survival, including food,
water, and medicine. Millions of Syrians have found themselves trapped and forced to live under
precarious conditions and subject to horrific atrocities, human rights violations, and severe forms
of physical, economic, and political insecurities. As of February 2016, the war had killed in
excess of half a million people, with more than 117,000 missing and believed to be either
detained or kidnapped (Human Rights Watch, 2016a).
As a result, more than 12.6 million Syrians were forcibly displaced by the end of 2017 – over
half of the country’s population, which was estimated at 22 million before the war (UNHCR,
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2018). Of this number, more than 5.6 million became refugees, seeking protection in
neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, where large
numbers have continued to struggle, often under appalling conditions, and frequently without
even the minimum standards of protection (ibid.). Because of these challenging circumstances,
many of them have considered leaving the region for other destinations, primarily in Europe, in
search of protection. In this dissertation, I examine the experiences of these refugees. I also focus
on Palestinian refugees from Syria, who are uniquely vulnerable because they are stateless and
hence excluded from the structures of international protection.
Palestinian Statelessness and Palestinian Refugees from Syria 5

About half a million Palestinian refugees who lived in Syria when the conflict started in 2011
have been affected by the conflict (UNRWA, 2016a). Thousands of them have been forced to
undertake journeys towards Europe to seek asylum and refuge, as I will discuss in this
dissertation. Their statelessness subjects them to special consideration in some European
countries, such as Sweden – for example, a shorter waiting period (four years, as opposed to the
normal five) for receiving Swedish citizenship (Swedish Migration Agency, 2018). For many
Palestinian refugees with whom I spoke, such factors influenced their choice of final destination
of their journeys. Examining the situation of Palestinian refugees from Syria also can help us
understand the situation of Syrian refugees in general, because Palestinians from Syria are
excluded from the refugee regime. During their displacement in Syria’s neighbouring countries,

5

This section is based on my article, “Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian refugees: Governing through exclusion”
published in Social and Legal Studies (2018). See Almustafa, M. (2018). Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian
refugees: Governing through exclusion. Social and Legal Studies. 27(2): 164-179.
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they are often treated differently from, or experience more precarious conditions than, Syrians.
Yet, before discussing their journeys, we should understand why the structures of the refugee
regime excluded them.

The enduring crisis of Palestinian refugeeness, which formally began with partition of their
homeland in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, exposes starkly the
limitations of the global refugee regime and its failure to resolve their statelessness. This
existential crisis illustrates the imposition of political and legal restrictions on a certain group of
non-European refugees, thereby excluding them from the international refugee regime. This
conundrum flowed directly from a refugee-resettlement program that sought to end the
displacement of refugees in Europe after the Second World War ended in 1945. It is because of
this connection that I examine how Palestinians became stateless, their exclusion from protection
available to other refugees, and the impact of this exclusion on their lives and trajectories during
the Syrian conflict.

The establishment of Israel in 1948, and the events of 1947 in Palestine, created a new wave
of statelessness, forcibly displacing more than 750,000 Palestinians. At the time, this crisis was
peripheral to the larger concern of resettling millions of European refugees. Arendt (1951: 290)
addresses the link between resettling Jewish refugees in Palestine and making Palestinians
stateless:

After the Second World War it turned out that the Jewish question, which was
considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved — namely, by means
of a colonized and then conquered territory — but this solved neither the
problem of minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other
events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a
new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the
stateless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people.
10

According to UN data, by the end of 1948, more than 726,000 Palestinians were displaced
(UN, 2016a), or approximately 70 per cent of the total population. After its official
establishment, Israel was determined to prevent them from returning to their homes and towns.
Consequently, those who refused to leave were subject to systematic and institutional policies
that aimed to erase any sense of a Palestinian nation (Piterberg, 2001). Israel has issued laws that
dispossessed Palestinians of their land6 and then institutionalized and normalized this situation
through the ideological and political foundation of a radical denial of Palestinians’ rights (Habib,
2011). This Israeli institutional rejection of their rights as a nation involved the systematic denial
of Israeli responsibility towards the creation of Palestinian statelessness (Pappé, 1998) and a
rejection of any international solutions that recognized them as refugees deserving of protection
(Pappé, 2018; Piterberg, 2001). None the less the international community has since recognized
Palestinians as deserving of humanitarian assistance.

Yet the involvement of the United Nations (UN) in the creation of Palestinian statelessness
has helped prolong this crisis. Palestinian refugees have been subject to a special relief regime
that cannot invoke refugees’ usual protection by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) – or UN Refugee Agency -- and lacks the power to repatriate them. UN
Resolution 194 (III) in 1948 called for a peaceful return of Palestinian refugees to their homes
and compensation for those who did not want to return (UN, 2016a). The resolution led to
formation of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) as the first

6

Israel implemented a set of policies and recommendations entitled Retroactive Transfer: A Scheme for the Solution
of the Arab Question in the State of Israel. These policies provided the basis for Israel’s systematic prevention
practices. Akram (2011: 3) explains: “Among the measures recommended and implemented were destruction of
Palestinian Arab population centers, settlement of Jews in Arab towns and villages, and the passage of legislation to
prevent refugee return. Israel also passed a series of laws defining Palestinians who had been forcibly removed from
their lands or had fled as ‘absentees’, and their land as ‘absentee properties’ which were then confiscated.
Subsequent Israeli legislation converted vast amounts of confiscated Palestinian properties for the exclusive benefit
of Jews, and prohibited restitution of such land to Palestinian Arabs in perpetuity.”
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step towards a separate regime of humanitarian assistance for Palestinian refugees. The United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) emerged
in December 1949 “to prevent conditions of starvation and distress … and to further conditions
of peace and stability” (UNRWA, 2016b). UNRWA was responsible for carrying out direct relief
and work programs for “Palestine refugees,” including education, health care, relief and social
services, camp infrastructure and improvement, microfinance, and emergency assistance in Gaza,
the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (UNRWA, 2016c). Thus UNRWA’s mandate was
operational and did not offer these refugees any legal status that would entitle them to
international protection (Khalil, 2009). In other words, UNWRA could offer them humanitarian
assistance but not legal protection. Its mandate was designed mainly to protect their social and
economic rights, leaving protection of their physical security, human dignity, and human rights
to the discretion of their host governments (ibid.). As a result, UNRWA became the sole
international agency responsible for assisting them, yet there was no reference to any protection
and no authority to facilitate their “right of return,” as stipulated by UN Resolution 194 (III).

The 1951 Convention for the Status of Refugees became the founding document of an
international regime for refugees but excluded Palestinians, who were subject to the mandate of
UNRWA (see article 1D of the 1951 Convention). Accordingly, Palestinians were excluded from
the mandate of the UNHCR as the main international agency responsible for coordinating the
international protection for refugees, and the main UN agency that can facilitate the solution for
their statelessness through the implementing of UN Resolution 194 (III). Stateless Palestinians,
who were not represented during the Convention’s drafting, were left with only UNRWA as the
only relief agency operating in certain areas of the region but one which also had no protection
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mandate. Their legal status therefore continues to be subject to the discretion of host states,
resulting in various forms of politicization, discrimination, and social marginalization.

Thus, the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the 1951 Convention and from the UNHCR
mandate denied them access to the international refugee regime and its promise of protection and
offered them no alternative sources of protection. The Convention’s drafters did not distinguish
between UNWRA’s relief mandate -- mainly providing material assistance -- and the UNHCR’s
mandate -- protecting the safety, security, and human rights of refugees. Furthermore, Palestinian
refugees’ exclusion from the Convention and the UNHCR’s aegis left them without any
systematic route to repatriation under UN Resolution 194 (III). This lack of international support
reinforces Israel’s persistent rejection of their “right of return” and keeps them stateless. These
factors have prevented any genuine attempt to end the statelessness and multiple displacements
that Palestinians have suffered since 1948 (Habib, 2011; Pappé, 1998; Said, 2011).7
The impact of Palestinian refugees’ exclusion has re-surfaced through their re-victimization
during the current Syrian war. Palestinian refugees from Syria have been subject to oftenunbearable displacement and may experience extreme vulnerability in the neighbouring countries
where they have sought protection (UNRWA, 2014a). Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt have all
systematically discriminated against, criminalized, and detained many of them (Human Rights
Watch, 2014, and 2015). Hundreds were detained there and, in some cases, forcibly deported to
Syrian war zones, which is a clear breach of the international principles of refugee protection
(Amnesty International, 2014a; Human Rights Watch, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2013). As a result,

7

I focus on the events of 1948 because they directly affected the current status of Palestinian refugees from Syria
whose experiences I explore.
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thousands have been forced to consider resettlement in other destinations, with many favouring
northern Europe because of special considerations (as in Sweden) as I noted earlier.

It is worth noting that on their way to destinations in the global north Palestinian refugees lose
their unique characteristics as stateless individuals and join other desperate refugees who search
for protection beyond their regions. They are perceived by the global north as a part of one
homogeneous group of illegal migrants who challenge the border regime and need to be deterred
and controlled. This is why in this dissertation, I discuss the new displacement of Palestinian
refugees from Syria in the region separately as they are subject to particular forms of
discrimination (chapter three), but I do not distinguish between them and other refugees from
Syria when I study the details of their actual journeys to Europe (chapter four).

Theoretical Approaches and Concepts
To examine the experiences of refugees from Syria as they search for protection, I employ a
multidisciplinary approach. My inspiration has come from critical social science theory and
scholarly debates in political science, sociology, and anthropology that focus on refugees and
their encounters with bordering practices and failing protection policies (Habib, 2011; Ilcan,
2013; Johnson, 2014; Khousravi, 2011; Malkki, 1996; Mountz, 2015; Rygiel, 2011; Schuster,
2011; Squire, 2011; Stierl, 2016). I review scholarly work on the global governance of migration
and the international refugee regime and on policies and practices that have normalized certain
groups of refugees’ exclusion from international protection. For example, I explore
governments’ containment and deterrence policies and analyse how these – as well as offering
humanitarian assistance to refugees -- aim to keep them far from Europe. This body of
scholarship explains the emergence of conditions that have led to a global crisis of protection
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that forces many desperate refugees to make frequently precarious journeys looking for
protection and acceptance.
Inspired by Malkki’s (1995) “ethnography of rejection,” my work brings the stories of
refugees to the fore and situates them at the center of my analyses. Malkki explains that refugees
challenge the Foucauldian “national order of things” and the “categorical order” rooted in the
contemporary power structures of the nation-state. Within such structures, refugees are perceived
as “anomalies,” “a threat to national securities,” and “an attack on the categorical order of
nations.” They are classified as “no longer, not yet,” struggling through an imposed status of
irregularity and “a systematic invisibility” (Malkki, 1995: 7). My work is also informed by
Edkins’s (2011) argument about the significance of voices. Edkins demonstrates how, in the
aftermath of the Second World War, displaced persons (‘DPs’) were treated “as bare life – life
with no political voice – lives to be saved, nothing more” (2011: 195). This order was challenged
“when people at DP camps made their voices heard” (ibid.). Building on Malkki’s and Edkins’s
theses, I argue that refugees’ stories are significant because they challenge their invisibility in
official narratives and I present their stories as alternative sources of knowledge about their own
predicaments.

In her work on borders and asylum, Heather Johnson (2014) proposes engaging with
unauthorized voices and making them heard. Inspired by her arguments, I position refugees from
Syria as the prime source of knowledge about their own journeys and about the crisis of
protection more generally. By doing so I hope to challenge policy formation based on
representations of refugees that assume their “abstract nakedness” (Malkki 1995: 12), rather than
seeing them as real people with diverse backgrounds, experiences, and aspirations. I harness
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here the principles of standpoint theory, as Sandra Harding (1993: 63) explains: “Marginal lives
ground knowledge for standpoint approaches.” Marginalized people’s experiences, she maintains
(1993: 54), offer “a source of objectivity-maximizing questions” for research and scholarship.
Harding confirms that answers for such questions exist in policies and control practices against
these people:

The activities of those at the bottom of such social hierarchies can provide
starting points for thought -- for everyone’s research and scholarship -- from
which humans’ relations with each other and the natural world can become
visible. This is because the experience and lives of marginalized peoples, as
they understand them, provide particularly significant problems to be
explained or research agendas. These experiences and lives have been
devalued or ignored as a source of objectivity-maximizing questions -- the
answers to which are not necessarily to be found in those experiences or lives
but elsewhere in the beliefs and activities of people at the center who make
policies and engage in social practices that shape marginal lives.
This explanation relates to my work, which centralizes refugees as the prime source of
knowledge about the crisis of protection, a knowledge which official narratives often ignore. By
using refugees’ own stories, I reveal how policies and practices of governing them affect their
lives and decisions. In so doing, I aim to encourage scholars, policy makers, and the public to
adopt more humane and inclusive frameworks of protection and acceptance of refugees.
Emphasizing this ‘positionality’ of refugees also challenges the dominant “methodological
Europeanism,” which places Europe at the centre of migration analysis and sees it as “the
blueprint for migration epistemology” (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013: 247). This positionality is also
informed by scholarly debates that aim to challenge and correct the state-centric perspective of
mainstream migration scholarship, which focuses on states’ perspectives on governing categories
of people, numbers, flows, and policies. I refer here to Jasmin Habib’s (2018: 187) call for
shifting our engagement with old nationalist political frameworks:
16

Given the dangers as we already know them, debates and actions about
migration should no longer be made on grounds that assume the legitimacy
of nation-state arrangements. That is, nationalist arrangements must not be
taken as the parameters for those debates. If anything new is to come in
response to the new old fascist nationalist political ecologies, it is that
the very bases on which we can meaningfully resist and engage must shift.
By using refugees’ stories, I hope also to challenge the dominant narratives about refugees,
which portray them either as victims, or as criminals, when they exert their agency through their
“unauthorized” crossing of borders. Both types of narrative serve to support containment and
deterrence policies that many states in the global north impose against refugees from the south.
By victimizing refugees, states aim to contain them in their regions and provide them with
humanitarian aid from a distance, but subject those who dare to cross borders to deterrence and
border control. Centralizing refugees’ stories as the prime source of knowledge about the journey
and the crisis of protection undermines both ‘victim’ and ‘criminal’ narratives by providing
alternative account about refugees’ experiences, decisions, and aspirations. The stories present
them as real people who act politically while they experience often extreme precarity. This
approach relies on several theoretical concepts and terms – refugees, agency, precarity, crisis,
borders, and journey -- that I now outline.
Refugees: According to the UNHCR (2017: 56), the term “refugees” refers to “individuals
recognized under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the
1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute,
individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary
protection. The refugee population also includes people in refugee-like situations.” Unlike the
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category “refugee,” “asylum seekers” refers to “individuals who have sought international
protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined” (ibid.).
In this dissertation, I choose to use the term “refugee” in a broader sense, in effect to cover
both categories. I focus on individuals’ need for protection rather than on their legal status and
therefore use “refugee” for individuals needing protection, including both asylum seekers and
officially recognized refugees. Both categories are subject to the same containment and
deterrence policies and may experience similarly precarious conditions during their journeys in
search of a protection unavailable in their home regions.

My work here draws on scholarly debates about the political implications of categorization.
For example, in their work on crises and who should ‘count,’ Allen and Anderson (2018) refer to
the impact of a politics of categorization and discuss how labels such as “migrants,” “refugees,”
and “asylum seekers” create the binary of visibility and non-visibility and are used by states as
tools to govern people’s mobility. In the same vein, I use “protection” to refer to what Hathaway
describes as “sufficient protection” -- “conditions of independence and dignity which enable
refugees themselves to decide how they wish to cope with their predicaments” (2007: 364). This
notion of protection underscores the elements of independence, dignity, and decision making that
the stories I heard have shown to be refugees’ central aspirations during their search for
protection.
Agency: As refugees’ stories show, the decision to undertake what may become dangerous
journeys requires enormous agency. These stories provide a different picture of refugees than
those from media and policy makers, which sometimes depict either victims or criminals.
Instead, their own stories tend to portray individuals hoping for better lives and therefore
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challenging conditions of war and displacement and willing to undertake journey beyond their
regions and, usually, against their will in search of rights and protection. These acts reflect a
high degree of resistance, which exemplifies refugees’ agency.
This understanding of “agency,” which is political per se, speaks to Johnson’s (2011: 29)
definition: “the capacity to be political: to contest and demand participation in the practices that
shape a life and the meaning-making discourses that shape a world.” In this sense, it means the
ability to refuse and resist. Yet, because their journeys may be precarious, severe restrictions
affect refugees’ ability to decide and act. Mainwaring (2016) examines the dynamics between
this particular notion of migrants’ and refugees’ agency and border controls. She refers to
overrepresentations of agency in the literature of migration, exemplified through complex acts in
moments of vulnerability and ambivalence. This point may illuminate refugees’ decisions and
actions during their journeys, which can often seem irrational and confused. Thus, we must not
overromanticize refugees’ agency and need to separate it from the notions of free choice and
intentionality. This is crucial because of the political implications of representing refugees as
political figures with a high degree of agency.

This approach may provoke hostile responses against refugees by the receiving states, which
may treat them as undeserving of protection. This reaction may be a volte-face from policy
discourses that victimize refugees and render them powerless, unable to decide or act, who
ideally remain in their regions, subject to humanitarian aid. Those refugees who challenge border
controls and search for protection and better lives elsewhere, perhaps in Europe, then become
“illegal migrants” to criminalize and deter. Scheel and Squire (2014) discuss the problematic
representation in policy discourse of forced migrants as “illegal,” which may lead to their
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criminalization and deterrence when they act. Additionally, overemphasizing refugees’ agency
often undermines their often-precarious conditions and the emotional toll of the journeys and the
heavy load of scars many carry even after resettlement. Vicky Squire (2017) presents a
framework of “acts, interventions, effects” in her work on unauthorized journeys, avoiding the
notion of intentionality and addressing instead the political actions of creating new and
unexpected spaces.

Precarity: As I noted above, while it is vital to examine the agency of refugees during their
search for protection, we must also acknowledge the precarious conditions under which they may
live and seek to exert their agency. The literature traditionally used the term “precarity” to refer
to labour insecurity and the socioeconomic status that results from insecurity and unpredictability
in the workplace (Papadopoulos, 2016; Paret and Gleeson, 2016; Wall, Campbell, and Janbek,
2015). More recently scholarly usage has expanded to cover other vulnerabilities in the lives of
marginalized groups. For Banki (2013), as an example, exploitation related to the lack of
security, and for Butler (2009: 25), “the politically induced condition in which certain
populations suffer from failing social and economic networks … becoming differentially
exposed to injury, violence, and death.” Scholars have also used it to refer to extreme “social
vulnerability” during war, as with Khosravi (2017: 5) on life in Iran, where he sees it as “a
broad range of social vulnerabilities that Iranians are struggling with: from insecure work
conditions and physical insecurity to hopelessness, purposelessness, alienation, and
disconnectedness from a sense of social community.”

This notion of precarity describes a state of social and political marginalization and refers to
the uncertainty and unpredictability that may affect people during wartime. It effectively
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characterizes the insecurity, uncertainty, and unpredictability that continue to urge people from
Syria to flee the war -- the emotional, socio-economic, and political insecurities of war. It
involves the risk of losing property, jobs, and loved ones, even one’s own life. Displacement in
neighbouring countries brings other forms of marginalization and social exclusion. In this sense,
precarity stands for an everyday, existential state of vulnerability and temporariness with little or
no access to social rights of protection, education, health care, and employment. Such
circumstances may engender pervasive uncertainty and unpredictability. For example, Baban,
Ilcan, and Rygiel (2016: 5) examine the precarious legal status of Syrian refugees in Turkey and
illustrate how it can affect various aspects of their lives. They refer to precarity as:

involving a lack of security and instability in how people experience their
lives in diverse fields, such as citizenship, employment, housing, education,
health, mobility, social protection, and social rights …, and in how such
experience can marginalize or displace them or unite them for collective
action.
This notion of precarity helps explain the acute helplessness some people experience in wartime
Syria and during displacement in the region, with few choices and little ability to act.
Crisis: Some European governments have spoken of “crisis” -- chaos or disorder – vis-à-vis
the unauthorized arrival of large numbers of refugees. Critical migration scholars have
challenged this usage by addressing its imbedded elements of governance and control (De
Genova, 2016; De Genova and Tazzioli, 2015). Writing about the “crisis” in Europe, De Genova
and Tazzioli (2015) find the term implies “emergency politics” and “control”: “What is
commonly called the ‘migration crisis’ or, the ‘refugee crisis,’ actually reflects the frantic
attempt by the EU and European nation-states to control, contain, and govern people’s
(‘unauthorized’) transnational and inter-continental movement” (2015: 20).
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I apply the term to the human suffering of many refugees and the conditions that have forced
many of them into illegality and vulnerability in search of protection. I thus reframe the “crisis
of migration” in Europe as a “crisis of protection” rooted in the intrinsic paradoxes of the
international refugee regime, which fails to protect refugees from the global south. I argue that
the crisis exists in the global south, where millions of refugees are governed through deprivation
as they are contained with insufficient protection and no access to their rights as refugees or as
persons. They are subject to what Liz Feket (2009: 29) describes as “a system of warehousing
the displaced in large camps in their region of origin until a conflict has been resolved to the
satisfaction of western powers.”

Within such conditions, refugees who seek their rights, in effect, must leave their regions for
the global north. But, since that route is blocked, they see no safe or legal pathways to their
intended destinations. To avoid confrontations with control, many risk their lives through oftenprecarious journeys that may sometimes end in death at the global frontiers. While Europe is the
focus of this dissertation, the crisis occurs elsewhere and is visible most acutely in the bodies of
those who have not survived the journey across borders, for example, between the United States
and Mexico or in the sinking of boats between Indonesia and Australia. In Europe, however, the
crisis can be traced through the thousands of bodies of victims of perilous journeys across the
Mediterranean and Aegean Seas and washed up along the shores of Turkey, Greece, and Italy or
inside sunken boats near Lampedusa.

This crisis continues even for many survivors, transformed into illegal migrants who
challenge the structures of control presented by borders and yet need to be ‘securitized.’ Many
experience illegality and rejection at the borders and also on arrival at their final destinations due
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to the shrinking asylum spaces and states’ reluctance to honour their international commitments
to protect refugees. It is because of such suffering and tragedies that I reframe this refugee crisis
as a crisis of protection instead.

Borders: During their search for protection, refugees may cross multiple borders and be
subject to various forms of border practices. In this sense, borders represent sites where the crisis
of protection is manifest through deterrence and illegalization. Refugees’ stories show how their
interactions with borders affect their decisions about their routes, means of transport, even final
destinations. This study, informed by refugees’ experiences, treats borders not as static, territorial
demarcations, but as excluding and including practices and performances that also produce
reactions and resistance. In other words, borders are not merely sites of inclusion and exclusion
but are rather spaces of life, resistance, and political actions. In this sense, borders embody
“complex social relations” or “complex social institutions, which are marked by tensions
between the practices of border reinforcement and border crossing” (Mezzadra, 2015: 9). The
dynamics of borders and border crossing are relevant to refugees’ experiences during their
journeys. It is borders and their encounters with border control that may turn refugees into
“illegal” figures that are deterred and criminalized. Loyd and Mountz (2014: 23) understand
borders as “paradigmatic symbols and material manifestations of the efforts of nation-states to
regulate and deter irregular migrants and asylum seekers.” Processes of border enforcement often
criminalize and dehumanize refugees, make them more vulnerable, and exclude them from and
deny them their basic human rights of access to food, water, and free mobility. Their stories
show that they often resist such conditions and exert high degrees of agency and resilience. This
is also true for refugees in the Occupied Territories, as Habib shows in her studies of Palestinian
communities in Israel/Palestine (2007, 2011).
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This reconceptualization of borders acknowledges refugees’ engagement in new forms of
political power “that cross the walls of borders and detention centers consistently [and] expose
the limits of state sovereignty” (Loyd and Mountz, 2014: 37). In this sense, refugees become
political (Johnson, 2013) through actions such as hunger strikes, burning tents inside detention
centers, and protesting in front of media cameras at closed borders, as I show in the coming
chapters. Such political acts transform borders and camps into “sites of intervention” (Johnson,
2014: 15) and spaces of “contested politics of mobility” (Squire, 2011), where politics emerges
as controlling structures that engage with vulnerable individuals, who continue to claim
substantial agency while searching for protection.

Journey: It is through these interwoven notions of agency, precarity, and (reconceptualised)
borders that I study the actual details of refugees’ journeys as a reflection of the global crisis of
protection. By positioning refugees as the prime source of knowledge, I explore their suffering as
they search for protection, and, in doing so, I aim to contribute to migration and refugee studies
by bringing into the scholarship knowledge about refugees’ daily experiences during their
journeys. This is invaluable because accounts of the journeys provide first-hand knowledge that
demonstrates how bordering practices can produce illegality and make refugees more vulnerable
in their search for protection. Situating refugees at the centre of analysis reveals the impact of
policies aiming to govern their movement and showcases the inadequacy of protection over their
lives and identities. By focusing on refugees and their perceptions of border control and
protection, my work aims to challenge the dominant state-centric narrative in mainstream
migration studies and to contribute to the developing literature on refugees as real people.
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Despite the recent and growing body of scholarship on refugee journeys (Briden and
Mainwaring, 2016; Crawley et al., 2018; Gill, Caletrioa, and Mason, 2011; Hassan and
Biorklund, 2016; Kaytaz, 2016; Khousravi, 2011; Squire et al., 2017), migration and refugee
studies still do not cover them adequately. Scholars tend to concentrate on the causes and
consequences of refugee movement rather than on the process in between, which is the journey,
and on refugees’ experiences in the process. This neglect short-changes our understanding of the
emotional and transformative processes of the journey and hides the real “human cost” of the
crisis of protection. Refugees’ journeys change their lives, reflect the crisis of protection, and
influence refugees’ lives in their new destinations – all dimensions to explore.
To address this lacuna, I examine the journey through refugees’ stories and their own words. I
take the discussion deeper to reflect on the emotional toll of the journey, where detention spaces,
smuggling practices, borders, and fences travel with refugees, occupy their memories, and
transform their identities. Thus, I develop a conceptual framework that examines three
significant and yet underappreciated aspects of this complex and transformative experience,
addressing the “refugee journey” as:

1) an act of resistance and survival that demonstrates the vulnerability, but also the agency, of
refugees on the move
2) a messy, complex, and non-linear passage that encompasses extreme elements of precarity
3) an emotional and transformative process that can reshape refugees’ positionality and
identities
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Methodology
My research uses several methods deriving principally from ethnographic work and builds on
the stories of refugees who have made the journey from Syria to Sweden. It also includes site
visits and observations, policy critique, and a literature review of scholarly debates and literature
on the global governance of migration and the international refugee regime using critical
migration and refugee studies scholarship, as I noted earlier.
My policy critique is informed by types of ‘grey’ literature that are “produced on all levels of
government, academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not
controlled by commercial publishers" (New York Academy of Medicine, 2016). For this
dissertation, I examine policy documents, government reports, and related publications by
international organizations (e.g., IOM, OCHA, UNHCR, and UNRWA), human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Watch the Med, and
reports from various regional and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active
in refugee assistance and humanitarian activities.

By examining such policy documents critically, I uncover the political rationalities and the
emergence of the crisis of protection through the lens of the Syrian crisis of refugees. This
literature assists me in grasping some of the circumstances surrounding refugees’ decisions to
leave and to journey towards Europe. For example, I have analysed the international and national
responses to the Syrian refugee crisis through UNHCR reports, including its regional plans for
resettling Syrian refugees and providing them with humanitarian relief since 2011. The
documents examine states’ responses to the UNHCR’s multiple pledges for resettlement and
illustrate the funding gap in humanitarian allocations received from states in response to the
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Syrian refugee crisis. The reports have also shown me how protection policies have shifted to
containing and immobilizing refugees. For example, I have analysed border control practices by
regional and other states in reaction to the Syrian conflict since March 2011 and demonstrated
how they are designed to contain refugees and have thus rendered them more precarious and
vulnerable.

Ethnographic Methodology

My research also benefited from my position as a research assistant for a project funded by
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (of Canada) (SSHRC) on Syrian refugees
in Turkey. In the summer of 2015, I travelled to Turkey and conducted interviews with some
Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Kilis for the project. The visit enabled
me to observe the actual conditions of displacement of these refugees, which drove many of them
to push on towards Europe. My work for the project also included conducting interviews with
three refugees from Syria who travelled through Turkey. Two of these individuals (Khaled and
Ammar), whom I interviewed via Skype, ended up in Germany after travelling through the
Balkans in the summer of 2015. I interviewed the third person (Arad) in Kitchener, Ontario, in
Canada, while he and his family were being officially resettled as government-assisted refugees
after a journey of displacement in Turkey.8

8

The SSHRC-funded project, “Humanitarian Aid, Citizenship Politics, and the Governance of Syrian Refugees in
Turkey,” involves the following faculty members: Dr. Feyzi Baban, associate professor at Trent University, Dr.
Suzan Ilcan, professor at the University of Waterloo, and Dr. Kim Rygiel, associate professor at Wilfrid Laurier
University. The stories of these three journeys appear in “Resisting Precarity and Precarious Resistances: Claiming
Rights to Belong, Stay, and Leave,” which I co-wrote for The Precarious Lives of Syrians: Living under Temporary
Protection in Turkey (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, under review).
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Rather than using refugees’ stories as one of several qualitative research methods to collect
data on refugees’ experiences, I position these stories as the main source of knowledge about
refugees’ journeys and the crisis of protection. In learning from, and basing my work on, their
own stories, my methodology is inspired by narrative inquiry principles in documenting and
further analyzing the actual experiences of the journey. Calddinin and Rosiek (2007: 50) argue
that narrative inquiry “values the stories of people as the ultimate insight as to how people live in
the world.” It is a mode of knowledge that helps us understand not only the stories but also how
and why participants construct them according to their status or identity (Gubrium and Holstein,
2009). It is “the study of experience as story, [and] first and foremost a way of thinking about
experience. Narrative inquiry as a methodology entails a view of the phenomenon. To use
narrative inquiry methodology is to adopt a particular narrative view of experience as phenomena
under study” (Connelly and Clandinin, 2006: 477). I use the terms “narrative” and “story”
interchangeably in this dissertation, applying “narrative” generally to a structural and technical
form of speaking about refugees’ experiences, and “story” more casually and individually.

In my research, I follow an ethnographic method with a participant observation approach that
is mainly informed by stories of refugees from Syria when they encounter bordering practices and
failing protection structures. Alpa Shah (2017: 51) captures the essence of this approach:
“Participant observation centers a long-term intimate engagement with a group of people that
were once strangers to us in order to know and experience the world through their perspectives
and actions in as holistic a way as possible.” My research expands from open-ended qualitative
interviews to an ethnographic study that builds initially on my personal knowledge as a member
of the community and engages intimately with its experiences and actions. I lived in this
community for most of my life and was separated from it only because of the war in 2011.
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Julie Peteet (2005: X) writes about the anthropologist’s role when studying people, such as
refugees, in emergency situations: “Our task is also to analyze not just how violence and suffering
of refugees are enacted, experienced, narrated, and coped with, but also the historicity and the
structural conditions, local, regional, and global, that underpin their displacement.” She claims
that anthropologists should “humanize those otherwise marginalized and demonized” and address
their agency. “Working with populations at risk or in a state of emergency heightens the
anthropological imperative to forge beyond the constitution of the refugee by a traumatic history
to explore refugee agency” (ibid.). This understanding of the anthropologist’s role speaks to my
work as I examine how refugees exert their agency when navigating war, displacement, and oftenprecarious journeys in search of protection. My work also addresses the failure of the
international refugee regime to protect refugees from Syria; the effect of containment and
deterrence on their lives, their decisions about travel, and their choices of means and routes; and
the way in which such policies transform them into illegal subjects, even criminals.

My work finds inspiration as well in the methods of autoethnography, where Elizabeth
Dauphinee (2010) calls for a new way to produce knowledge via unheard, unathorized voices:
“An academic voice that allows for certain elements of autoethnography has the potential to recentre our attention on the individual lives and deaths of people whose names we would otherwise
not know” (2010: 806). I bring my personal insights on the refugees’ journey, much like those in
Khosravi’s (2011) Illegal Traveler -- “an ethnography of borders.” This scholar examines the
politics of borders and the human experiences of them through his own journey and those of
other “undocumanted,” “illegal” travellers. For Khosravi, “auto-ethnography links the world of
the author with the world of others. It bridges the gap between the anthropologist’s reality and the
reality of others” (2011: 5). I bring to my research my insights and experiences of exile and
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reconceptualization of home and identity. My understanding of identity owes much to Arturo
Escobar’s (2008: 203) representation of identity as a dynamic and fluid concept:

Identities are constructed through everyday practices at many levels. From
the realm of daily tasks and activities, which create micro worlds, to the
construction of more stable, albeit always changing, figured worlds, identity
construction operates through an active engagement with the world. There is
a constant tracking between identity, local contentious practices, and
historical struggles that confer upon identity construction a dynamic
character.
I reflect particularly on my own journey and experience as a mother of two stateless
Palestinian children and as a migrant to Canada, who then became a refugee from Syria and a
citizen of Canada, both at the same time. In June 2011, I arrived in Canada as a Syrian migrant,
married to a stateless Palestinian refugee, along with our two children. During my exile, I
experienced the pain of loss and uprootedness, when returning home became impossible because
of the war in Syria. I have often felt as if I were a refugee while I was struggling through my new
life in Canada. Despite my new citizenship, I have often experienced “homelessness,” where
“achievements … are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever”
(Said, 2000: 173) -- my house and my lifelong community. My house in Yarmouk was first looted
by army soldiers and was later turned into a base for the opposition militia. When the Syrian army
launched its military operation in Yarmouk in April 2018, I lost my house and my belongings as
most of the district turned into rubble.

During the same period, I maintained close connections with my extended family, friends,
neighbours, and community members who experienced similar forms of pain. To do so, I used
phone calls and social media, including facebook, Messenger, Skype, and Whats App. I stayed in
close contact with hundreds of friends and acquaintances from Yarmouk who were forced to
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depart in 2012 and ended up journeying to various destinations in search of protection. My
personal experience and the extensive knowledge from these links facilitate an ethnographic
approach which provides an important body of scholarship that is missing in refugee studies. By
reflecting on my own journeys and the knowledge I gained in seeking protection for my family
and me, I am able to position myself in a more connected fashion to those I interviewed than are
many researchers.

Research in Sweden

I conducted my interviews in Sweden during the summer of 2016. I visited the country three
times; in June, July, and August 2016 where I conducted 45 interviews with 60 Syrians and
Palestinians who made the journey from Syria to Sweden between 2012 and early 2016. My
interviews took place in Hässleholm, Laxå, Malmö, Stockholm, and Uppsala. Most of these (40)
were individual interviews but five interviews consisted of more than one individual, two of
which were with husband and wife couples and three with larger families with five people
including children who came in and out of the room and while not directly interviewed, at times
interjected their thoughts as well.

I used an open-ended interview technique with opening lead questions about the journey and
the experiences of escape, displacement, and the actual journey to Sweden; What was the
situation in your area in Syria? How was your life in Lebanon (Egypt, Jordan, or Turkey)? Why
did you travel through Egypt (Turkey or Libya)? Can you tell me about the conditions of the
actual journey? The questions offered my interviewees the freedom and the authority to tell their
stories in their own way. They were able to choose their moments of departure, discuss their
decision-making process, and provide details about their negotiations and encounters with various
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actors during their journey including their family and community members, smugglers, border
controls, and other refugees.

It is worth noting that the Appendix includes 20 interviews which are featured as the principal
stories in this dissertation. The stories are featured because they are stories that contain the most
complexity. They are also chosen because they are representative for capturing stories common to
most people with whom I spoke. In making decisions about which stories to share, I have selected
those that I believe to be most representative of many others’ experiences I heard about regarding
the journey from Syria to Sweden. These stories demonstrate the messy, unpredictable, and oftendisastrous nature of refugees’ journeys while also exposing their commonalities.

I benefited from my extensive personal network within the Palestinian and Syrian communities
in Sweden. I was able to interview people from my community in addition to other individuals
and families to whom relatives and friends introduced me. That is, I was able to apply a snowball
method, as some families willingly invited their friends to their houses for them to meet with me
and to share the details of their journeys as well.

Politically, Sweden presents a powerful example of shrinking asylum spaces in the global
north as well as the wide gap between the numbers of resettled refugees and in-country grants of
asylum, all while the state shifted protection from permanent to temporary. Sweden is also an
interesting case because of the special consideration (noted above) it offers to Palestinian refugees
from Syria because of their statelessness. Additionally, Sweden was the first European country to
grant asylum and permanent residence to Syrian refugees. In September 2013, Swedish Migration
Minister Tobias Billstroem called on European countries to assist Syrian refugees. Then
Swedish Migration Agency spokeswoman Annie Hoernblad declared: “All Syrian asylum
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seekers who apply for asylum in Sweden will get it” (DW, 2013; SBS, 2013). She explained that
the “vast majority of Syrian nationals, who today have provisional status, would apply for
permanent status” (ibid.). “No other conflict on earth today,” she added, “is as terrible as the
long and bloody conflict in Syria. That should make many politicians, inside and outside the
EU, think about our responsibilities” (ibid.).

Word of these developments reached desperate refugees trapped in either the war in Syria or
in displacement in neighbouring countries. Many perceived them as an open-door invitation to
Sweden. Although the Swedish and other European governments did not facilitate their
movement, some refugees decided to risk their lives to reach Sweden for asylum and permanent
residency.

The minister was also addressing his fellow Swedes perhaps more than people in distant
Syria. Paulin de los Reyes from Stockholm University observed:

He [the minister] was talking to the people in Sweden, making them think
that they have humanitarian government; we are a humanitarian country; we
show solidarity. But in his imagination, the “others” are so other and this
speech is not dedicated to those people, because those people are so different
that in his imagination they will not react … they are not his target. (De los
Reyes, 2016)
In 2015, Sweden received approximately 160,000 asylum seekers, a third of them from Syria,
and accepted between 90 and 100 per cent of them (AIDA, 2016). With a total population of 9.6
million, Sweden took in more asylum seekers per capita than any other European state (ibid.).
During the same period, Sweden undertook to resettle 2,700 Syrians per year (up from 1,900) in
response to the UNHCR’s calls for resettlement and humanitarian admission of Syrian refugees
(European Resettlement Network, 2016). During the same period of 2015, some 50,000 people
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from Syria entered the country “illegally” as asylum seekers. Nevertheless, Sweden was the first
European state to grant Syrians permanent protection (AIDA, 2013), thereby entitling them to
permanent residency as well as residency permits for immediate family members. However, as of
November 2015, the government tightened its regulations for protection and recognition of
asylum applications in favour of EU minimum standards of protection, as set out in the EU
Temporary Protection Directive of 2001 (Orchard and Miller, 2014). That document defines
temporary protection as:

a procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx
or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are
unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary
protection to such persons, in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum
system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its
efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons
requesting protection. (EC, 2017)
These new measures aimed to deter asylum seekers from choosing Sweden as their final
destination, as Prime Minister Stefan Löfven made clear: “We are adapting Swedish legislation
temporarily so that more people choose to seek asylum in other countries ... We need respite”
(The Guardian, 2015b). As a result, a new Swedish Aliens Act (20 July 2016) stated that
individuals granted asylum will receive temporary residency, varying with their status. Persons
with refugee status will receive a residency of three years, and those with subsidiary protection,
thirteen months. The law also limits family reunification to refugees or people given subsidiary
protection before 24 November 2015. Later recipients may apply for family reunification if the
case is exceptional (Swedish Migration Agency, 2016). The new law was a response to far-right
demands and was criticized by various civil society organizations for undermining the rights of
asylum seekers. The law seemed to hinder the integration of refugees and asylum seekers, as it
targeted mainly the right of refugees to be joined by their family members (Folkkampnj for
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Asyllratt, 2016). Further, the changes in protection standards were to be accompanied by
deportation of larger numbers of rejected asylum seekers – some 80,000, the state announced in
January 2016 (The Guardian, 2016) -- while it offered other asylum seekers cash payments to
return voluntarily to their countries (The Independent, 2016).

Ethical Sensitivities and Reflections

In order to be ethically sensitive when conducting my research, I avoided interviewing
refugees still on the move, due to their extreme vulnerabilities and hardships. I decided instead to
interview refugees who had reached Sweden and achieved a sense of safety and a degree of
settlement. I conducted my interviews in the summer of 2016, and all my interviewees had arrived
in Sweden between 2012 and early 2016. Many were already permanent residents, while some
were still waiting for the results of their asylum applications.

I also explained to my interviewees that their participation in my research was voluntary and
that they could withdraw from the research at any time prior to, during, or after the interview. I
offered to stop the interviews at any moment if they felt uncomfortable. Although recalling the
details of their journeys and previous experiences of displacement and wartime caused some of
them to feel vulnerable and emotional, none of them asked me to stop the interview or asked to
withdraw from the research. On the contrary, I was amazed by their willingness to talk about their
experiences and to share the details of their journeys. There were occasions where families
gathered to tell me their stories. This was particularly the case in Hässleholm (near Malmö) and in
Laxå (near Örebro) -- two small towns that host some families from Syria. I felt that people
wanted their stories about the journey to be heard and understood. They appreciated the fact that
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someone from their own community was doing this research and trying to present them as real
individuals with aspirations for better lives.

Most of my interviews took between three and four hours, but some more than six. Some
lasted longer than six hours, and a number of people were willing to meet with me more than once
to continue sharing their stories. As I mentioned above, most of the interviews took place at
interviewees’ houses, where I was able to meet and interact with many family members at the
same time. Even though I did not intend to interview children (and never interviewed them
directly) because they are especially vulnerable, some joined the storytelling after their parents
invited them to participate and told their part or shared their insights about certain stages of the
journey.

Some men preferred to talk to me individually and shared tense, emotional moments of their
journeys with me, including stories about detention, humiliating experiences, torture, pain of
separation, and loss of loved ones. Many wept as they recalled these moments, and some admitted
to me that they had never before shared these feelings, even with their partners. Refugees
normally do not speak about such sentiments with foreign researchers, but they chose to do so
with me probably because I am a Syrian researcher married to a Palestinian refugee, have
undertaken such a journey, and have been through similar experiences. Most of my interviewees
treated me as an insider, in ethnic terms, and also as a person who could feel their pain and who
shared the same sentiments of loss and helplessness, but also determination and hope. My unique
situation facilitated my access to the interviewees and created a friendly research environment
(Morosanu, 2015). This positionality also allowed me to overcome various ethical challenges

36

often facing this type of ethnographic research, including power dynamics vis-à-vis interviewees,
trust building, and cultural sensitivity (Johnson, 2011; Puvimanasinghe et al., 2014).

My fluency in Arabic permitted me to conduct all the interviews in Arabic without the need for
interpretation, which reduced one type of cultural barrier frequent in such research and enhanced
mutual trust. I was able to audio-record my interviews after first obtaining interviewees’
permission.

I transcribed their interviews verbatim and used pseudonyms throughout my work to protect
their identity and confidentiality. I then analysed the narratives thematically, identifying
differences and commonalities with regard to wartime experiences and displacement in the
region, which I discuss below in chapter three. I also identified details about chosen routes and
encounters with smugglers and bordering practices during the actual journeys – see chapter four. I
focused on indications of particular sentiments during the journey – elements that affected
refugees’ emotional and physical conditions while on the move and after arrival at their
destinations. I was also able to identify expressions and indications that reflected the
transformation of refugees’ roles, positionality, and identity. I discuss these emotional and
transformative elements of the journey in chapter five.
In fact, due to the messy and complex nature of refugees’ journeys, I faced difficulties in
defining certain moments of departures and arrivals. It was also a challenge trying to study the
journeys through a chronological framework (departure, actual movement, arrival). Most of the
journeys developed as a series of departures and included several loops of mobility and
immobility. Thus, in chapter four, on the conditions of the journey towards Europe, I followed the
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storylines of refugees’ journeys and held my reflections until chapter’s end. I thereby avoided
breaking the flow of the stories and allowed refugees’ voices a central place in my analysis.

My position as a researcher did not save me from emotional stress during and after my
interviews and also when I revisited those stories as I transcribed and analyzed them. I was
subject to various emotional moments during my research, as I shared similar feelings of pain,
loss, and grievance that most of my interviewees experienced. This was exacerbated by my
position as an insider and was particularly intense when I interviewed members of my own
family, who told me about moments of fear, humiliation, and pain during their journeys. It was
also emotionally challenging for me whenever I involved my own experience and personal
insights. However, despite the emotional toll of taking an autoethnographic approach, rather than
reflecting on these experiences from the outside looking in, such moments allowed me to engage
deeply with all of the individuals whom I met and with the stories they told.

Overview of Chapters
Chapter One – The Global Crisis of Protection and the International Refugee Regime: In
this chapter I challenge the dominant narrative that frames the “unauthorized” arrival of one
million refugees on the shores of Europe in 2015 as a “crisis of migration.” I propose rather that
the arrivals reflect a global crisis of protection, which emerged as a result to bordering practices
and policies that restrict protection for refugees from the global south in order to protect the order
of the global north. I further address the global conditions of mistrust and rejection that govern
and control refugees. I show how refugees from the South may be victimized, represented as
nameless and powerless masses of people, who suffer in their distant camps, yet are often
demonized with their arrival in the global north.
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To capture the nuance of this crisis of protection within the international refugee regime, I
discuss the regime’s intrinsic paradoxes and focus on its state- and Euro-centric orientations to
show how it was established mainly to deal with post-1945 refugees in Europe while protecting
the international state system. I examine the performance of the regime’s normative principles
under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol and the regime’s institutional structures,
especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

I show that the practices and strategies against refugees from the global south do not deter
them from arriving in the global north in search of protection. Rather they increase the “human
cost” of the journey by reducing legal and safe routes and rendering refugees illegal and
precarious.
Chapter Two – Conceptualizing the Refugee Journey: This chapter examines the concept
of the refugee journey as a reflection of the crisis of protection and a result of containment and
deterrence practices of governments in the global north vis-à-vis refugees from the global south. I
discuss refugee journeys as part of the “human cost” of the crisis of protection, where refugees
may experience illegality as cogs in a global system of border controls, based largely on policies
designed to immobilize them. This process may transform individuals from refugees who deserve
protection into “irregular migrants,” who may be criminalized for challenging borders and border
controls. By reviewing critical migration and refugee studies scholarship, and learning from
refugees’ personal stories, I develop a conceptual framework of the journey as an act of survival
and resistance that can become messy, complex, and very precarious and transforms refugees’
roles, positionalities, and identities. I discuss these three significant, yet underappreciated,
elements of the journey in the following chapters.
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Chapter Three -- Stories of Escape and Survival: Refugees’ stories of escape and
displacement relate to the first aspect of the journey, which I depict as an act of survival and
resistance. I examine their experiences of insecurity and fear during wartime and their subsequent
displacement, where they are often subject to social marginalization and exclusion, with limited
access to rights. I show how many refugees, who may be socially marginalized, have no other
choice than to continue to other destinations in Europe in the hopes of finding protection and
acceptance.
Drawing on refugees’ stories of escape from the homeland, I discuss insecurity, fear of
detention or conscription, and loss of income as the main reasons for their fleeing their homes to
seek safety in neighbouring countries. Refugees’ stories of displacement in Lebanon, Jordan, and
Turkey provide a comparative perspective of their social marginalization and limited access to
rights in these countries. I examine the case of Palestinian refugees from Syria whose
statelessness traps them in particular peril and exclusion.

Chapter Four -- The Non-linear, Messy, Complex Journey to Europe: In this chapter, I
investigate the conditions of the actual journey towards Europe. I discuss the unpredictability and
messiness of refugees’ journeys as they experience various forms of violence and precarity.
These elements present the second aspect of my conceptual framework of the refugee journey as
it develops through multiple loops of non-linear movements that are often chaotic and
unexpected. I show how refugees may exercise high degrees of agency, which comes at a high
price because their journeys are so precarious. Through my discussion I aim to answer the
following questions: a) How did refugees from Syria decide who should go and who should
stay? b) How did they choose certain routes and pathways? c) How did they travel from Syria?
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What types of transportation did they use? And how did they negotiate border crossings with a
variety of border actors such as smugglers, coast guards, and other actors while on the move?

Chapter Five -- The Emotional Toll of Refugee Journey: In this chapter, I take the
discussion to another level and focus on the journey’s emotional toll and its transformative impact
on refugees’ roles, positionalities, and identities. I argue that many refugees who survive the
precarious journey arrive at their new localities with a heavy burden of scars and painful, even
tragic memories that affect their perceptions of themselves, their family, and their lives. The
transformations they undergo en route affect their ability to integrate within their new ‘homes.’
Here I also look at mothers and their intense emotional experiences. I explore the transformation
of refugee identities through the experiences of Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk in Syria, who,
as we saw above, relive the trauma of their statelessness through their new displacement from
Syria. Their journeys in search of protection result in penetrating cases of identity affirmation as
refugees with multiple losses.

Conclusion: In the conclusion, I review recent developments in the crisis of protection. While
the world’s attention shifts away from refugees’ predicament, we witness individuals facing everharsher deterrence that increases their exposure to inhumane conditions at border crossings. I
propose that these conditions necessitate our focusing on refugees’ stories and knowledge about
the crisis and the journey. It is by examining their words and their real-world experiences that we
can help create a more inclusive and humane protection framework. Building on this argument, I
discuss future research that will expand on ideas developed in this dissertation to examine
unanswered questions about refugees’ experiences and perspectives in their new localities.
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Featuring
Ammar: A Syrian tourist guide from Damascus. He escaped to Lebanon in 2013 after multiple
detentions. He travelled to Thailand and then to Turkey, where he crossed to Greece and
travelled through the Balkan route to Germany in the summer of 2015. He lives in Hanover,
Germany.
Arad: A Syrian Kurdish man from Aleppo. He left Aleppo in 2012 with his wife and two sons.
They lived in Istanbul, Turkey until they were resettled as a government-assisted refugee in
Canada in 2014. They live in Kitchener, ON, Canada.
Fares: A textile merchant from Hama. He was detained in 2012 and then travelled to Egypt with
his wife and two-year-old son. He then moved to Libya and lived there until 2014. He and his
family undertook a journey from Libya to Sweden through the Libyan route. He lives in
Stockholm, Sweden.
Hania: A Palestinian mother who travelled from Damascus with her six children to join her
husband in Sweden. She travelled through the Balkan route in 2015. She lives in Laxå, Sweden.
Issam and Qamar: A Palestinian couple who travelled with their five children from Damascus
to Egypt and undertook a journey to Sweden through the Egyptian route in 2013. They live in
Stockholm, Sweden.
Karam and Jenna: A Palestinian couple from Homs. They travelled with their three children
from Homs to Turkey and crossed to Greece in 2014. They had to send two of their children with
smugglers to Italy on their way to Sweden. They live in Hässleholm, Sweden.
Khaled: A Palestinian refugee from Daraa, Syria. He departed Syria in 2012 and lived in
Amman, Jordan for two years. He left his wife and two sons in Amman and travelled back to
Syria, crossed to Turkey, and undertook a journey with his sister and her family through the
Balkan route in the summer of 2015. He lives in Berlin, Germany.
Mahmoud: A Palestinian refugee from Homs. He travelled with his two sons to Sweden through
the Egyptian route in 2014. His oldest son had to stay in Germany and Mahmoud, and the rest of
his family live in Hässleholm, Sweden.
Rahma: A Palestinian mother from Homs. In 2015, she travelled with her three-year-old son to
Turkey to join her family in Sweden. She lost her son during the crossing to Greece. She lives in
Hässleholm, Sweden.
Rana: A Palestinian mother from Yarmouk near Damascus. She travelled with her husband and
two sons to Irbil, North Iraq and then undertook a journey with one son and her mother to
Turkey and crossed to Greece in 2014. She had to send her son with smugglers to Copenhagen,
Denmark. She had several failed attempts at Athens airports before her departure to Sweden. She
lives with her son in Katrineholm, Sweden.
Rasha: A Syrian widow from Damascus. She undertook a journey with her three children to
Sweden in 2015 through the Balkan route. She lives in Laxå, Sweden.
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Rawan: a Palestinian refugee from Syria. He used to work as an engineer with the largest
petroleum company in Syria. Rawan crossed into Turkey, found a way to travel to Malaysia in
order to be smuggled into Germany from where he was finally able to continue his journey to
Sweden. He lives in Uppsala, Sweden.
Safieh: A Palestinian refugee from Yarmouk. She and her husband undertook a journey through
Turkey to Greece where they flow to Oslo, Norway. They live in Ramnes, Norway.
Salam: A Syrian teacher from Lattakia. He travelled to Turkey in 2013. He crossed to Greece
and flew to Sweden from Athens airport in 2016. He lives in Avesta, Sweden.
Wassim and family: A Palestinian refugee from Damascus. He moved to Egypt in 2013 with his
wife, Rajaa and two sons, Rami and Shadi. Rami travelled to Sweden through the Egyptian
route. Shadi travelled to Turkey and reached Sweden after a long journey through the Balkan
route. Wassim and his wife Rajaa travelled to Turkey and flew from Greece to Sweden
separately. They live in Stockholm, Sweden.
Yamen: A Palestinian refugee from Homs. Travelled to Sweden with his four-year-old daughter
via Libyan route. He lives in Hässleholm, Sweden.
Youssef: A Palestinian refugee from Damascus. He lost many relatives in the war and was
detained for a number of months. He travelled to Europe via the Libyan route. He lives with his
family in Hässleholm, Sweden.
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Map of Syria: (https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/syria-map.htm)
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Map of Sweden (https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/sweden-map.htm)
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Chapter One: A Global Crisis of Protection and the International Refugee Regime
Introduction
In 2015, an unprecedented number of people around the world were suffering displacement
because of war and persecution. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) – in effect, the United Nations Refugee Agency -- recorded a total of 65.3 million
displaced individuals, of whom 21.3 million were refugees -- its highest number since its
founding in 1949 in the aftermath of the Second World War (UNHCR, 2016). In response,
however, only 107,000 refugees received official resettlement. This number is far fewer than the
3.2 million who applied for asylum globally (ibid.), a situation former United Nations secretarygeneral Ban Ki Moon called “a crisis of solidarity” (ibid.). More than half of these refugees were
from three countries: 4.9 million from Syria, 2.7 million from Afghanistan, and 1.1 million from
Somalia (ibid.). Other conflicts also produced internally displaced people, refugees, and asylum
seekers, again in record numbers. The large-scale displacement because of the conflict in Yemen,
for example, has seen almost 3 million people internally displaced or seeking protection in
neighboring countries (ibid.). The majority of these refugees are staying in developing regions,
including sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, where Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon host
millions of refugees (ibid.).

Despite these overwhelming statistics, global media focused on the so-called migration crisis
in Europe, as more than one million asylum seekers arrived by sea during the summer of 2015
(UNHCR, 2015). Every day that summer, 4,000-10,000 refugees reached the continent (BBC,
2015; The Guardian, 2015). Almost 4,000 of them went missing, believed to have drowned at
sea (UNHCR, 2015). Bodies of little children, such as Alan Kurdi, were found washed up along
46

the shores of Turkey and Greece. Thousands of refugees who survived the sea trip found
themselves trapped in the overcrowded, often-appalling reception facilities in Greece or stranded
and detained at heavily militarized razor-wire fences along the borders of the western Balkan
route through Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. This sobering reality led many commentators to
invoke a “refugee and migrant crisis” (BBC, 2015; European Parliament, 2017; The Guardian,
2015), a crisis described variously as “existential” (US News, 2015), “biblical” (Fox News
Politics, 2015), and completely “political” (Human Rights Watch, 2016).
In this dissertation, I challenge this dominant narrative and argue instead that this is a “crisis
of protection” revealed through the refugees’ suffering and tragedies during their search for
protection. What is shocking is not the number of asylum seekers reaching Europe, but rather the
precarious conditions that have denied them protection in their home regions. This lack of
protection forces them to undertake risky, sometimes life-threatening journeys to Europe hoping
for protection and access to their rights as refugees. In a sharply divided world, globalization
acts as “a system of inclusion and exclusion of specific areas and groups, which maintains and
exacerbates inequality” (Castles, 2003: 16). Within these asymmetrical power dynamics and
inequalities, countries in the global north decontextualize refugee crises in the global south by
evading their own historical roles in creating the political and economic crises there, instead
blaming the people there for their own hardships (Chimini, 1998; Ferguson, 2006). In the same
vein, the global northern states are reluctant to honour their commitment towards refugees from
the global south and design and practise containment and deterrence policies to exclude them.
Yet many refugees, who escape wars and conflicts in their home countries and cannot find
protection in their regions, challenge such practices and journey northwards, seeking protection
and acceptance.
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In this chapter, I provide a policy context to governing refugees in general and for the Syrian
refugee crisis in particular. I present states’ perspectives on the crisis of protection, which I then
reconsider through refugees’ own experiences and stories in later chapters of this dissertation.
Yet, to capture the nuance of the crisis, in this chapter, I examine the historical development of
the international refugee regime to identify its limitations, which have allowed the recent global
crisis of protection. I argue that this crisis is produced by the reluctance of many countries in the
global north as they refuse to honour their commitments to the international refugee regime and
to protect refugees. This reluctance is especially clear in their policies of containing and
deterring refugees from the global south and restricting space of asylum and protection for
refugees who reach the global north. I examine these practices and show how these governments
have altered the norms and practices of protection to contain refugees from the global south and
deter them from reaching the global north and claiming refuge and access to their rights as
refugees. I discuss how these practices affect the lives of refugees who do not find sufficient
protection in their regions and are forced to search for protection in other destinations while
often enduring extreme precarity. I start the chapter, however, by examining the global crisis of
protection and its development.

A Global Crisis of Protection
The harrowing images of refugees in Europe during 2015 illustrate the extent of what has
become a litany of human suffering, even tragedy. This nightmare, however, reflects a larger
crisis of protection. Understanding this crisis to be about protection focuses attention on the
countries in the global north that are reluctant to honour their international commitments towards
refugees, as affirmed in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. Instead of protecting refugees, many governments in North America, Europe, and
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Australasia have recently reduced their assistance to and support for refugees from the global
south by creating various frameworks of governance and control that aim mainly to contain them
in their own regions and to keep them away from the global north. Those refugees finding
inadequate protection in their home regions, are forced to look for protection elsewhere. Yet to
do so they usually have to challenge daunting border practices, where they may become subject
to illegality and sometimes be left to die, as a result of government actions to stop them.

The current practices of refugee protection reveal how international systems, as reflected in
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol – whatever their limitations -- have given way to
alternative practices, such as externalization of borders, containment, and deterrence. This in turn
has resulted in the current protection crisis for millions of refugees around the world. Powerful
states, in particular, have reduced their obligations towards refugees to a bare minimum,
reshaping the norms and practices of protection to serve the perceived national priorities of
security and selective migration, in addition to – in some countries – a move towards more social
and cultural homogeneity. U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive order of 27 January 2017
offers a telling example of how powerful states can withdraw from their international obligations
towards refugees. Titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States” (The White House, January 2017), the order denied entry to citizens from seven Muslimmajority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The order suspended
admittance of refugees for 120 days while banning all refugee from Syria. Despite domestic
opposition and international criticism of the document, a follow-up, on 6 March 2017, reinforced
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the previous order but excluded Iraqi nationals from the travel ban (The White House, March
2017).9

Such actions resonated across the globe, as far-right governments suggested similar policies.
For example, Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary rejected the European Union’s (EU) plan
to relocate refugees within Europe in 2015 according to a quota scheme. It also erected walls
along its border with Serbia to stop refugees and decided to detain all asylum seekers during the
lengthy processing of asylum applications. Orbán described migration as “a Trojan horse for
terrorism” (The Guardian, 2017). These official policies stem from extreme nationalism and
anti-immigrant sentiments that problematize refugees and perceive them as “anomalies,” “a
threat to national security,” and “an attack on the categorical order of nations” (Malkki, 1995: 7).
In other words, they present patterns of “securitization of nationalism” (Sparek, 2006) against
“others” (i.e., groups of migrants and refugees from certain regions), by rendering them a
security threat and therefore attempting to deter and exclude them.

The concerns raised here arise because many states are limiting their commitments towards
refugees despite their adherence to an international convention guaranteeing refugee protection.
By so doing, they are undermining the international protection regime, which depends on states’
willingness to honour those commitments. Dennis McNamara, director of the Division of
International Protection at the UNHCR, insists: “The essential institutions of refugee protection –
including the Conventions and the UN structures -- are ultimately only as strong as States allow.
State responsibility is at the heart of this problem” (McNamara, 1997). By their neglect, such

9

Executive Order 13780 was reviewed in September 2017, and the list of countries subject to entry restrictions was
modified. The new list includes Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (The White House,
September 2017).
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states are creating a global crisis of protection that seriously harms millions of refugees. The
current Syrian refugee crisis, widely referred to as one of the world’s most disastrous
humanitarian emergencies and the largest forced displacement since the Second World War
(UNHCR, 2014a), reveals starkly this global crisis of protection. With all its complexities and
implications, it acutely reflects the effects of global policies of containment and reduction of
protection. It graphically illustrates the failure of the international refugee regime to protect the
millions of refugees who have escaped the brutal Syrian war and have found themselves trapped
in the inhumane circumstances of displacement.

Syrian Refugees and the Global Crisis of Protection
The conditions of the Syrian war (see the Introduction) have forcibly displaced more than
12.6 million Syrians, about 5.6 million of whom became refugees (UNHCR, 2018). They are
displaced in neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, where
many struggle to live, often in shocking conditions, without even minimum protection (ibid.).

The official international response to the Syrian refugee crisis has seen chronic shortages in
aid funding and very limited resettlement. Allocations for humanitarian aid in Syria for 2018
were $5.6 billion (U.S.) short of what was needed (UNHCR, 2018). For 2016, the UNHCR had
estimated humanitarian needs for Syrian refugees at $4.5 billion but received only $2.8 billion,
for a funding gap of 62 per cent (ibid.). In 2017, the requirements stood at $4.6 billion, against
only $2.4 billion coming in (ibid.). Consequently, in June 2017, the agency announced a series of
aid cuts. It had to halt monthly cash assistance for 60,000 Syrian refugee families in Lebanon and
Jordan, along with winter assistance for 209,000 families. It also cancelled 192,000 health
consultations for Syrian refugees in both countries (Relief web, 2017). These chronic funding
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gaps reflect the global “crisis of solidarity” (UN, 2016) and “responsibility shifting” vis-à-vis the
international community’s collective duty to protect refugees. As a result, Syrian displaced
persons, victims of a brutal war in their homeland, often experience dire conditions of
displacement either internally or in neighbouring countries where infrastructures are already
weak and resources are strained (Mercy Corps, 2016).
This “crisis of solidarity” (UN, 2016) and “responsibility shifting” have expanded to affect
even the handful of international efforts at resettling Syrian refugees. The UNHCR has pleaded
many times for assistance with resettlement and humanitarian aid, but by the end of April 2017
fewer than 260,000 Syrian refugees had been offered resettlement (UNHCR, 2017). This total
equaled about half of the 10 percent of the Syrian refugee population, a population perceived by
the UNHCR to be the most vulnerable group in need of resettlement by the end of 2018 (ibid.).
As well, since the conflict began, many countries of the global north have tightened their border
controls and imposed a “non-entrée” regime against people from Syria. This regime, which I
discuss in the next section, betokens “a commitment to ensuring that refugees shall not be
allowed to arrive” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2015: 241). Generally speaking, it
controls refugees’ mobility and to prevent them from reaching the global north, where they
might seek asylum and protection. It distances them spatially and isolates them in Syria and
neighbouring countries, without adequate protection and legal or safe routes to other destinations
such as Europe. Yet, rather than reducing the actual numbers of refugees, these restrictions have
eliminated safe and legal routes for them. As a result, many pursue more dangerous routes
towards other destinations, where they believe they can find protection and refuge. Thus, about
one million Syrian nationals applied for asylum in the EU between 2011 and June 2017
(UNHCR, 2017), creating an alleged “European crisis of migration” (Bundy, 2016: 51).
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However, as I explained earlier it is not so much their numbers as their precarious conditions of
travel that make this crisis unique. I examine those journeys below in chapters two, three, and
four, and five, where I focus on individual refugees’ perspectives and draw on their own stories
in order to reveal the impact of the global crisis of protection on their lives. The reminder of this
chapter examines, first, historical development of the international refugee regime, to understand
how its limitations have allowed the current, massive crisis, and, second, governance today: how
states today limit their international obligations towards refugees and circumvent them by
strategies of containment and deterrence, leading to such a widespread crisis of protection.

Governing Refugees Historically and Today
The historical development of the international refugee regime

The contemporary refugee regime emerged in the aftermath of the First World War when the
map of Europe was redrawn and the populations of old empires were reorganized (Gatrell, 2013).
After the war, Russians fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 were looked upon as the main
contributors to a ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe (Bundy, 2016). Armenian and Greek refugees
escaping the Ottoman Empire formed another ‘refugee crisis’ that attracted the attention of the
League of Nations, which sought solutions through the Minorities Protection Treaties. Hannah
Arendt (1951: 275) argues that these treaties were designed to preserve the new European
politics of nationalization and the state-system order:

The Minority Treaties said in plain language what until then had been only
implied in the working system of nation-state, namely that only nationals
could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full
protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed
some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and
divorced from their origin.
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Through this hypothesis, Arendt links the new states and the production of stateless
individuals. She explains that individuals who left their countries of origin to seek refuge
elsewhere became “stateless” and lost their rights as citizens. Their ‘refugeeness’ made them
“foreign” and “exceptional.” The League of Nations appointed a High Commissioner for
Refugees (Fridtjof Nansen), which issued travel documents such as the “Nansen passport” to
facilitate refugees’ mobility, but the provision of refugee aid was mostly voluntary and ad hoc,
with no effective institutional framework (Gatrell, 2013).

During and after the Second World War, the numbers of refugees displaced across
Europe increased dramatically. Jews fled the German atrocities, and Italian and Spanish citizens
escaped the Fascist regimes in their respective countries (Bundy, 2016). By mid-1945, there were
more than 40 million displaced individuals, in addition to 13 million ethnic Germans expelled
from the Soviet Union and other central and eastern European countries (UNHCR, 2000). In
response, many European states sought to control their movements by introducing restrictive
procedures such as nationality screening and eligibility checks (Lui, 2004). The institutional
structures of today’s refugee regime began to emerge. The United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had been established in 1943 and managed refugee
camps and resettled millions of refugees within Europe (Bundy, 2016). UNRRA was then
replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in April 1946. The IRO facilitated
asylum applications and large-scale mobility of European refugees, including groups of Soviet
citizens and Greeks who fled their countries before the Second World War, in addition to the
thousands of Jewish refugees who were transported from Europe to Palestine under the British
mandate there (Marrus, 1985). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
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was set up in 1949, and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted in 1951,
codifying international obligations towards refugees.
These origins of the world’s refugee regime reveal its Eurocentric nature. It emerged to help
European states manage the large numbers of postwar refugees (Barnett, 2002), which, according
to Lui (2004), challenged the new order of the European state system. The system, she shows, is
state-centric and helped forge the modern state system and national citizenship. Her thesis
suggests that its creation was as much about preserving the international system of nation-states
as about assisting refugees (ibid.).

This Eurocentric focus of the regime resulted in the neglect of millions of refugees elsewhere
who were dramatically affected by the war and other regional conflicts, including China, India,
and Pakistan. According to the UNHCR, “It was the movements of people across the European
continent, which had been so devastated by war, that most concerned the Allied powers”
(UNHCR, 2000:13).
Marrus (1985) proposes that the 1951 Convention’s narrow definition (in article 1) of
“refugee” reflects European influence vis-à-vis the concept of protection. It related to individual
reasons for fearing persecution and focused on the cause of flight (Kushner and Knox, 1999). It
related only to people from Europe who became refugees as a result of the Second World War
(Johnson, 2011). Consequently, article 1 defined a refugee as a person who:

as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail him/herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
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result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it. (UN, 1951: 152)
Article 1 thus clearly presents political instability as a legitimate cause for flight but ignores
economic reasons. The Convention’s 1967 Protocol removed the earlier document’s time and
geographical limitations.10 The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984) of the Organization of
American States (OAS) expanded the legal definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Protocol to include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts,
massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public
order” (UNHCR, 1984: 36). Yet, according to refugee-law scholar Audrey Macklin (1996: 119),
the definition still excluded massive groups: “Simply through adopting this legal definition,
millions of women (and men) are already eliminated, not because the impetus for their flight was
gender-specific, but because war, starvation, and environmental disasters ‘don’t count’ for
purposes of the legal definition.” The Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Refugee
Convention (1969) described a refugee as:

Every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place
of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his
country of origin or nationality. (UNHCR, 1974: 3)
The additional definitions by the OAS and the OAU addressed issues such as “external
aggression, occupation, (and) foreign domination” as well as referring to “persons who have fled

Article I of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) states that “the term, ‘refugee’ shall, except as
regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article I of the
Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and …’ and the words ‘… a result
of such events’, in article I A (2) were omitted” (UNHCR, 2010: 46). The same article also states that ‘The present
Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation” (ibid.).
10
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their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized
violence” (ibid.). Consequently, and despite the universal application of the 1967 Protocol, the
limitations arising from the 1951 Convention have facilitated the continuing exclusion of
millions of refugees from the global south from the international protection regime.

The case of Palestinian refugees, which I discussed above, presents a powerful example of
how the original design of international protection failed them. Since the formation of Israel in
May 1948 eased the pressure of refugees in Europe, the statelessness it created for another
people received short shrift. The latter’s exclusion from the international refugee regime
illustrates manipulation of protection policies to serve powerful states’ interests and leave
certain groups of refugees to suffer through, as it turned out, a series of displacements and
vulnerabilities. The establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 1949 appeared to offer a solution but provided these
refugees little legal protection or access to social rights. Their historical exclusion helps explain
the failure of international protection for millions of refugees who have no access to permanent
protection or social rights because of the circumstances of their displacement, which I will
discuss in the chapters that follow.

The three solutions sought by the regime -- repatriation, return to country of origin, or
resettlement and integration in a third country -- were also Eurocentric by definition, tailored to
align with the political and economic interests of European states (Chimni, 2004). They were
designed to “re-order” refugees (Lui, 2004) and govern migration as part of a state-centric
regime. They seek to return refugees to their former subjectivity as “citizens” of a state,
reflecting sovereign political, demographic, and economic priorities that relate to protection not
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of refugees but of international state system (ibid.). Chimni (2004) explains how, after 1945,
Western states did not favour repatriation of refugees due to Cold War politics and to the
economic needs of reconstructing Europe. UNRRA, for example, helped repatriate refugees, but
the United States opposed its work of repatriating Soviet refugees to the Soviet Union. As the
major donor, the United States could refuse to renew the organization’s mandate (UNHCR,
2000). As a result, UNRRA was replaced in this effort by the International Refugee Organization
(IRO), founded in 1946, which mostly resettled refugees rather than repatriating them. During its
mandate, which lasted until 1952, the IRO facilitated repatriation of 73,000 people and helped
resettle one million (ibid.). The IRO gave way in 1952 to the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), set up in 1949 under the control of the UN General Assembly (UNHCR,
2000). The UNHCR was created to act as the main international agency to protect refugees and
seek permanent solutions for their displacement (ibid.). Yet it operated under extreme restrictions
and limitations, due to “the desire of the United States and its Western allies to create an
international refugee agency that would neither pose any threat to the national sovereignty of the
Western powers nor impose any new financial obligations on them” (UNHCR, 2000: 19).
Since its establishment, the UNHCR has been subject to “non-humanitarian” factors including
the economic needs in Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, as outlined above, in
addition to the politics of the Cold War. The United States, for example, refused to contribute
funding to the organization due to the UNHCR’s activities behind the “Iron Curtin”, which
dramatically affected the organization’s ability to achieve its mandate (UNHCR, 2000). Yet, the
two significant moments in the UNHCR’s history, as identified by the organization itself, were in
fact rooted in the politics of the Cold War. The first “defining moment” was the involvement of
the UNHCR in the crisis of Hungarian refugees in 1956 (ibid.) and the second was the UNHCR’s
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initial operation outside Europe when the organization assisted Chinese refugees in Hong Kong
in 1957. In both cases, people were escaping communist governments and assisting them enabled
the organization to secure more support from the United States (ibid.).
These “non-humanitarian” factors continue to influence the UNHCR’s performance and the
international refugee regime. The UNHCR received a start-up, temporary three-year mandate in
1949. Its founders sought mainly to resolve the postwar European refugee crisis. The mandate
was renewed every three years until 2003, when the UN recognized that this periodic renewal
was unnecessary and made its mandate permanent (UNHCR, 2014a). Its decades of uncertainty
clearly contradicted its assigned goal of finding permanent solutions for refugees, particularly
when refugees no longer were temporarily “out of place” and their displacement had become a
structural feature of the international state system.
Also limiting the UNHCR’s effectiveness are its lack of financial autonomy and its lack of
political impartiality. It receives a small administrative budget from the UN General Assembly
and depends mainly on voluntary, often-unpredictable contributions from donor states. As well,
the top ten donors contribute up to 75 per cent of its budget (Milner, 2008). Consequently, the
UNHCR’s endeavors to assist refugees have always been subject to economic, political, and
cultural factors and the need to accommodate the interests of major donors, most of them from
the global north (Betts, 2013).

This section has addressed the deficiencies in the regime as a universal system of protection
and humanitarian assistance for refugees. Migration and refugee scholars debate the roots and
causes of those deficiencies. Hathaway (2016), for example, confirms that refugees are
experiencing less protection at the global level. He explains that the 1951 Convention astutely
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“gives priority to allowing refugees to make their own decisions about how best to respond to
their predicament” (Hathaway, 2007:364), But, he points out, many states’ performances and
practices vis-à-vis international norms of protection relate directly to their desire to reduced
their commitments to protect refugees -- hence the global crisis of protection. Hathaway argues
that states’ deterrence and containment of refugees are the main source of the current crisis. He
thus opposes attempts to “renegotiate” the 1951 Convention and calls for better strategies to
“operationalize that treaty in a way that works dependably, and fairly” (Hathaway, 2016: 99).
Against Hathaway’s argument, critical refugee and migration scholars note that a number of
intrinsic limitations impede the regime’s performance and have engendered the global crisis of
protection (Lui, 2004; Scheel and Squire, 2014; De Genova et al., 2015). For example, De
Genova et al. (2015: 71) see the regime as “highly political,” “partitioning,” and “authoritarian.”
First, according to De Genova, its political nature flows from the 1951 Convention’s definition
of “refugee,” which he finds state-centric and territorial, since the right to claim refuge requires
crossing a state border. Second, the regime creates an either/or partition through its
determination of status, which either grants or denies refugee status. Third, it is “authoritarian,”
since it requires individuals to behave according to a set of disciplinary norms and to follow
governance rules in their camps and displacement zones in order to receive protection as
refugees. For example, long processes of determination may finally reject refugees’ applications
and deny them protection. The “well-behaved” refugees are expected to return voluntarily to
their countries when they are asked (ibid.). Further, in the camps, refugees must obey the regime
and are subject to programs of assistance and aid allocated according to donors’ priorities,
regardless of refugees’ actual needs and aspirations.
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Governing Refugees Today
The refugee literature extensively addresses the role of sovereign states’ interests in shaping
protection of refugees and has linked it to the limits the regime enforces, which lead to
exclusion of millions of refugees from the structures of international protection (Betts, 2011;
Gamlen and March, 2011; Lui. 2004). For example, Lui (2004) explains how in a world
articulated around the order of nation-states and citizenship, the regime acts as a model of
“policing the non-citizens” (ibid.), where refugees are “anomalies” vis-à-vis the state-citizen
order and need governing so they no longer subvert the international order and its pillars of the
nation-state and the territoriality of citizenship (ibid.). Theoretically, international human rights
and refugee law guarantee refugees access to universal human rights. Yet it is almost impossible
for them to realize these rights when they are not members within a state. In fact, refugees, who
leave their countries because their state is unable or unwilling to protect them, lose their
privileges as citizens and enter a status of “rightlessness.” This notion of “rightlessness” brings
to the fore Arendt’s argument about rights – that they can be protected only within the structure
of a nation-state, which is the only political community that can guarantee its citizens’ rights and
well-being (Arendt, 1951). As a result, the right of asylum, as an international concept, is
actually subject to the politics of nation-states (ibid.). This state-centric notion of rights grounds
a system that subjects refugees to states’ sovereign decision to deny them entry to the statecitizen framework. Thus the sovereign structures protecting the rights of a state’s citizens
simultaneously exclude refugees and deprive them of their “right to have rights” (ibid.). They do
so by making refugees “non-citizens” with no access to political membership and therefore to
rights.
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According to Hathaway (2007: 353), the presence of refugees outside their own state brings
them within “the unconditional protective competence of the international community.” Yet, I
maintain, some states of the global north, despite their international obligations, are trying to
evade this “unconditional protective competence” by containing refugees in their home regions
and by deterring those who would search for protection elsewhere. This unwillingness derives
substantially from their perception of refugees as a burden (Hathaway, 2007) -- “uninvited
migrants” who cross a state’s borders irregularly but whom, by the 1951 Convention, they
should protect rather than subject to discrimination, penalization, or refoulement (UNHCR,
2010: 3). According to the Convention, states should protect refugees so as to guarantee their
rights, including access to education, work, health care, legal services, and all necessary
documents, such as travel papers to facilitate mobility (UNHCR, 2010: 3). In reality, however,
they perceive refuges as “irregular migrants” who challenge states’ abilities to decide who may
cross their borders and harness social welfare and citizenship rights.

It is this unauthorized movement that concerns states (Johnson, 2011): refugees challenge a
“state’s sovereignty and authority over migration” (Hathaway, 2007). They undermine states’
bordering practices, which are, as Schuster and Solomos (2002) describe, “Selective by nature.”
These notions -- of governing migration selectively and of refugees as threatening this ability - lead some states of the global north to treat them as “unwanted” people to contain and keep
in their own, home region. Many states tend to govern migration in a way that protects domestic
markets, national security, and sovereignty, social cohesion, and, in some countries, even cultural
homogeneity (Casetles and Loughna, 2004). They may see refugees as a threat and potential
burden.
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An official narrative against refugees and irregular migrants may result in what Koser (2010)
calls “protection gaps,” leaving millions of irregular migrants and refugees without protection
and vulnerable to human rights abuses and exploitation. Koser (2010) relates these gaps to the
absence of a global authority on migration, and Castles (2003), to embedded elements of
globalization. Refugee protection policies thus reflect asymmetrical structures of power between
wealthier countries in the global north and those in the poorer global south. In this sense,
governance of global migration, including of refugees, is a complex set of norms, structures, and
actors, which facilitates this global process of inclusion and exclusion of people through control,
division, and policing. This understanding of migration governance speaks to Walter’s definition
of migration policy as “a form of dispersed police that is exercised over the world’s population,
ordering, dividing, distributing but also connecting populations and territories” (Walter, 2015:
13). Thus refugees who journey in search of protection become subject to discriminatory
structures of governance and in effect “an issue of international relations” (Lui, 2004: 121),
where norms of “burden shifting,” or “refugee exporting,” prevail. States may invoke or create
mechanisms to minimize their obligations towards refugees and neglect “the unconditional
protective competence of the international community” (Hathaway, 2007: 352). They may
categorize refugees as “irregular migrants” to manage and control, even marginalize, criminalize,
and/or fully exclude them (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008).

Since the 1960s, many countries in the global north have increasingly restricted and excluded
refugees, particularly in response to decolonization struggles and conflicts in the south after the
1960s. Refugees from Africa and Asia were fleeing war zones but did not serve the ideological
and political contestations of the Cold War. As a result, many European states saw refugees not
as victims of a larger ideological struggle but as social and cultural threats and an economic
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“burden.” The terminology of “genuine” refugees and “bogus” asylum seekers surfaced
increasingly in the public discourse of refugee protection. As Bloch and Schuster (2002: 399)
argue, “The ‘morally untouchable category of political refugee’ has been deconstructed and
replaced with the figure of exploitive and criminal ‘bogus’ asylum seeker.” Refugees were
perceived as opportunistic migrants who move to the global north to improve their living
conditions, attracted by generous welfare schemes (ibid.).

Restrictive policies often went hand in hand with a shift in the public perception of refugees.
Some people may regard refugees as simply victims in need of charity or humanitarian assistance
rather than as human beings who have demonstrated political agency in challenging and fleeing
war and other forms of oppression and persecution (Johnson, 2011). As Johnson proposes, this
reframing of what it means to be a refugee reflects a shift in perception from that of “a heroic
male, fleeing for his politic beliefs,” to that of a passive group easy to govern, ideally away
from the global north (ibid.). Such depoliticization transforms refugees from political figures
who have “found (their) ways of mastering an uncertain future” (Arendt, 1943: 111) to
individuals whose lives are “desperately simple, and empty. No homes, no work, no decision to
take today” (Johnson, 2011: 1029, quoting Soguk, 1999: 9). This new representation means that
the public, media, and policy often imagine them as powerless masses of women and children
who deserve aid and humanitarian assistance. It is critical to note, however, that this aid is
expected to occur yet in their home regions (Johnson, 2011). Such images of refugees are
employed in the global north to engage public support for humanitarian aid to the global south
(ibid.). Johnson (2011) explains how this political act of representation shapes refugee policies
and stems from the perception of refugees from the global south as the “other,” who presents a
potential threat to the state-order of the global north. Johnson refers to Chimni’s (1998) notion
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of a “myth of difference,” whereby refugees lose their individualistic features in a constructed
mass of powerless and nameless people, essentially different from European refugees. States of
the global north, Chimni (1998: 351) maintains, may use this “myth of difference” to
decontextualize refugee crises in general. This reframing of the narrative ignores historical
backgrounds and conditions of instability and inequality, which are the main causes of refugee
movement. These conditions, which Chimni relates to the “geopolitical spread of capitalism and
the politics of imperialism” (ibid.), underlay refugee crises initiated by the two world wars and
the anti-colonial struggles in the global south. Yet some states in the global north tend to
decontextualize and belittle the refugee crises arising from the global south. They may present
such conflicts as emerging from local political or social concerns, largely ignoring the power
dynamics of political and cultural subordination, in addition to the economic inequalities
imposed on the global south by the global north (ibid.). Further, the “myth of difference”
normalizes their rejection and deterrence vis-à-vis refugees from the global south.
This mistrust -- a “crisis of authenticity” (Johnson, 2011) -- means that refugees from the
global south must prove themselves “genuine” refugees, who suffer from persecution. Refugees
are increasingly less welcomed in parts of the global north and may be subject to restrictive
measures designed primarily to reject them and return them to their regions of origin -- they
become “undesirables” subject to institutionalized exclusion and distancing (Agier, 2011). This
systemic rejection has helped engender a public “culture of fear” and increasing xenophobia
against them (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008), especially since the “war on terror” and the events
of ‘9/11’ (in New York, 11 September 2001). The more recent overall securitization of societies
in the global north has subjected refugees from the global south to new forms of restrictive
governing policies, which often lead to extreme vulnerabilities and exclusion for them (Bigo,
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2002). After 9/11, notions of asylum and protection moved gradually from the purview of
international law to frameworks of national security – a sea change. Hyndman and Mountz
(2008: 253) perceive “a shift from a paradigm of refugee protection to prioritizing the protection
of national security interests.” They note that the existing legal norms of protection for asylum
seekers and refugees have been limited significantly, whereas rejection and violence prevail and
have been normalized. Hyndman and Mountz (2004: 254) explain:

The threat of migrant invasion is underwritten by securitization; a
governmentality based on mistrust and fear of the uninvited other. The
mobilization of fear to securitize asylum serves a politically powerful
resource for states that need legitimate grounds for extraordinary measures,
such as exclusion from their territories by potentially legitimate legal
subjects, namely asylum seekers.
A Shift of Emphasis

Global northern states have been re-prioritizing the three solutions for refugees -- repatriation,
return to country of origin, or resettlement and integration in a third country -- with a shift of
emphasis from resettlement towards repatriation (Chimni, 2004), regardless of the poor, even
inhumane conditions in refugee camps and hosting communities in the global south. The
UNHCR has been influenced particularly by global northern states’ strategies of containing
refugees in their own regions (through camps, for example) (Chimni, 1998).

In recent years, UNHCR operations have favoured mass repatriation over resettlement.
Resettlement clearly relies on states’ willingness to provide space for refugees, which
governments can easily reduce by letting in fewer refugees. In response, the UNHCR
rationalized its operations as “emergency or crisis relief” (Hayden, 2009: 258) -- humanitarian
aid in crisis zones and homeland protection. States can appear to uphold their international

66

commitments while reducing them in practice, by containing and deterring refugees through
“non-entrée” regimes (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, 2015). These authors see a
“schizophrenic approach,” where such governments avoid their obligations towards refugees but
uphold the global regime. Some have even convinced states in the global south to take in more
refugees as part of their own international commitments, thereby containing refugees within the
region (ibid.). Further, a number of states have found ways to control refugees’ movements in
order to keep refugees away from the global north. Restrictive policies include: containing
refugees in their home regions through humanitarian assistance, applying protection in refugees’
regions of origin, using “non-entrée” regimes to keep asylum seekers out of the global north, and
deterring refugees by enforcing physical borders.

Containment through humanitarian assistance

Policies designed to contain refugees in their regions of origin rely on humanitarian relief and
homeland-oriented solutions (Crips, 2001). Humanitarianism here shifts from traditional caring
for refugees’ welfare to governing policies and practices to control refugees in the first place.
Hyndman (2000: 3) describes an “increasingly well-funded and politicized process of balancing
the needs of refugees and other displaced persons against the interests of states.” This
combination of care and control crystallizes through a set of social and cultural relations (Ilcan,
2013). At the international level, humanitarianism serves to control certain groups of the world’s
population and keep them out of the global north (Agier, 2011). It thus safeguards the global
north’s perception of the world order by erecting barriers that close off the northern world to
outsiders. Agier (2011) suggests that, the more globalized our world becomes, the more walls we
see around us. In this sense, refugees from the global south are not forgotten but instead subject
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to a global mobility regime designed principally to maintain the nation-states of the global north.
This governing process excludes and spatially distances the “undesirables,” who await their
fates, however dire, in their camps, far from the global north (ibid.).

Many countries in the global north are normalizing such containment of refugees by
supporting international humanitarian assistance in regions of origin rather than resettlement as a
way to protect refugees. For example, the UNHCR is increasingly offering humanitarian aid to
refugees in their home regions with less involvement in resettlement activities. The UN’s
allocations for that purpose, however, illustrate a massive gap. In January 2017, the global
requirement was $22.5 billion (U.S.) needed by 93.5 million people in 33 crisis-affected
countries, whereas UN appeals for aid generated only $77.2 million, for a shortfall of $22.4
billion (OCHA, 2017) – a minimal commitment, showing how unsustainable are the containment
strategies implemented by the global north.
Protection practices at refugees’ regions of origin
A second way for governments in the global north to control refugees’ movement is by reprioritizing the first two of the three “durable solutions” of the protection regime -- repatriation
to the home country, integration in the host country, and resettlement in a third country. Johnson
(2011) argues that this change emerged because of the preponderance of refugees coming from
the global south. UNHCR records for 2015 show 21.3 million refugees globally, most of them
hosted in the global south, and 107,100 people resettled worldwide (UNHCR, 2016).

Furthermore, global northern states are creating new norms for protection to contain refugees,
as in the “right to remain” approach, which encourages them to stay in their areas under UNHCR
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supervision. Yet, according to Hathaway (2001), this practice actually does little to protect
people in “imminent danger.” Thus the “right to remain is in essence not a right of refugees at
all, but is the right of governments to avoid confrontation with the needs of refugees” (ibid. 43).
Hathaway refers to other such practices, including “safe havens” in the Bosnian war, “no-fly
zones” for the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the situation at the Kibeho refugee camp in Rwanda
(ibid.). The horrifying events and lack of protection in such zones exemplify how these norms do
not protect refugees but rather serve the political agendas of powerful states, which aim primarily
to govern refugees and control their mobility in their own, home regions.

Non-entrée regimes and externalization of borders
States are also working to circumvent their international obligations by creating “non-entrée”
regimes. Territorially oriented systems of national asylum require refugees to cross a state’s
borders in order to claim asylum there (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). Thus, to cut back on
their obligations while sustaining the global refugee regime, some states in the global north
attempt “non-entrée” regimes, which Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen see as “ensuring that
refugees shall not be allowed to arrive” (2015: 241). This system limits refugees’ access to
protection by controlling their mobility and excluding them from the global north (Johnson,
2011). Its conventional form uses legal and administrative strategies such as restrictive visa
regulations and sanctions on carriers. Its restrictions on mobility include externalization of
border controls and linking trade and development agreements to migration control, which
effectively outsources and shifts the refugee burden. For Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen
(2015), “non-entrée” regimes deter would-be refugees in their countries of origin, which act as
gatekeepers in exchange for trade and development assistance: “With poorer states of origin and
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transit often willing for economic, political, and other reasons to serve as the gatekeepers to the
developed world, wealthier countries believe that they can insulate themselves from liability for
refugee deterrence by having such action take place under the sovereign authority of another
country” (2015: 249). Such policies spatially distance refugees from the global north, where
they may believe they can have better access to protection and rights.

In another element of the regime, externalization of borders, states outsource border control to
a third party or stretch its operations beyond national boundaries (Casas et al., 2010). Hyndman
and Mountz (2008) see this as a “geography of exclusion” or “respatialization of asylum,” which
shifts protection from the “legal” to the “political” domain of governance (ibid.), so as to deter
asylum seekers. Some global northern states are immorally offering “cash for containment,”
whereby, according to Chimni (2004: 68), they “pay for the care of refugees in exchange for
being refugee free states.” The most notorious instance perhaps is Australia’s “Pacific Solution,”
in effect since the 1990s (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008), however, in 2001, Prime Minister John
Howard announced publicly, during his re-election campaign, that he would not allow asylum
seekers to reach Australia’s shores (Mountz, 2011). Following the election, Canberra instructed
the Australian navy to intercept vessels in territorial waters and transfer asylum seekers to
offshore detention centers it had set up in the Christmas Island, on Papua New Guinea’s Manus
Island, and in Nauru (Parliament of Australia, 2012). It signed agreements with Fiji, Nauru, and
New Zealand for them to accept asylum seekers under the aegis of the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) (ibid.). Since asylum seekers could not enter the Australian mainland, they
could not apply for asylum. Although the “Pacific Solution” ended officially in 2008, the
outsourcing of detention facilities on Pacific islands continued, and new agreements arose for
such places on Nauru and Manus Island (Parliament of Australia, 2012).
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Readmission and safe-third-country agreements between states in Europe and the global south
also externalize and outsource border controls, using a third country to deter and detain refugees
and irregular migrants (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008; Rygiel, 2011). Since the Tampere
European Council Summit in October 1999 and the EU-African Summit in Lisbon in 2007, the
EU has worked closely with governments in the global south, mainly in north and west Africa,
on migration control and policing through strategic partnerships and neighbourhood policies that
link migration control to aid, trade, and development (Casas et al., 2010). The Global Approach
to Migration (GAM), for instance, which the EU initiated in 2005, links migration to other
sectors of international relations and development by extending border controls into a third
country – a neighbour or a non-neighbour country of the EU (ibid.). Within that framework, the
EU controls border policy and immigration by cooperating with other states, which manage
regional protection and refugee movements (ibid.). Hence the GAM framework keeps refugees
away from the global north, with a third country protecting them that may not have signed the
1951 Convention to guarantee it is ‘safe.’
Through the ‘EU-Turkey deal,’ signed 18 March 2016, the EU shifts protection to a third
party (Turkey) and keeps out refugees. Starting 20 March 2016, Greece (an EU member) would
return illegal migrants from Turkey without assessing their claims. By the deal’s “one-to-one
initiative,” for every Syrian whom Turkey readmitted from Greece, the EU would resettle
another Syrian from Turkey (European Council, 2006). Turkey agreed to enhance security “to
prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU” (ibid.),
while the EU would liberalize visa restrictions for Turkish citizens and disburse €3 billion for
the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (ibid.). Various human rights and civil society organizations
argued that all parties to the deal were seeking to evade responsibility for refugees (Rygiel,
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Baban, and Ilcan, 2016). Some criticized it particularly for “undermining the right to asylum”
and jeopardizing the rights of refugees detained in Greece with limited access to asylum (DRC,
2016). On the deal’s first anniversary, Amnesty International announced: “The EU-Turkey deal
has been a disaster for the thousands who have been left stranded in a dangerous, desperate and
seemingly endless limbo” (Amnesty International, 2017). This status includes detainees on the
Greek islands and Syrians returned to Turkey, where more than 2.7 million Syrian refugees live,
many of them with insufficient protection and limited access to education, health care, and
employment (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Rygiel, Baban, and Ilcan, 2016).

In February 2017, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) reported a French
and German proposal for “a crisis-resistant Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to face
any potential new ‘migration crises’.” The policy note cites the EU-Turkey deal as a “blueprint
for future European asylum policy,” as Europe seeks to cooperate with its neighbours to protect
its external borders. The note also proposes: “All those entering the EU would be removed to
non-EU countries willing to host them, and kept there in conditions which minimally guarantee
their survival and non-removal to unsafe countries” (ECRE, 2017).

Enforcing physical borders

Despite all their attempts at containment, governments in the global north have been unable to
prevent refugees from arriving at their borders, seeking asylum and rights. In response, some
securitize their borders with walls and fences to physically keep out “irregular migrants,”
including refugees. In Europe, even though the Schengen agreement (1985) lifted most internal
borders, some states have reinforced their external borders and harmonized the legal
frameworks of border control and asylum standards (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), securitizing
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migration to transform borders and further limit access to asylum and to protection (2015: 20).
This process spread globally after 9/11 and the multiple bombings in European capitals,
especially in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). However, it was the political unrest in the
Middle East after 2010, which led masses of individuals to escape the violence for protection in
Europe. By the end of 2012, Greek authorities completed a four-meter-tall fence, equipped with
thermal cameras, at the land border with Turkey, along the Evros River -- the “shortest, and
safest route for migrants and refugees” (World Post, 2015). In 2015, Bulgaria constructed a fiftymile-long razor-wire fence, fifteen feet tall and five feet wide and equipped with infra-red
motion-sensitive cameras and monitored with armed guards, to seal its borders with Turkey and
block ‘illegal’ crossings (Mail Online, 2015). The UNHCR spokesman in Bulgaria explained
that “the fence is there to keep people out but it means asylum seekers undertake more perilous
journeys and pay higher rates to smugglers” (ibid.).

In response to the massive arrivals of refugees in Europe in 2015, European territories
constructed additional walls and fences, stranding thousands of refugees at militarized and
heavily securitized borders inside Europe. In November 2015, Macedonian soldiers erected a
metal fence at the border with Greece (The Guardian, 2015). In September and October 2015,
Hungary had sealed its southern borders with Serbia and Croatia (CNBC, 2015). In August 2016,
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced an additional fence at Hungary’s border with Serbia “to
keep out major new waves of migrants” (Reuters, 2016). The European Border and Coast Guard
Agency, Frontex, was formed in 2004 to manage operational cooperation at Europe’s external
borders, but it focuses on prevention and deterrence. Critics have often accused it of abusing
migrants and refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2015, 2016).
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Europe’s practices of containment and deterrence keep refugees in their home regions and
control them by “burden-shifting.” The official narrative about “unauthorised” arrivals in Europe
during the summer of 2015, which I discussed above, illustrates this approach. Accounts often
presented refugees as “others” who threatened Europe’s political, social, and cultural identity and
reframed their unexpected arrival as a “European crisis of migration.”

Shrinking Spaces of Asylum
I explained above how governments develop practices to control the movement of refugees in
order to deter them from entering the global north. They may tailor humanitarian aid, offer
protection in home regions, and set up “non-entrée” regimes. Nevertheless, such procedures do
not stop desperate refugees from seeking protection and new opportunities for better lives, but
rather limit safe pathways for them and significantly increase the “human cost” (Spijkerboer,
2007) of border crossing. As a result, refugees may undertake precarious journeys through oftentreacherous routes that can lead to their illegalization and criminalization. Refugees continue to
risk crossing the Aegean and Mediterranean (Tazzioli, 2015). If they survive, they must then cross
through several countries in southern and central Europe, where they will encounter heavily
securitized borders and inhumane detention. This journey transforms them from refugees,
deserving of protection, to illegal migrants, supposedly needing control (Schuster, 2011). Arrival
in the global north does not guarantee them access to rights and protection. Macklin (2005) refers
to refugees’ “discursive” disappearance in the West: states reduce their international duties to
protect refugees while “doing everything possible to repel the spontaneous arrival of migrants
likely to seek asylum” (2005: 367). Governments are increasingly reducing standards of
protection and asylum so as to discourage asylum seekers. Such practices create legal limbo for
asylum seekers and limit their access to social rights. Liza Schuster (2011) outlines some of the
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mechanisms European governments use to restrict asylum seeking. According to Schuster, the
Dublin Regulation (Dublin III, 2013), which governs assessment of asylum applications and
involves EU member states and the EURODAC database (which stores fingerprints of asylum
applicants), aims to “reduce the number of those able to apply for asylum to an absolute
minimum” (2011: 401). The Swedish case, which I discussed above, presents a stark example of
shrinking asylum spaces in the global north, which is in effect turning refugees who travel to
Europe irregularly into asylum seekers, subject to national domestic asylum rules. As Hathaway
(2001: 43) explains, “Under the current international regime, refugees who arrive in an asylum
state are solely the legal responsibility of that state. As such, the distribution of state responsibility
towards refugees is based primarily upon accidents of geography and the relative ability of states
to control their borders.” It was the unauthorized mass arrivals in 2015 that some officials
perceived as a crisis but actually reflected a global breakdown of protection because the global
north shirked its international commitments.

Conclusion
Some European officials’ perceptions in 2015 reflect how the arrival of more than one million
people caught states in the global north offguard, as they had anticipated that refugees would
remain in camps and hosting communities in the global south. The situation has in fact proved
that refugees continue to challenge global frameworks of migration governance and decide to
claim international protection as refugees and as humans in the global north. They do this despite
the daunting combination of containment practices and “non-entrée” regimes that have sought to
deter asylum claims. Such challenges have upset the global order and created what some officials
term “the migration and refugee crisis in Europe.” Reece Jones (2016: 180) concludes: “By
refusing to abide by wall, map, property line, border, identity document, or legal regime, mobile
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people upset the state’s schemes of exclusion, control, and violence. They do this simply by
moving.”

In this chapter I have shown that the arrivals of refugees in Europe in 2015 reflect a global
crisis of protection emerging because the international regime for protecting refugees seems not
to be working. Further, I have illustrated how states in the global north have altered the norms of
protection to serve their own priorities and reduce their international duties towards refugees and
to that end have reshaped the protection regime to contain and deter refugees. The UNHCR’s
increasing focus on aid and relief, its re-prioritization of durable solutions for refugees, with less
emphasis on resettlement, and its insufficient humanitarian aid and minimal quotas of resettled
refugees all reflect the global crisis of protection through the structures of the international regime
for protecting refugees.
In this chapter, I have critically examined the regime’s historical development and its
performance in order to explore the roots and relations of the more recent global crisis of
protection. I showed the links between the crisis and the regime’s intrinsic deficiencies, present at
its creation. Set up to resettle European refugees after the Second World War, it has continued to
operate substantially according to the interests and preferences of the global north. I also showed
protection norms and structures shifting frequently in tandem with the politics of the global north,
even though most refugees since the 1960s have come from the global south. These historical
developments help explain the “crisis of solidarity” in responses to the Syrian refugee crisis and
some European officials’ construction of the arrival of more than one million “unauthorized”
individuals in 2015 as a “crisis of migration.” These unexpected arrivals disturbed the sense of
order by contesting states’ ability to govern refugees. They exposed the failure of the global
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refugee regime and revealed not a “crisis of migration” but rather a crisis of protection, as some
European countries failed to honour their international commitments and refused to assist
refugees.
The regime’s inability to respond was painfully visible. According to its own standards, it was
supposed to contain refugees in their own regions and govern them remotely through
humanitarian operations -- which, not incidentally, proved woefully inadequate. Yet these
refugees dared to confront the norms of containment and deterrence. They managed, despite all
odds, to reach the global north to claim protection. In so doing, they posed an unexpected
challenge for those states and forced them to reconsider and reframe their policies of protection
and asylum, as Sweden did. By their unauthorized movement, they exposed the regime’s intrinsic
paradox: refugees, who deserve protection, face states’ sovereign decision to (not) allow them in.
In fact, such government decisions force refugees to risk their lives and travel in unauthorized
ways and through challenging, sometimes-inhumane conditions in order to seek asylum and claim
their right of protection as refugees, and that exercise of political agency transforms their
positionalities and identities, as we see in the following chapters, about refugees’ journeys in
search of protection.

As well, this chapter has considered the system of protection through the eyes of government
leaders and policy makers and of migration and refugee scholars. Later chapters add further
complexities by showing what this system looks like from the ground, as I hear from those people
actually affected by it. I use their stories to challenge the official narrative of refugees as
powerless victims or as a threat. Their accounts provide alternative knowledge of the crisis, as
people whose lives have been affected by the failing regime of protection and the bordering
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practices of states. Examining the concept of the refugee journey draws our attention towards the
actual lived experiences of refugees, as they move in search of the type of protection sorely
lacking in the system. As I discussed above, examining refugees’ stories on the journey shifts our
focus from policy discussions to the narrative of people who are often ignored by international
policy makers. I challenge this neglect by positioning refugees as the prime source of knowledge
for my work about the journey and the crisis in general. Their stories of their journeys will reveal
the impact of war, lack of protection, and deterrence against refugees during their search for
safety and acceptance. Their words illustrate the “human cost” of the crisis of protection.
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Chapter Two: Conceptualizing the Refugee Journey
Introduction
In chapter one, I challenged the dominant narrative favored by countries in the global north
about “the European migration crisis.” I showed that advocates have reconstituted the structures
of international protection to contain and deter refugees in their own regions so they will not
threaten the international state order. I explored the shifts policies and practices for international
protection in an increasingly divided world, which often subverts protection to put people “back
in place” in the global south, with or without protection. I showed how some countries in the
global north are backing away from their international duties towards refugees and block their
access to Europe. In the resulting “global crisis of protection,” failing protection, containment,
and deterrence lead to immense suffering, sometimes tragedy, when refugees from the global
south, including Syria, dwell in poor, even horrific conditions. When their lives become
unbearable, refugees may undertake “unauthorized” journeys, which only make them more
vulnerable. It is this notion of “crisis” that I seek to discuss in the following chapters, as I explore
the experiences of desperate refugees who see no option but to journey towards asylum and
rights.
As I discussed above, examining refugees’ experiences during their search offers us
alternative, real-life knowledge from people who have lived through the failing regime of
protection and the bordering practices of states. This new, rich, primary source challenges the
official narrative, which usually omits or misrepresents refugees. Instead, I bring their voices to
the fore and present them as real individuals. This approach situates refugees as the prime source
of knowledge about their journeys and experiences en route. Their first-hand accounts enrich the
scholarship of migration and refugee studies by adding their insights and perspectives, and, as I
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noted above, they show how bordering practices create illegality and increase the “human cost“
(Spijkerboer, 2007) of crossing.

As I suggested above, a refugee journey that starts as a simple response to the horrors of war
and persecution, or as a survival move in a search for protection, may evolve into a complex act
of resistance, even of political agency, which involves various transformations of identity and
positionality. By deciding to leave their home regions for the global north, refugees exercise
agency and reject the sometimes-precarious status and often-dehumanizing conditions of camps
and host communities. Though vulnerable, they practise a “right to escape” (Mezzadra, 2015),
refusing marginalization and aiming to reach other, more accepting destinations.

In this chapter and those that follow, I examine the conditions of these journeys to reveal the
“human cost” of the global crisis of protection. These journeys reveal how a global system of
border controls traps refugees, largely through government policies designed to immobilize
them. Those who survive are trapped again in their new localities in the global north, where
protection is usually temporary and opportunities for starting new lives are shrinking. This
process transforms refugees who deserve protection into “irregular migrants,” sometimes
criminals, challenging the state’s sovereignty at its borders.

Critical migration and refugee studies have increasingly embraced the journey with new
attention to the journeyers’ perspectives. In this dissertation, I examine these journeys by using
refugees’ own stories. Building on their accounts, and learning from various migration
literatures, I develop a conceptual framework of the journey and study it as a precarious,
complex, and messy act of survival and resistance that entails multidimensional transformations
of refugees’ identities and positionalities in their new localities. In this chapter, I discuss this
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concept of the journey focusing on the three elements: survival, messiness, and transformation.
In the following chapters I explore in turn each of these aspects, weaving in the actual
experiences of refugees from Syria. In chapter three, I study the journey as an act of survival and
examine refugees’ vulnerability during war and displacement in neighbouring region of Syria, a
situation that pushes some to leave. Chapter four deals with the refugees’ messy, complex, nonlinear journey, facets emerging as refugees recount the conditions of their movement towards
Europe. Chapter five discusses the emotional and transformative dimensions of the journey.

In the next section, I explore how the concept of the journey has developed in the literature of
migration, especially in critical migration and refugee studies and in mobilities scholarship.
Through this review, together with my knowledge from experience and field research, I
articulate my own understanding of the concept of refugee journey and its three significant, yet
undertheorized dimensions: survival, messiness, transformation.

Conceptualizing the Journey
The migration literature has usually treated the journey as a linear and planned move from
one point to another, or as a temporary passage from country of origin to that of destination
(Brigden and Mainwaring, 2016; Collyer, 2007). Yet migrants frequently undertake fraught,
multiple-stop journeys in several countries. Various concepts and literatures have attempted to
better capture this non-linear experience. For example, much migration literature speaks of
“transit migration” (Collyer, Düvell, and de Hass, 2012) -- migrants and refugees who aim to
reach certain destinations but make a series of stops and detours en route. The term implies
temporary transitions or even brief interruptions to an otherwise-smooth journey. Düvell,
however, recognizes that restrictive policies of control affect migrants’ routes and actions: “It is
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the destination countries’ policies that contribute to the emergence and construction of transit
migration” (2012: 422). Hence, he sees transit migration more critically as “a strategic response
to the constantly changing control regime and part of the complex interaction between migrants’
autonomy and states sovereignty” (ibid.). So too, de Hass stresses border control as a major
cause of “illegal” mobility and notes the “vicious circle of more restrictions – more illegality –
more restriction” that absorbs migrants (2008: 16). Yet, writing about African migrants’ journeys
to Europe, he refers to their high sense of agency and determination on the move, criticizing the
stereotypical image of “African misery” as the root causes of this migration (ibid.).
Some critics feel that “transit migration” aims to fix or stabilize the actions of migration,
which are fluid and unpredictable by nature (Collyer, Düvell, and de Hass, 2012). Düvell (2012),
for example, refers to its politicized, policy-driven, and Euro-centric orientations, as it serves
migration control and externalization of borders against migrants and refugees on the move.
Düvell (2012) calls for careful analysis of in-migration as complex and changeable categories
and patterns of migration, which include transit migration, “These kinds of dynamic migrations
can be subsumed under the umbrella typology of in-migration of which transit migration would
be a sub-category” (424). Such a call allows for play of various dynamics and patterns of
migration that capture complex and unpredictable migration acts, including refugees’ journeys
towards protection.

Like Düvell and de Hass, Collyer (2007: 668) also opposes a linear logic for the journey,
emphasizing the “places in-between origin and destination.” He also replaces “transit migration”
with “fragmented migration” (2010), to better reflect current reality. He grants that border
controls and mobility restrictions initiate and prolong these forms of migration, but notes roles of
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social networks, advanced technologies, and modern communications. Collyer and de Hass
(2012) argue for “fragmented journeys” to reflect migration’s fluid nature, with oftenindeterminate starting and ending points and people’s status transformed while on the move.
This argument supports my drawing on refugees’ stories of moving when I analyse the journey,
as it reflect its messy, non-linear, and transformative nature, characteristics which eliminate
some of the problems in terms such as “transit migration.”

Just like transit migration, mobilities studies has wrestled with the complexity and
unpredictability of mobility and human movement, which can help explain refugees’ journeys.
For example, it complexifies the study of movement and migration by incorporating the more
nuanced experiences of potential movement and stillness. Mimi Sheller (2011: 6) explains:
“Mobilities research in its broadest sense concerns not only physical movement but also potential
movement, blocked movement, immobilization, and forms of dwelling and place-making.” This
understanding captures the refugee journey, with its moments of emotional and physical
departure, phases of stillness, and loops of movement, often unintended, as I illustrate in the
following chapters when I discuss refugees’ stories. Other mobilities scholars, such as Tim
Cresswell, address the complex and diverse nature of mobility and examine the impact of
individuals’ identities and status on the politics of mobility, which he defines as “the ways in
which mobilities are both productive of such social relations and produced by them” (Cresswell,
2010: 21). Cresswell treats mobility as a resource that is “differentially distributed” and subject
to different politics of representation. He proposes: “The representation of movement can
certainly impact the experience of its practice” (2010: 22). In other words, one act of movement
may hold different representations when different groups of individuals of varying identities and
status practise it. This argument speaks to refugees’ experiences at borders and explains how
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officials may present their movement as “illegal” and “unauthorized,” because they are
“unauthorized,” but treat the same act of border crossing as regular and welcome for compliant
individuals. Cresswell further demonstrates how choice is crucial in the discourse of mobility,
yet he realizes the interactions between will and enforcement: “Mobility, as practices [,] brings
together the internal world of will and habit … and the external world of expectation and
compulsion” (2010: 20). In this sense, mobilities scholarship helps us move beyond the journey’s
details (who went where and when) and allows us to incorporate the subject’s experiences and
expectations. It particularly helps us theorize the concept of refugee journey, as it explores
aspects of this complex form of mobility and its interrelated politics of physical movement,
representations, and practices.

Yet the traditional mobilities paradigm often associates movement or the ability to move with
notions of progress and freedom. Cresswell (2006) criticizes the romanticization of mobility and
its association with positive notions of freedom: “The romanticization of the nomad, for
instance, is infected with the discourse of Orientalism. It is also the outcome, historically, of
deep-rooted ideas about mobility as a progressive force, as a form of relative freedom, as a break
from earlier, more confused, spaces and times” (Cresswell, 2006: 56-7, cited by Gill et al., 2011).
According to Gill, Caletrio, and Mason (2011: 302), viewing movement positively reflects a
“partial geographical concern.” This tendency may exclude the movement of millions of forcibly
displaced people in the developing world, as well as the mobility of asylum seekers and refugees
who long for stillness and stability but have to go on complex and uncertain journeys. Gill,
Caletrio, and Mason (2011) recognize uncertainty and insecurity in the movement of forcibly
displaced populations and emphasize those groups’ reluctance vis-à-vis “an undesirable
necessity” (2011: 304).
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Mimi Sheller (2018) calls for a new way of thinking about mobilities, power relations, and
different mobility capabilities that disconnects mobility from freedom and permits a more
inclusive paradigm: “Mobility justice is an overarching concept for thinking about how power
and inequality inform the governance and control of movement, shaping the patterns of unequal
mobility and immobility in the circulation of people, resources, and information” (2018: 30).
Sheller proposes: “A more robust and comprehensive theory of mobility justice can help us
address the combined ‘crises’ of climate change, sustainable urban transitions, resource depletion
and global migrations. These ‘crises’ are part of a common phenomenon, which shares its origins
with other uneven mobilities that impact everyday life” (ibid.). Understanding the impact of
asymmetrical power relations and inequalities on the patterns of mobilities and immobility can
help us fathom refugees’ complex decisions and actions on their journeys. Such complexities
have also received analysis from critical migration scholars such as Brigden and Mainwaring
(2016), who look at migrants and refugees’ clandestine journeys and their encounters with
structures of control at borders. They worry that the literature tends to neglect migrant journeys.
Indeed, many scholars focus on migration policies and practices before and after arrival,
downplaying the crucial phase in between.
In recent years, it is journalists who have explored the refugees’ journey most extensively,
with many travelling alongside them after awareness skyrocketed in 2015. Examples include:
Wolfgang Bauer’s Crossing the Sea: With Syrians on the Exodus to Europe (2016), Charlotte
McDonald-Gibson’s Cast Away: Stories of Survival from Europe’s Refugee Crisis (2016), and
Patrick Kingsley’s The New Odyssey: The Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis (2016). All of these
works draw attention to the lives of people and the difficulty of their journeys. Migration and
refugee scholars should examine refugees’ journeys and experiences as complex social and
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political acts. Brigden and Mainwaring (2016: 247) explain, “The journey is not simply a space
in between arrival and departure, a temporary moment of mobility between more ‘normal’ static
existences, but a social process that shapes migrants and societies alike.” I discuss this notion of
the journey and how it shapes refugees’ positionality and sense of identity in chapter five.

With this understanding, Brigden and Mainwaring (2016) look at the journey not as a linear
process but as a multifaceted series of non-linear movements, with many moments of
“im/mobility.” “Migration journeys are rarely a linear passage, traveled from point of origin
directly to destination. Rather, migrants make these journeys in broken, unplanned stages; a
failed stage may give rise to another unexpected leg of the journey” (2016: 415). Thus journeys
incorporate various typologies of movements and stillness that start before they begin and
continue after they arrive. Through this viewpoint, I shed light on refugees’ experiences. In
chapter three I show how for most of my interviewees, the journey begins before their physical
departure. In chapter four, about the conditions of actual journeys, many refugees ended up in
unintended destinations.

Like Brigden and Mainwaring, Alexandria Innes depicts the journey as much more than a
linear pathway of travel from one place to another. Looking at asylum seekers in Greece, Innes
(2016) finds that refugees, when not moving forward, may well be immobile. However, such
moments of “stillness” may allow for the vital acts of “negotiation” and “navigating” (ibid.).
Like Brigden and Mainwaring, who describe the journey as a “social process” (2016: 247), Innes
(2016: 266) uses “state of being” to reflect on the journey’s complexity, which stretches from a
temporary passage, or a direct crossing, to a transforming “political act” that shapes the lives and
trajectories of migrants and refugees.
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A Conceptual Framework of the Refugee Journey
In what follows, I build on the work of these critical migration scholars and others, and focus
on refugees’ journeys from Syria to Sweden. I use the concept of the journey to reflect on their
individual experiences, facing war, lack of immediate protection, and – because of the failure of
the international refugee regime -- insufficient protection through their passage and resettlement
elsewhere. Some of them cross borders illegally, becoming “illegal migrants,” who then begin
more precarious journeys that in many cases, resulted in human tragedies (Striel, 2016). En
route, most refugees experience anxiety, fear, even violence in a series of intense, sometimestraumatic experiences. Yet, despite being highly vulnerable, many display true resilience and
agency. Their journey transforms their identities and prospects for life in their new localities.
Thus, learning from refugees’ own stories, I develop a three-part concept that reveals the journey
to be variously:

- an act of resistance and survival
- a messy, complex, and non-linear passage
- an emotional and transformative process
This dissertation applies the insights I noted above. My use of the term “journey” here, while
I think critically about refugee mobility, develops from my method, which draws on refugees’
stories and their experiences during their journeys. I call as well on the knowledge I acquired
during my fieldwork, where I conducted 45 interviewed with 60 refugees from Syria who made
the journey to Sweden. Their stories and words have helped me to develop this conceptual
framework of the journey and explore its three aspects.
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The Journey as an Act of Survival and Resistance
We were surrounded by death. It was everywhere. We escaped death back
home to find death in Libya. Death is around us. The way ahead might bring
death or life. We did not know. We were not sure. We were not sure of
anything, except of the death that was around us. (Fares, Stockholm, Sweden,
July 2016)
As Fares, who journeyed to Sweden via Libya, indicates starkly, the journey can become an
act of survival, in which refugees attempt to protect themselves and their loved ones through a
series of traumatic events. After the intensifying war in Syria undid social networks in their
home communities, and finding insufficient protection in neighbouring countries, refugees may
conclude that the journey is the only route to rights and protection. As I noted above,
governments seeking to contain and deter them transform the journey into an experience of
illegality and precarity. Examining the journeys is a way to analyse the impact of the crisis of
protection on refugees and to engage with their stories. This study challenges refugees’
“structural and systematic invisibility” (Malkki, 1995) and provides a counter-narrative to
migration studies that, as scholars have noted, have often presented refugees as powerless,
speechless victims (Malkki, 1996). Further, this account of personal experience challenges the
state-centric view of refugees as a burden or a threat (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). Refugees
are rather political subjects whom circumstances force them to challenge sovereign borders to
claim their rights. They are able, as Johnson (2014: 19) suggests, “to contest and demand
participation in the practices that shape a life and the meaning-making discourses that shape the
world.” We can understand their journey as “taking politics through which refugees assert their
own capacity to decide their own life conditions” (Johnson 2014: 181).

Yet, while interviewing refugees, I noticed that agency and resistance became most visible
while they recounted acts of survival that they did not intend or understand as political, which
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downplays any intentional agency on their part. In most such cases, refugees did not aim to defy
state sovereignty by crossing a border illegally. They were looking for safety and acceptance and
the rights that such border controls denied them. In fact, most did not want to leave their homes
and communities in the first place. The conditions of war forced them to do so and when
neighbouring regions failed to offer support, they set out on their fraught journeys in search of
protection. In addition to fearing a perilous journey and lacking adequate finances, many
expressed shame and humiliation about having to travel illegally and about the stigma of
becoming refugees in need of protection. They found uprootedness extremely hard to accept, and
possible illegality even harder. For Palestinians, leaving Syria meant another painful episode of
statelessness that further distanced them from their homeland, Palestine.

Yet extreme conditions left these refugees from Syria with no other choice. Thus we must
examine their agency and political acts separate from the notions of choice and intentionality.
Some migration scholarship tends to overemphasize refugees’ agency, which may well
romanticize their choice to leave. This view may depict refugees as deliberately challenging
states’ sovereignty by crossing borders, and observers may thereby seek to justify harsher
treatment of them. In reality, almost all refugees seek principally and ultimately protection and
safety. As well, overplaying their agency may undermine the dynamics of control and its painful
impact on their lives. Their stories show that they decide about their journeys in a precarious and
restrictive atmosphere, which constrains them and further problematizes the notion of their
agency.
Vicky Squire’s (2017) framework of “acts, interventions, effects” seems very apposite here. It
opposes the political simplifications of the binary “agency – structure” vis-à-vis refugees’ actions
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and positionality and offers new ways to analyse the politics of their “unauthorized” journeys
and their ability to act and resist while on the move. Squire adapts Foucauldian structure of
power and resistance to focus on “action” rather than on the actors and their uncertain intentions.
Building on Isin’s (2008) definition of political action, she explores how certain activities disturb
“established scripts and subjectivities” and create unexpected “political subjects” (Squire, 2017:
265). The model reflects on the transformative nature of refugees’ “unauthorized” journey when
they create new trajectories and spaces while they struggle for survival. Particularly useful, it
addresses their agency while also examining the lack of protection that forced them to leave. It
avoids the actors’ intentions and strategic orientations and gives space to examine the actions of
people who did not intend to act politically. Even so, they managed to create new and
unexpected spaces and trajectories through their journeys while interacting with control
structures. Refugees become political through their acts of resistance and survival, which stance
develops within a highly precarious atmosphere, as revealed by Fares.

I examine the survival and resistance dimensions of the journey in chapter three through
refugees’ stories of escape and displacement. Their experiences of escape unpack the key
motives that force refugees to leave their hometowns in search for protection. These motives
include insecurity and violence, fear of detention, fear of conscription, and loss of income.
Through their stories of displacement, I examine the lack of sufficient protection that refugees
suffer from in their camps and host communities in the neighbouring countries of Syria and how
these conditions force them to consider journeying towards destinations beyond their region. The
journeys are, however, conducted in disastrous circumstances, which turn them into messy,
complex and non-linear passages as I discuss in the next section.
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The Journey as a Messy, Complex, Non-linear Passage
I could not evaluate my decisions at the time. For example, the
smugglers I chose were too bad but I did not know that at the
beginning. No one can judge me since I was too desperate. I was
totally trapped. (Yamen, Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016)
Yamen’s degree of confusion reveals another theme that emerged in the stories refugees
shared with me. The journey’s complex and unpredictable events occur in the midst of
challenging conditions that escalate when refugees encounter structures of control. The journey
is rarely linear, but rather messy, with moments of “im/mobility” and “resistance/surrender.”
“Messy” best captures the journey’s true nature. Since this dissertation presents the personal, and
harrowing, stories of individuals, I wanted some of its language to reflect the emotional intensity
of their experiences.
I grasped the journey’s complexity when I tried to identify its specific starting and ending
points for each refugee. I could not readily delineate clear stages of departure, physical
movement, and arrival. Many refugees went through multiple moments of departure and
disconnection that were emotional rather than physical. After leaving their hometowns, most
faced multiple borders, often failing to cross and waiting long periods. Many became stranded at
points of their journey for weeks, months, even years -- detained, subjected to new border
controls, or having to wait for additional finances from families or friends. They experienced in
effect “a trajectory of wandering” (Khosravi 2011: 51).

Three striking examples illustrate this nightmare. Ammar is a Syrian refugee who was a
successful tour guide in Damascus. He speaks Arabic, English, German, and Persian. Fearing
further detention, he fled Syria in search of protection abroad. After 2011, several security
departments had detained him for participating in peaceful protests, later releasing him on bail.
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However, in March 2013, through connections, he learned that Syria’s notorious military
security was still looking for him, so he crossed illegally into Lebanon. He was unable to access
the facilities of the UNHCR there so lacked protection. He then journeyed to Thailand to apply
for UNHCR resettlement there, a process that would take years and with no guarantees of
success. He found life in Thailand hard and when his residency status there expired, he again had
to leave. He considered an “illegal” journey to Germany to seek asylum. However, his finances
were limited, and, even after borrowing money from family and friends, he could not afford
smugglers’ services so set out on his own. This “do-it-yourself” process took him through
Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan route (accessible at the time), to Germany, where he now lives.
Rawan, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, experienced similar circular mobility. He crossed into
Turkey, found a way to Malaysia, was smuggled from there into Germany, and pushed on to
Sweden. Shadi, a Palestinian refugee, was 17 when he spent more than nine months moving
between countries on his way to Sweden. Egypt detained him when he tried to leave illegally
with family. As a Palestinian refugee, he risked deportation to Syria, but he was released after his
family paid a huge bribe to a mediator. He then travelled to Turkey with help from his father’s
business connections there. He crossed then by boat to Greece, which detained him for months
for trying to leave illegally with a smuggler. After his release, he continued north on the Balkan
route, but Macedonia detained him for a few weeks. He crossed into Hungary and then into
Germany with the aid of relatives in Europe. He arrived in Sweden in February 2014; nine
months after he left Egypt and two years after departing Syria. Egypt, Greece, and Macedonia
had detained him, and his journey cost more than €40,000. I explore the conditions of journeys
such as those of Ammar, and Shadi in the following chapters.
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Arrival at the intended destination does not end the journey for many refugees, who may have
to seek asylum and wait months for residency permits. Sweden, with its Aliens Act of 20 July
2016, has lengthened the process for arrivals after November 2015. As I noted in the introduction
of this dissertation, the Swedish law states that asylum will mean temporary residence -- three
years for persons with refugee status, and thirteen months for those with subsidiary protection.
The law also limits family reunification to people who became refugees or received subsidiary
protection before 24 November 2015. Later recipients may now apply for family reunification
only in exceptional cases (Swedish Migration Agency, 2016). Thus refugees who left their
families behind now have limited hope for reunification. For them, the journey has not ended,
even at their intended destination and with asylum.

Family reunification takes a long time and is exhausting even for those who arrived before the
law came into effect. Rana, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, reached Sweden in November 2014
following a journey of four months, after being stranded in Greece and sending her younger son
with a smuggling network to Sweden before her. She had already left her eldest son and her
husband in Irbil, Northern Iraq, as they could not afford the cost of traveling as a family. When I
met Rana in Stockholm in July 2016, she was learning Swedish, applying her skills working in
the aviation industry, and waiting for family reunification – her journey continues.
The examples I considered suggest refugees’ multiple departures, unpredictable conditions,
loops of im/mobility, and unmarked arrivals. Such intense experiences, as in Yamen’s words,
reveal the journey as a messy, complex, non-linear passage. Exploring these elements assists us
with understanding the impact that the containment and deterrence policies imposed by countries
in the global north have on refugees from the south, especially where there is a lack of sufficient
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protection in refugees’ regions of origin. I study these elements of the journey in chapter four
through refugees’ experiences during their actual movement to Europe via the three popular
routes where they are subjected to extreme violence and precarity.

The Journey as an Emotional and Transformative Process
I lost my country to save my family … I lost my family and saved myself
… I lost myself … (Mourad, Canada, 2018)
Experiences of uprootedness affect people’s lives and shape their perceptions about their
identities and their lives. Refugees’ journeys, complex and messy, stand as “highly intensive”
(Benezer, 2002) or “life-changing events” (Benezer and Zetter 2014). As I outlined above, the
journey may expand from a temporary moment of movement to a process of transformation that
reshapes the person’s state of being and perception of home and belonging. My research has
uncovered the complexity and fluid notions of refugees’ positionalities and identities both during
their journeys and in their new localities. Their stories present the journey as an intense
emotional experience, involving separation pain, loss, guilt, and shame. Their physical and
psychological challenges affect their mobility and their perceptions of life in general. Many
refugees live with fear of detention and of losing their own life or that of a loved one. They may
experience humiliating treatment by smugglers, disastrous conditions at gathering points, sea
crossings in unworthy boats, and passage through the wilderness in the dark of night. Yet most
are still able to celebrate moments of joy, excitement, and accomplishment.

The intensity of these emotional experiences is overwhelming and unforgettable for them. I
heard stories of frustrated men who were humiliated during their detention or unable to protect
themselves and their families from violence or physical danger during encounters with smugglers
or while crossing borders. I met mothers who lost their babies at sea, or who had to send their
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children ahead with smugglers. Some told me about the shame they internalized when they had
to teach their children to lie about their identities in order to pass through airport controls. I
explore these stories in the following chapters – notable elements of refugees’ journeys that
profoundly affect their perceptions of self and life.
Additionally, the often-messy and -unpredictable journey may transform refugees’
positionalities and roles within their families and communities. As illustrated in the quote above,
refugees who could not protect their families from the horrors of war or from the devastating
conditions of their journey may feel they have lost their most important role as protectors.
Arrival at their destination turns refugees into asylum seekers with limited ability to work. They
may become dependent on social services and stop being providers, which affect their familial
and community relations. I examine these major changes in chapter five.

Their journeys alter refugees from war victims to political subjects whom authorities may
brand “illegal migrants.” At their destinations, they become asylum seekers and protected
persons, perhaps eventually permanent residents, even citizens with rights and responsibilities.
Thus a series of complex moments of transformation take them from one status to another. This
differs from the legal definition of a refugee, as I discussed in chapter one:

individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity
(OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR status, individuals
granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary
protection. (UNHCR, 2010: 3)
Their stories show that being a refugee transcends legal status to become an emotional state of
being (Khosravi, 2011). In fact, most of my interviewees were not officially recognized as
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refugees, despite their need of protection. Lack of sufficient protection had pushed them to
consider journeys despite their uncertainty and vulnerability, though also great aspirations and
determination. They decided to claim their rights as humans and seek protection elsewhere as
refugees, changing in the process from passive victims to vulnerable political figures creating
their own spaces and trajectories (Scheel and Squire, 2014). Thus, as I explained above, I use
“refugee” for any individual in need of protection, regardless of legal status. Edward Said
(2000), my inspiration here, distinguishes between the limited international political concepts of
“refugee” and the emotional notion of the lonely and isolated “exile.” Said sees exiles as
uprooted and existing in the “territory of not-belonging.” This emotional status renders identity,
belonging, and home fluid and changeable.
The journey of displacement and search for protection reshape a refugee’s perception of home
and exile. The case of Palestinian refugees from Syria, particularly from Yarmouk, in Damascus,
which I explore in the following chapters, exemplifies how multiple displacements during war
and the journey towards Europe reshape these refugees’ ideas about identity, home, and loss.
Palestinian refugees’ families have long experience with journey and exile. Much of the writing
on Palestinians and exile deals with reconstruction of identity in the refugee journey and exile.
Said acknowledges the dialectical relationship between exile, borders, self-awareness, and
national identity for Palestinians, addressing (1986) its uniqueness as it has been reproduced
repeatedly since 1948, through the wars of 1948, 1967, and 1982. Their current suffering in the
midst of the Syrian war is exacerbated by their exclusion from international protection, as I
discussed in chapter one, and by neighbouring countries’ discrimination and rejection against
them. I discuss these policies in greater detail in the next chapter.
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The case of Yarmouk reflects the new sense of loss since Palestinian refugees were forced to
leave that community in December 2012 and have been prevented from returning to it again.
This new displacement has affected their sense of identity. They reaffirm their identity as
Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk rather than as Palestinian refugees from Damascus or Syria.
They attempt thereby to reassert that they belong to Yarmouk -- their home, according to the
diasporic notion of multiple-home identity in exile (Chimni, 2004), and which they have lost like
their first diasporic home, Palestine. A young Palestinian refugee, now a resident of the
Netherlands, summarized this experience on his facebook page after the bombing of Yarmouk in
April 2018: “This is the smoke of my burning tent. This is my father and grandfather’s tent. I am
now a stateless refugee with no tent (facebook, 20 April 2018). Said (1986) refers to this
reconceptualization of identity as a communal affirmation of collective identity.

Syrian refugees do not share the same type of reconceptualization of communal identity as
Palestinians. To add to Syrians’ vulnerability, the current and complex conflict in their country,
often perceived as a civil war, has sharply divided them. While the nature of the conflict is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, it has, like most civil wars, destroyed any common sense of
identity among the people of Syria. In the midst of such strife, people suffer personal grief and
loss, while divisions between them add more pain and vulnerability to their experience in exile. I
examine the emotional toll and transformative impacts of the journey in chapter five where I
discuss in detail the set of sentiments that refugees suffer from during their search for protection.
Their stories reveal the heavy load of scars and traumatic memories they carry with them during
their journeys which influence their ability of settlement in their new localities.
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Conclusion
Referring to critical migration and mobilities literatures and to my own knowledge from
refugees’ stories, in this chapter I have explored the concept of journey as a consequence and a
reflection of the global crisis of protection. Lacking protection in their home region, refugees
decide to seek protection in the global north, thereby challenging government policies of
containment and deterrence.
Hearing refugees’ own stories, I developed a conceptual framework of the journey that
highlights three crucial dimensions. First, the journey is an act of survival against precarious
conditions and lack of protection. Refugees, who suffer from insecurities and violence during
war, escape their hometowns and seek refuge in neighbouring counties. Yet, when during
displacement, they do not find “conditions of independence and dignity which enable refugees
themselves to decide how they wish to cope with their predicaments” (Hathaway, 2007: 364),
they decide to journey elsewhere to gain their rights as refugees and as humans. Examining the
journey as an act of survival and resistance is significant as it shifts the focus of analysis towards
refugees’ agency and their ability to act unexpectedly despite the disastrous circumstances of war
and displacement. The stories show that, by deciding to leave, many refugees resist their own
desire to stay home or closer to home. In the case of Palestinian refugees, resisting having to
leave is, in itself, also an act of agency as it is also a way for Palestinians to assert their unique
political claim as stateless refugees. This approach also demonstrates how, through their
survival attempts, refugees are subject to illegality and imposed invisibility which in many cases
results in restricting their agency. Thus, this understanding of the journey challenges the
perception of refugees as powerless victims, presenting them instead as people with agency and
the ability to act unexpectedly. Yet, the approach avoids the misperception and
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overrepresentation of refugees’ agency in romanticized ways because it simultaneously
recognises the conditions of control and marginalization imposed on refugees during their
journeys.

Second, the journey turns out to be frequently non-linear, messy, and precarious. The notion
of agency is also useful in this context. I illustrated how problematic ideas of choice and
intention may be, particularly when making decisions to leave under such harrowing situations.
These conditions suggest that refugees’ journeys are often a series of complex loops of nonlinear, unpredictable, uncontrollable movements. Yet these same experiences can transform these
highly vulnerable refugees from powerless victims into political actors, who are able to create
new spaces and trajectories for themselves and their families. In this sense, examining the
journey as a messy and complex process can challenge states’ narratives that often render
refugees as powerless victims or as criminals when they challenge the bordering practices. It also
challenges states’ claims about their ability of controlling “unauthorized” migration, including
the movement of refugees. It problematizes the way that states often reject “unwanted” migrants,
including refugees, by securitizing their borders and the way that this response to the refugee
crisis has become normalized within the international community. This approach to refugee
journeys demonstrates how state practices fail to deter desperate individuals, pushing them
instead to travel through dangerous routes, which transform their journeys into messy and
complex passages that in many cases end tragically.

Finally, the third key dimension of conceptualizing the journey is as a highly emotional, and
transformative act that often reshapes refugees’ understandings of identity, self, home, and
belonging. Examining these feelings and transformations reveals the human cost refugees pay for
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their acts of resistance. These feelings are the price of challenging policies of containment and
deterrence, which mainly aim to keep refugees in their regions without sufficient protection. In
other words, these feelings demonstrate at the human level the emotional toll of the global crisis
of protection and how it invades the intimate space of refugees’ bodies and minds. In this sense,
understanding the journey as a transformative emotional experience enhances our understanding
of refugees’ predicament and challenges the dominant perception of them as faceless and
voiceless people. By focusing on the emotional toll of the journey, we are more able to
understand and treat refugees as humans. In fact, bringing the emotions to the discussion
challenges the absence and marginalization of emotions and feelings in social research, in
general and in refugee studies, in particular. Conceptualizing the refugee journey in this way
thus expands the idea of a journey from away from simply physical movement from one land
point to another to include the intense emotional experience that influence the lives of refugees
in their new localities. My unique positionality, as I explained above, helped me to grasp the
reality of this change. In my field research, many refugees saw me as a member of their own
community whom they trusted and therefore graciously offered me intimate and personal
insights about their painful experiences during the war and throughout their respective journeys.

In the following chapters, I draw on those individual stories and insights to reflect on the
impact of war and the absence of protection on the lives and trajectories of individuals. These
personal stories help us see refugees’ journey as a complex, messy, and life-changing experience
that involves often-acute precarity but also resists passivity as refugees exercise agency. This
viewpoint reveals the complex nuances of the global crisis of protection as reflected in the
human suffering of these refugees in their search for protection. We can then perhaps visualize
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the refugee journey as both a complex passage from the local to the global and a friction between
structures of governance and the intimate space of refugees’ bodies.

I will examine these elements of the journey as experienced by refugees from Syria who made
the journey to Sweden. In chapter three, I focus on the conditions of refugees’ journey during
wartime and in displacement in Syria’s neighbouring countries. I show how Syrian refugees
receive inadequate access to their rights in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Yet I also describe the
challenges they raise to as they seek to claim their human and refugee rights. Many reject the
dire circumstances of displacement by risking dangerous journeys to pursue protection in
Europe, thereby finding what Hannah Arendt evocatively terms “ways of mastering an uncertain
future” (1943: 111). Such acts allow refugees to take the lead in establishing new trajectories and
new lives for themselves. Following Arendt’s observation, the following chapters show the
agency of refugees who wrestle with the precarity that results from war, displacement, and
strategies of containment and deterrence to reach destinations where they aim to claim their
rights and start new lives.
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Chapter Three: Stories of Escape and Survival
Introduction
In chapter two, I examined the refugee journey as a reflection of the global crisis of protection
and proposed a conceptual framework to study it. I proposed that the journey evolves as an act of
resistance and survival, which leads to escape and displacement (this chapter). The journey then
develops as a non-linear, messy, and complex passage (chapter four); and, in the process, may
well transform the individuals who are undertaking it and impact their identities and roles
(chapter five). In this chapter, I look at the first dimension of the journey, resistance and survival,
as refugees decide to leave their homeland (escape) and begin a stay, perhaps temporary, in a
neigbouring country (displacement). I explore people’s reasons for leaving and the conditions of
their displacement as they cross borders into neighbouring countries.
To understand refugees’ journeys one must examine their choices, as well as their interactions
with various policies and actors during their escape, their displacement, and their travel towards
northern Europe. The details of their daily lives during wartime and displacement help explain
the motives for their journeys. Months or even years before they depart physically for Europe,
precarious wartime conditions and severe vulnerability in Syria, and displacement into
neighbouring lands, disconnect them emotionally from their communities. The absence of safe
and legal routes out leads many to risk their lives with smugglers.
The stories refugees told me ground this chapter’s first part, “Stories of Escape.” They seem
to indicate four key motives for leaving Syria: insecurity and violence, fear of detention, fear of
forced military service (conscription), and loss of income. The chapter’s second part – “Stories
of Displacement” -- analyses their conditions of displacement in each of three neighbouring
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countries -- Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. This discussion provides a brief comparative
perspective of how the conditions for refugees differ between countries. The third part considers
a distinctive case: the subset of stateless Palestinian refugees from Syria and their particular
conditions of precarity and rejection during both escape and displacement.

The stories in this chapter highlight aspects of resistance. Most of the refugees I interviewed
first tried to cope with wartime life in their country. Yet, especially after the violence intensified
and conditions worsened, all the interviewees left the country in search of protection elsewhere.
These departures were acts of both survival and resistance, as refugees rejected marginalization
and sought alternatives offering – they hoped -- greater rights and safety. As Johnson (2014: 19)
explains, refugees “contest and demand participation in the practices that shape a life and the
meaning-making discourses that shape the world.” And, as I discussed above, and explore here,
refugees’ agency, despite their vulnerabilities, reflects their ability to act when action is not
expected or even, perhaps, permissible.

The findings in this chapter, and those that follow, emerge from the stories of 60 Syrian and
Palestinian refugees who journeyed from Syria to Sweden between 2012 and 2015. I met and
interviewed them in the summer of 2016 in Hässleholm, Laxå, Malmö, Stockholm, and Uppsala
in Sweden. In addition, in the spring of 2016, I interviewed two refugees in Germany through
Skype and one Syrian family the Canadian government resettled in Kitchener, Ontario, after a
journey of displacement via Turkey.

Stories of Escape
In chapter two, I referred to refugees’ feelings of helplessness in the midst of the Syrian war,
which limited their choices and their ability to act. Since the crisis began in March 2011, people
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in Syria, lacking networks of support or protection, have daily faced vulnerability, insecurity,
and unpredictability as conditions threatened properties, jobs, loved ones, and life itself. As a
result, more than 5.6 million individuals have left in search of protection and support in
neighbouring states (UNHCR, 2018). They cite as principal motives insecurity, fear of detention,
fear of forced military service (conscription), and loss of income.

Insecurity

I personally witnessed the first three months of unrest in Damascus before I left with my
family for Canada on 4 June 2011. I recall the fear that I shared with my husband as we drove
through central Damascus one Friday evening. It was the end of March 2011, when weekly
protests at mosques followed Friday noontime prayers. Security forces often brutally attacked
protesters. The silence in the empty streets was unnerving in this usually crowded and lively
capital. There was a moment when I had to ask my children, in the back seat, to lower their heads
to avoid any bullets that might come from the dark corners of the empty streets. This was the
moment when I felt that things had changed and Damascus would never be the same.

Our concerns about insecurity and violence increased as military operations escalated and
fighting intensified throughout the country. I spoke later with many individuals from Syria who
had similar stories to my own of fear. As insecurity deepened, daily activities became harder to
maintain. Constant bombing, explosions, and kidnappings haunted residents and made them
afraid of going to work or even sending their children to school. Many families moved several
times within the same city in order to maintain their jobs. All these stories cited conditions of
violence and insecurity, fear of detention, and loss of employment and income, which all help
create economic insecurity and social vulnerability.
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These and other types of precarious conditions have forced millions of people to leave their
communities in search of stability and new opportunities elsewhere. The stories of Rajaa, Rana,
and Rasha, three women who lived in Damascus, and whom I met in Sweden after their long and
complex journeys, illustrate the insecurity and violence typical for people in wartime Syria.

Rajaa is a well-known Syrian actress. She is married to Wassim, a Palestinian refugee from
Syria, and they have two sons, Rami and Shadi. Initially, Rajaa did not want to leave Syria, but
her family insisted she depart with them to Egypt because they were concerned about her mental
and emotional condition. She explained:

From the beginning of the crisis, I was terrified by the war, the bombing, the
burnings, and the sounds. Our area was relatively safe but we were at the
borders with Daria, which was a hot zone. There was a particular bombing that
happened near our place, which caused me a kind of nervous breakdown … I
could not bear the situation anymore. I was terrified. I started using medication.
I used to hide in the corners of my house whenever I heard something. I even
stopped sleeping in my bedroom because it had big windows … I continued
rejecting the idea of leaving but I almost lost it. I was not able to focus on
anything. I lost my appetite. I was totally paranoid as a result of the bombing.
(Rajaa, Stockholm, July 2017)
Rajaa and her family fled to Egypt in 2012 to start new lives there. Yet after two years in
Egypt, they chose to journey to Sweden (see the next chapter for details).
Like Rajaa’s story, Rana’s reflects these elements of precarity. Rana and her family left their
home in Yarmouk in December 2012 for a safer part of Damascus. After more months of
suffering, they felt they had to leave Syria and moved to Irbil, northern Iraq, where her husband
found a job through some contacts. As I explained above, Rana ultimately headed to Sweden
with her younger son, leaving her husband and older son behind in Irbil. She described
conditions in Damascus:
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We left Yarmouk camp on 16th December 2012 when the air fighters bombed
the camp. We rented a house in the suburbs of Damascus where we lived in
continuous fear and instability. There was a lot of fighting and bombing on
daily basis on our way to work in addition to suffering at the checkpoints. We
used to face lots of difficulties in reaching our offices. I used to work at the
airport, and my husband was an accountant at Benetton Company, near
Damascus. The checkpoints were very scary, as we were never sure that we
would be able to pass and reach home. We stayed like this for six months.
(Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
Such insecurity was common to millions of individuals who have lived through the war in
Syria, as illustrated acutely in the story of Rasha, a widow from Damascus, whom I met in
Sweden after her horrible journey there with her three children. Rasha decided to escape with
them from Damascus after a bombing of the children’s school while they were in class. When
she got there, she found her daughter totally covered with broken glass. She observed about
Sweden:
At least we can sleep peacefully here … I can close my door and go to sleep. I
do not have to wake up in the middle of the night to rush to the basement
because of the bombing … We witnessed lots of horrors in Syria … bombs,
explosions, kidnaps, chopped heads … We have seen it all. Whatever we face
here, at least it is safe. Back in Damascus, I used to say my final goodbyes to
my parents every time I used to leave the house to go to work because I was not
sure that I will be back again … Do you remember the explosion of Al Hayat
hospital, downtown Damascus? I was there. I survived. It was a miracle. (Rasha,
Laxå, Sweden, July 2016)
The stories of Rana, Rajaa, and Rasha illustrate the common insecurity during the war. Their
stories reveal how Syrians have lived, and still live, in precarious conditions, whether destruction
of houses and communities or direct targeting of people’s bodies.

Many individuals have been subject to direct violence and threats of detention or death.
Khaled’s story reflects such danger. Khaled is a Palestinian refugee who lived with his wife and
two sons in Daraa in southwestern Syria. After March 2011, security conditions in the city
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deteriorated, and Khaled decided to send his family to Jordan to live with his wife’s parents. She
is a Palestinian refugee from Jordan who held a Jordanian travel document, and their children
had multiple entry visas. They moved in November 2012, and the youngsters had to renew their
residency permit every two months. After only six months that was no longer possible because
Jordan blocked admission of all Palestinian refugees from Syria (as of January 2013; see AlMonitor media site, Washington DC, 2014). Without documents the children became illegal
residents, but their registration with the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) allowed them to stay in school and receive basic medical
care. But the older son, who was seven, was epileptic, and UNWRA did not cover his daily
medication, for which the family now had to pay.
Khaled had remained in Syria, unwilling to leave his home. He had often heard his parents’
stories of displacement from Palestine in 1948 and feared living as a displaced person. However,
violence in Daraa grew. Members of the Syrian security forces attacked and assaulted him when
they invaded his house during a check of the area. They then attacked Khaled’s neighbour and
took him to a detention centre, where he died a few weeks later. Khaled’s parents decided to
leave, but not without their son. Khaled finally decided to go with his parents to Jordan, but its
new restrictions kept them out. The family decided to cross illegally, and Khaled chose to travel
separately. He gave his parents fake identity documents as a Syrian couple with a disabled young
son (actually a cousin), while he posed as the son of an elderly woman (also a relative). As with
other refugees, Khaled had experienced severe insecurity and violence and decided to start a
journey in search of protection and safety.
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Fear of Detention

As was the case with Khaled, many refugees from Syria had to leave their home because they
fear detention. Youssef, whom I interviewed in Hässleholm, Sweden, had a desperate story of
detention and lost many relatives during the war. His three brothers and nephew died in prison,
where Youssef was also detained for two months in 2012. During that period, four of his cousins
were also killed. All of the men in his family were wanted by the security forces. During
temporary release, Youssef bribed a security officer to help him obtain a passport so he could
move to Egypt.
The continual threat of detention indicates Syrians’ extremely precarious situation. Like
Khaled and Youssef, Fares had to leave Syria to avoid a very dangerous detention. Fares is a
young textile merchant from Hama. He arrived in Sweden with his wife and two-year-old son
after a long journey through Egypt, Libya, and Italy. I met Fares in Stockholm in July 2016, and
he spoke with me for more than six hours about his journey. In his opinion, his journey began
long before he physically left Syria. His wedding day marked the turning point: that day security
forces killed his best friend. Fares had no interest in politics, but his friend’s death drove him to
become active in the protests and start helping families in the besieged areas of the city.
His actions resulted in his detention in a prison run by one of Syria’s most brutal national
security services. Fares shared with me the details of the horrible torture that he experienced
during his detention which deserves attention beyond the scope of this dissertation. His detention
furthered his emotional departure from his homeland. He internalized the shame of helpless
humiliation during his detention. His words captured his shame, which undermined his identity
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as a man and as a husband, and his later reunion with his wife after his release reflected his
severe trauma. He wept while he asked me:

What should I show her? The blisters of my skin, the cigarette burns on my
legs, on my back, and on other parts of my body? She is too young to
understand this … How could I describe the humiliation I experienced in
prison? Would she still see me as the man who could protect her from the
whole world? Would she still be able to respect me? (Fares, Stockholm, July
2016)
Only a few months after his release, Fares learned that he was still wanted by the security
forces. Fear of further imprisonment, and the ever-present risk of death there, pushed him to
leave the country in less than 24 hours. He had to pay one million Syrian pounds (roughly
$15,000 U.S.) to bribe a security officer in Hama for details from his security record. Having
confirmed that he was wanted by security forces, Fares paid more money to obtain passports for
himself and his family and also to guarantee that security forces would not stop them at the
airport. Yet, and despite his legitimate fear of further detention, Fares was ashamed of leaving
Syria in such circumstances. I could sense his deep sorrow and guilt when he told me: “I did not
have a passport before. I never thought of obtaining a passport. I never thought of leaving Syria.
Never. I adore Syria. I adore Hama” (ibid.).

The entire journey came as a shock for Fares. He had not prepared for it and had no idea
about its trajectory. He sometimes looks back and is puzzled by the way it unfolded: “My
journey has been a complete shock for me. After all this time, I am still confused about its
events. I have not yet understood how did it happen, how it developed and how I managed
through it all.” This shock and confusion affirm the atmosphere of violence and precarity
surrounding the refugee journey. Refugees like Fares act out of fear and need of protection, and,
despite the substantial agency their departure represents, they act essentially to survive. As I
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illustrated in chapter two, although refugees may be creating their own trajectories and
unexpected scripts (Squire, 2017), any observer’s invoking of their agency problematizes their
choices and intentions within such extreme conditions.

As with Fares, Ammar, whom I introduced in chapter two, feared detention and fled to seek
protection abroad. When I asked Ammar about his detention, he summarized it:

If you want to document the sufferings of refugees, I would tell you that all
the risks and the hardships I faced during my journey from Syria to Europe
which took me through Lebanon, Thailand, Turkey, and the horrible sea
journey to Greece cannot be compared with the experience of detention in
Syria, particularly during the first two months. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany,
April 2016)
Ammar summarizes the horrors of detention and the emotional scars it left. The
experience often launches an early emotional departure, where refugees disconnect from
their community as they lose control over themselves and their conditions. This acute status
of precarity affects how refugees see self, home, and life in general. I analyse this
transformation in chapter five.

Fear of Military Service and Conscription

In addition to insecurity and detention, possible military service pushed many people to leave
Syria. Many families with young men left to avoid military service, which is mandatory for
males who are eighteen and older. They needed passports for their sons, who otherwise could be
stopped and detained at any Syrian army checkpoint. As well, many families living in areas
controlled by opposition groups left to prevent their sons being forced into the militias. These
forces also frequently stopped young men at checkpoints and forced them to fight against the
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regime. The story of Mahmoud, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, illustrates this fear. Mahmoud
left his home near Homs with his two sons to keep the older one from military operations.

In fact, the main reason that forced us to leave was my concern about my oldest
son who had to choose between joining the Syrian army or the Free Army.
Both options were totally refused. My younger boys were at school at the time,
but my fear of seeing my oldest son joining the military operations forced me
to leave the country as quickly as I could. (Mahmoud, Hässleholm, Sweden,
June 2016)
Salam, a Syrian teacher from Lattakia, also had to leave the country to avoid joining the army
or the militia:

People at my age are supposed to get armed and are forced to fight. This was
the main reason for me to leave. In fact, I am from the coastal area, from
Lattakia, but I used to work as a teacher in Al Hassakeh, in the east of Syria.
When the revolution started in 2011, I moved back to Lattakia, and there was
lots of pressure on me to fight with one side against the other, which I totally
refused. I did not want to be a part of the war and did not want to participate in
any fight. This was the main reason that forced me to think about departing, but
I had no idea where to go. (Salam, Stockholm, July 2016)
By refusing to fight and deciding to leave, such young men exercise their “right of
escape” (Mezzadra 2015), distancing themselves from the horrors of war. They disconnect
themselves from their realities and attempt to create their own scenarios and trajectories
(Squire, 2017).

Loss of Income

If the fear of having to fight inspires many departures, so does loss of income. Arad went
through multiple internal displacements. He lost his shop and thus his income. He is a Kurdish
Syrian who lived in Aleppo with his wife and two children, seven and ten years old. He repaired
automobiles and owned his shop, managing a number of workers. In 2012, when the opposition
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Free Syrian Army (FSA) militia entered the area, it became a target for the regime’s barrel
bombs. Arad lost his shop and decided to take his family to his village near Afrin, close to the
Turkish border. They stayed there for nine months, but he could not find a job and had no
income. He then decided to return to Aleppo. In March 2013 the FSA and the Kurdish militia
entered Arad’s former neighbourhood, and the regime started bombing again. Arad and his
family escaped back to the village and stayed with his father for two months. The house had no
power, no drinking water, and no public services. There were no jobs, Arad still had no income,
and the schools had closed. Since returning to Aleppo had become impossible, Arad considered
Turkey. Lacking travel documents, he crossed the border illegally.
Arad’s case represents a chronic condition for millions of Syrians. Loss of jobs and income
has, in fact, affected the whole population. As well as greater insecurity, people in Syria have
faced a collapsing economy, which forced millions of them to leave in search of protection,
safety, and support. In 2017, the World Bank estimated that Syria lost about 538,000 jobs per
year 2011-15 and had unemployment of 78 per cent, as more than 9 million Syrians were jobless
(World Bank, 2017).

Stories of Displacement
In this section, I examine the conditions of displacement that refugees describe in their
stories. In particular, I look at their fleeing to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, so we can compare
their situations in each of those states. Syria’s neighbours, including Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey,
and Egypt, have put up border controls to keep out Syrian refugees (Human Rights Watch,
2013). Thus these refugees’ precarious wartime conditions include crossing borders to those
states, where they may become illegal for that very act. Further, their illegal transit worsens their
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living conditions as displaced people in those states. They encounter new forms of vulnerability
and unpredictability by engaging with smugglers and border control.
The story of Arad, from Aleppo, and his family shows how this illegality amplifies refugees’
vulnerability and affects their displacement conditions. A smuggler guided them from their
village near Aleppo into Turkey through a Syrian military area that contained land mines. There
was a dam on the Turkish side near the border crossing, and when Turkish authorities open the
dam gates the river often becomes too deep and too dangerous to cross. That day the water was
above Arad’s knee, making the passage quite risky:

It was very difficult at the borders. We waited for about two hours and were
then ordered to run without looking back. We had to run through a rocky
river. I carried a suitcase on one side and my son on the other, running and
jumping from one rock to another. My kids were too young to keep up the
pace, and my wife was hardly able to manage her way. It took about half an
hour to reach the borderline, which was a razor-wired fence with holes in it
made purposely by smugglers to allow people to cross through to the other
side. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016)
The image of the foursome passing through fields with land mines and crossing a treacherous
river captures the plight of refugees escaping a brutal war, only to cross a border illegally at great
personal risk. During the interview, Arad’s voice reflected his shame at crossing illegally, and
his wife wept when she recalled the mud that covered them when they reached Turkey.
As with its border with Turkey, Syria’s border in the south with Jordan also made refugees
more vulnerable. The official border exit was closed, so refugees had to cross illegally through
unofficial exit points under the supervision of the Syrian opposition militia, which coordinated
with the Jordanian army, to receive them at the other side of the border. For example, Khaled and
his parents used an illegal crossing three kilometers from the official exit, amid constant
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bombing. They waited six hours before trucks arrived to take them to the border. They crossed
with another 200 people. Once they were on the other side, the Jordanian army took women and
children in one truck, and men had to walk for about 45 minutes to the first military checkpoint,
where border authorities inspected their identity documents. Khaled did not have a passport so
presented civil records of his new, fake identity as a Syrian citizen. He begged the officers to
allow him in and asked a woman pretending to be his mother to intervene, but she was already
having trouble remembering her new name. She was not a good actor. His father then intervened
as a stranger and begged the army officer as well. The official finally accepted Khaled, who told
us:

Jordanian authorities sent men with no passports back to Syria. They loaded
them in what refugees called “expelling buses” and pushed them back through
the borders … At 5:00 a.m. I started losing hope. We were told by the
intelligence forces that we will be thrown back to Syria, including my parents,
the disabled young man, and the old lady. No one was allowed without
passports. (Khaled, Berlin, April 2016)
This encounter is typical of dehumanizing practices at the Jordanian border. Despite needing
protection, refugees without official travel documents were immediately deported back to Syria’s
war zones. Refugees like Khaled, whom authorities allowed in, could be deported at any time -an extreme precarity, which makes refugees more vulnerable while displaced in neighbouring
countries.

During their displacement, the majority of refugees from Syria share similar vulnerabilities
and social marginalization. They do not receive the “sufficient protection” they deserve as
refugees, “fundamentally oriented to creating conditions of independence and dignity which
enable refugees themselves to decide how they wish to cope with their predicaments”
(Hathaway, 2007: 364). As I showed in previous chapters, this definition entails dignity,
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independence, and autonomy for refugees, who are “the victims of fundamental social
disfranchisement and uniquely within the protective ambit of the international community” (ibid.
350). This notion of protection, enshrined in international human rights standards and the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees, entitles refugees to a set of social and economic rights,
including the right to stay legally, to work, and to receive education and health care (Human
Rights Watch, 2016).

Yet Syrian refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries lack access to these rights and the
protection they deserve as refugees. Instead, they are subject to the domestic regulations of each
country (Akram, 2014), where ad-hoc policies give them precarious legal status and few rights.
Even worse, Lebanon and Jordan have not signed the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol and
make no attempt to implement international standards of refugee protection (ibid.). Egypt, which
has signed the 1951 Convention and the OAU Convention, places refugees in legal limbo, as its
domestic regulations do not adhere to the norms of international refugee protection (ibid.).

Turkey applies such standards, but only to individuals of European origin, while most asylum
seekers in Turkey are non-European (Soykan, 2012). It processes asylum applications from the
latter group in an atmosphere of uncertainty and vulnerability and requires them to leave in the
long term (ibid.). Its Law on Foreign and International Protection Act (LFIP, 2013) created
statuses of “temporary protection,” “secondary refugee,” and “secondary protection,” which
exclude Syrian (and other) refugees from permanent residency (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2015).
The act maintains the geographical distinction European/non-European and offers refugees no
path to integration or naturalization (Soykan, 2012). Temporary protection has rendered Syrian
refugees more precarious by making international protection in Turkey or in a third country more
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unlikely for them. Furthermore, it has reduced their ability to claim international protection if
they register for temporary protection in Turkey and then go to Europe hoping to settle there
(Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel 2016).

To summarize, refugees from Syria become extremely vulnerable and precarious during
wartime and as displaced persons living in neighbouring states. Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey,
which do not recognize them as refugees and deny them many social, economic, and political
rights, present dramatic examples of this precarity through systematic discrimination and
marginalization. In the midst of such conditions, thousands of families have developed
“negative coping strategies” (LCRP, 2015) to survive, such as arranging early marriages for
young girls, withdrawing children from school, putting some to work, and eating less(ibid.).
Such strategies exacerbate their social, economic, and emotional vulnerability.

In the following three subsections, I examine their new forms of vulnerability and intense
hopelessness in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Their stories reveal harrowing details of their
displacement and allow us to compare conditions in each country, which in turn force many to
continue on towards other destinations, mainly in Europe, where, they believe, better access to
rights is available.

Lebanon

There are more than 1.5 million refugees from Syria in Lebanon, with only one million of
them registered by the UNHCR (LCRP, 2015). Lebanon has about 4.5 million people, including
more than 450,000 Palestinian refugees, so one in every three residents is a refugee (ibid.). While
the UNHCR recognizes escapees from the Syrian war as refugees worthy of international
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protection, the Lebanese government does not, referring to them instead as “displaced
individuals” (ibid.). This precarious legal status (ibid.) limits their access to aid and basic rights,
such as health care, education, housing, and work. Further, it subjects them to domestic
regulations concerning residency and mobility. For example, in 2013 Beirut restricted the flow of
Syrian refugees into the country. Would-be entrants must show a flight or a hotel booking in
Lebanon or obtain supporting documents from a Lebanese sponsor. Those who plan to stay must
obtain a residency permit and renew it frequently, with fees too high for most refugees to afford
(Amnesty International, 2015). As a result, entering the country has become harder, and people
already there face new forms of discrimination and precarity. In January 2015, the government
began requiring Syrians to obtain visas to enter Lebanon, making it almost impossible for those
already there to renew their residency permits (Akesson and Badawi, 2017). Syrian men unable
to renew their permits could be detained and deported. These regulations make them more
vulnerable, particularly as authorities reject most renewal applications, further marginalizing
thousands of families (HRW, 2016b). As well, thousands of unregistered Syrian children born in
Lebanon lack documentation proving their identity – some 50,000 of them in 2016; legally they
do not exist (Reuters, 2016).

Syrian refugees, because of their precarious legal status, face rejection, discrimination, and
harassment in many areas of the country. Denying their refugee status, Beirut refuses to set up
official camps for them, forcing most to live in the most vulnerable areas, including the Bekaa
Valley and Akkar (Akesson et al., 2017), or in unrecognized, makeshift camps such as those
around Arsal, close to the Syrian border. These places offer deteriorating living conditions and
extreme insecurity (HRW, 2017). Organizations including Médecins sans frontières (MSF)
(2013a) and World Vision (2013) have frequently reported on these shocking conditions. People
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struggle to find shelter and food, and many have no access to health care or schools. This
situation hits unregistered refugees especially hard, as they have no access to aid. Furthermore,
the escalating conflict in Syria has created more refugees, increasing social and political tensions
against Syrians in some areas of Lebanon, which started in the mid-1970s because of Syria’s role
in the Lebanese civil war. Such hostility forces refugees to maintain low profiles and avoid
interaction with local populations.

Many Syrians in Lebanon work in seasonal farming and building, but most are exploited and
many receive no pay, as employers exploit their precarious legal status, which affects every
aspect of their everyday life (Banki, 2013; Sigona, 2012), including housing. Such status of
precarity negatively impacts their socio-economic and subjects them to severe marginalization
and exploitation in the absence of protection and support structures. For example, Ammar, who
crossed into Lebanon, moved into an old abandoned building in the north, 10 km from the
nearest village. Despite its inaccessibility, the rent was high. Because of widespread hostility
against Syrians, Ammar found it best to avoid the locals. Like many of his compatriots in
Lebanon, he found work in building and farming, but received virtually no pay. He was
mistreated and abused by the Lebanese police, but could not complain due to his illegal status.
Ammar therefore considered resettlement in a third country. He tried to register as a refugee at
the UNHCR offices in Beirut, but the massive crowds of applicants every day, and the abusive
Lebanese security forces there, discouraged him, so he thought about leaving for another
country. He explained:

My situation was very miserable in Lebanon; I was hungry and cold most of
the time and thus started planning to leave to a third country where I could
claim asylum. I thought of going to Europe through Libya, but my mother
strongly rejected the idea, given the high number of casualties through that
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route. Then I heard from a relative, who had moved to Thailand that the
UNHCR are accepting refugee resettlement applications there. (Ammar,
Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
Ammar’s words show how illegality can shape daily life for refugees in Lebanon. Lack of
adequate international protection pushes many refugees into illegality, which further
marginalizes them and leaves them open to exploitation. Ammar, desperate for social acceptance
and protection, considered Thailand after he learned that the UNHCR there had resettled some
refugees from Syria. He borrowed money from family members and friends for a new phase of
his journey, and he headed to Thailand. But he found life there different from what he had
expected, creating new forms of vulnerability for him:

I was not legally allowed to work due to my tourist visa, so I maintained a low
profile and found a job at a Pakistani restaurant for a minimum wage, which
barely covered my rent and daily expenses. Working conditions were tough. I
worked 13 hours a day, seven days a week. After two months, I found another
job at an Iraqi restaurant. The conditions were not better. In fact, it was a kind
of slavery, but I had no other alternatives. Time, as well as my illegal status,
were not on my side. My visa had expired while I was trying hard to look for
better working conditions.
I registered with the UNHCR hoping that I will be resettled in a third country
… After a year of waiting, I was informed by the UNHCR that my second
interview was postponed for another seven months. Moreover, my
resettlement application will require three years at least to be complete. At that
moment, I had to consider other options; I thought about turning myself into
the Thai police, where the UNHCR is supposed to interfere six months after
my detention, but I was discouraged due to the horrible conditions at Thai
prisons.
Instead, a friend of mine offered to assist me to travel to Germany through
Turkey. The journey would cost $5,000 U.S., which I didn’t have. My friend,
whom I helped many times before, offered to give me $3,000 U.S., and another
friend in Egypt gave me $1,500 U.S. So I started a journey towards Germany
via Turkey. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
Ammar summarizes some of the factors that push refugees to consider an expensive and risky
journey to Europe. Living illegally, social and economic marginalization, and lack of protection
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may lead them to conclude that Europe is their only choice. Yet such a journey may be messy,
complicated, and unpredictable, as it was for Ammar, who travelled from Syria to Lebanon, then
to Thailand, only to head back to Turkey in order to reach Europe.

Jordan
Jordan displays exploitation similar to Lebanon’s -- poor workplace conditions, risk of
detention and deportation, minimal access to social rights, and absence of support. The UNHCR
(2016) reported that Jordan had more than 600,000 Syrian refugees. It worked with the national
government to establish four official camps for them, locating 115,000 of them near the Syrian
border in Zaatari, one of the region’s largest camps (Akram et al., 2014). Conditions in the
camps are shocking – no schools for children and people crowding into small tents with no
privacy (UNICEF, 2013). The catastrophic conditions in the camps has pushed some desperate
families to marry off their daughters very young, creating new levels of victimization and
vulnerability (Save the Children Fund, 2014). Urban refugees in Jordan, about 80 per cent of the
total, frequently face rejection and discrimination, since it’s an expensive country to live in, and
refugees have few job opportunities and limited aid and humanitarian support (Akram et al.,
2014).

For example, Khaled, who left Daraa, Syria, and crossed into Jordan illegally, spent two years
in Amman without humanitarian assistance. His Jordanian employer humiliated and mistreated
him. Khaled explained to me that the situation was so desperate that many families were willing
to return to the camps. He believed that the majority of Syrians were mistreated in their jobs,
because of their illegality. Many put up with this, fearing detention or deportation back to Syria:
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“In Jordan, we had no rights, we were not allowed to work, which is essential to survive”
(Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016).

In July 2014, Jordan, assisted by the UNHCR, introduced biometric scans, including of the
iris, to facilitate registration of Syrian refugees (Jordan Times, 2014). Khaled worried that such
measures, especially the iris scan, might reveal that he was a Palestinian refugee from Syria,
since the authorities had previous scans from his pre-war visit to the country. He returned to
Syria in order to avoid detention. At the border, he found himself among hundreds of Syrian
families exiting Jordan. That day, Jordanian security forces assigned three buses to transport
people to Syria through the same illegal border point where they had entered Jordan. Khaled reentered Syria to start another chapter of his journey.

Turkey

Turkey is often held up as one of the more promising options of escape for Syrians, yet living
conditions there can be very precarious, creating differential inclusion (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel,
2016). Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, Turkey has received more than 3.5 million Syrian
refugees (UNHCR, 2018) and opened camps for more than 200,000 of them, although most
Syrians live in urban centers. Yet, as I noted above in this chapter, refugees in Turkey – officially
“neither refugees nor guests” -- have precarious and problematic status and so limited access to
health care, education, permanent residency, and work permits (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2015).
Many families live in crowded places with poor facilities. In Gaziantep, in southern Turkey,
many rent dilapidated houses with no running water or electricity. Humanitarian assistance
amounts to minimal quantities of food, and children collect plastic from the garbage to gain some
money (my field observation as a research assistant, Gaziantep, June 2015).
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Arad, who crossed illegally into Turkey, found charities selective in offering aid: “They
preferred to support Arabs over Kurds and more favourably Muslims … It wasn’t hard to tell that
they were affiliated with the Syrian opposition coalition, like most charities in Turkey” (Arad,
Kitchener, Canada, March 2016). Arad and his family found social interactions very awkward:
We moved to Avcilar district in Istanbul …11 Syrian refugees were badly
treated by the officials at that area. They prejudged all Syrian refugees as
traitors for escaping their country; instead, they thought we should have stayed
in Syria to fight the extremists. Some locals even refused to rent houses to
Syrians and kept questioning us about reasons for leaving Syria. They
persistently asked us to return, but how is that possible? There is war there, our
house was destroyed, how can we go back? Municipalities managed by
[President Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s [AK] party treated Syrians a little bit more
humanly and provided some assistance. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March
2016)
Many Syrian refugees are subject to stigma, humiliation, even rejection while they struggle to
establish new lives. Such barriers may affect work too. For example, Arad’s boss refused to pay
him for five months and forced him to work non-stop for many hours. Arad found another job
but was again at his employer’s mercy. He could not complain to the authorities because he had
no legal status:

In Turkey, they do not recognize us at all; our existence is simply not
acknowledged … My employer was generous with me but expected me to
work very long hours; he would wake me up early in the morning and kept
asking for more working hours. He was nice, but the working conditions
were pretty tough. Many people could not continue working in such
circumstances. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016)

Avcilar has a majority population of Alevis, who generally oppose Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict.
Alevism is a branch of Shi’a Islam practiced in Turkey and the Balkans among ethnic Turks and Kurds and is
related to —though distinct from—Alawism in Syria. Alevis make up 20 per cent of Turkish Muslims and comprise
the country’s largest religious minority (Harvard Divinity School, https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/alevism).
11
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Such conditions exploit refugees in the absence of security and social protection (Banki,
2013). This legal limbo also affects access to health care:

Hospitals refused to accept us because we are Syrians. When my daughter
broke her arm, I took her from one hospital to the other (three hospitals in
total), only to be denied by all three. I was desperate and contacted my
employer, who drove us to a hospital near Aksaray [in Istanbul],12 but when
they found out she is Syrian, they referred us to another place and a third place
… It was a public hospital, and if you are not registered within the system,
they won’t let you in. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016)
The government introduced identity cards (kimliks) for Syrians in order to ease access to
social services such as health care. But, Arad explains: “There was no kimlik when we arrived in
Turkey. We were among the first people who had the kimlik. But it did not help much and did
not make any difference. We were still denied access to health care even after we received it.”
Kimliks did not help with schooling either. Arad’s children could not attend Turkish schools
because they could not speak Turkish. To study Arabic (Syria’s language), they would have to
attend private schools, which Arad could not afford, so they missed school for two years:

I wanted to move to another country just to secure education for them. I
wanted them to go to school. I was ready to go back to Syria. I did not care
about the war there. I wanted to see my kids attending schools. They have
been out of school for more than three years. I could not see them roaming
the streets without any education. (Arad, Kitchener, Canada, March 2016)
Arad became one of the few lucky Syrians in Turkey to register with the UNHCR’s
resettlement program in Istanbul in 2013. The UNHCR interviewed him in Istanbul and in
Ankara, and a few months later the Canadian embassy in Ankara accepted his resettlement
application. While he and his family waited for the paperwork, they remained in legal limbo,
with no social assistance or schooling and minimal access to health care and other public

12

Aksaray is a district in Istanbul.
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services. A year later, when they arrived in Canada, they received permanent residency at the
airport, which gave them full access to social rights, including education, employment, health
care, and social welfare. His wife cried tears of joy and relief watching her children enter their
Canadian school for the first time.
For Arad, displacement had given way to resettlement. Acceptance by the UNHCR’s program
had launched him and his family on a long process of applications, interviews, and waiting, but
his journey towards protection was now legal and regulated (Johnson, 2014). They arrived in
Canada legally, as Convention refugees. Thousands of other refugees, including Ammar and
Khaled, were desperate to achieve the same but, unable to become Convention refugees, lived,
often in rough conditions, as displaced persons, experiencing “mobility in ways that are outside
the strict policies and procedures of management and control governing border regimes”
(Johnson, 2014: 3).

During this process, many find themselves captives of a global system of border control that
prevents and deters them rather than protecting them (Johnson, 2014; Mountz, 2010; Squire
2011). Many aiming for Europe encounter the EU’s “non-entrée” regime as irregular migrants
(Hathaway and Gammeltoff-Hansen, 2015), as I discussed in chapter one -- hence their
precarious journeys to circumvent restrictive border controls. They have failed to gain
international protection through asylum after fleeing war in their homelands, but reject the
uncertainty of displacement, and their illegal journeys towards Europe show them to be both
extremely vulnerable yet acting politically, “taking politics through which refugees assert their
own capacity to decide their own life conditions” (Johnson 2014: 181). Yet, as chapter two
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explained, these acts of survival and resistance are also moments of extreme vulnerability and
uncertainty.

The particular case of Palestinian refugees from Syria illustrates the devastating impact of
regional political unrest, restrictive border controls, and social marginalization on these stateless
refugees, who, fleeing war in Syria, endure acute precarity and rejection.

Escape and Displacement: Palestinian Refugees from Syria
In this section I examine the case of Palestinian refugees from Syria who experience wartime
and displacement in neighbouring states. I do so to illustrate the acute precarity and rejection that
statelessness imposes on these refugees. It is worth noting here that Syria was considered home
by many Palestinian refugees who, as illustrated earlier, were forced out of Palestine in 1948.
Until 2011, they enjoyed better living conditions than their compatriots in neighbouring
countires. They integrated into social and economic life, faced few barriers to work or mobility
(Brand, 1988), and had full access to public services, such as education and health care. They
also received assistance from UNRWA, which provided Palestinian refugees in Gaza, the West
Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria with education, health care, relief and social services, camp
infrastructure and improvement, microfinance, and emergency assistance (UNRWA, 2016a).

Since March 2011, security has deteriorated for Palestinian refugees in Syria, as for their
hosts. The intense fighting has affected all the Palestinian camps in Syria and displaced most of
their residents, adding to their vulnerability as stateless persons (UNRWA, 2014a). More than
160,000 of them lived in Yarmouk (Mukhayyam al-Yarmouk or Yarmouk Camp), the largest
Palestinian refugee community in Syria (UNRWA, 2002). It was my home all my life before
coming to Canada in June 2011. Thus my notes and observations about the crisis there derive
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from my life there and from my daily interactions and communications with my family, friends,
and community members who witnessed the events before and after being forced to leave
Yarmouk on 17 December 2012.

Yarmouk was not a refugee camp in the standard sense, but rather a densely populated district
at the southern edge of Damascus, with a diverse demographic that included impoverished
neighbourhoods and also thriving commercial areas, home to thousands of Palestinian and Syrian
middle-class professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and wealthy merchants. During the first
months of the conflict, Yarmouk seemed a safe haven for thousands of Syrian families seeking
refuge from the intense fighting in the surrounding areas, and the population mushroomed. On 16
December 2012, however, a Syrian fighter jet attacked a local mosque, killing tens of civilians.
The next day, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) opposition militia and fighters of the extremist Jabhat
Al Nusra entered the district from the south. Fearing the consequences, on the morning of 17
December thousands of inhabitants fled towards other parts of Damascus. People dragged their
families and carried their small suitcases and plastic bags, leaving everything else behind, and
started a long journey of displacement and vulnerability. Safieh is a Palestinian woman from
Yarmouk, whom I interviewed in Sweden. She reported:

We lost everything. We used to live in Yarmouk. The armed groups attacked
the area in December 2012, so we had to leave. It was impossible for us to stay
with them because the area will be a hot zone and we will be under fire from
both sides. We will lose our lives. We were mainly afraid about our kids.
(Safieh, Stockholm, July 2016)
For many, leaving Yarmouk was a painful reliving of the memories or the story of the
Nakbeh (Catastrophe) of May 1948, when their parents were forced to leave their homes and
towns in Palestine and later became stateless refugees. After fleeing Yarmouk, people shared
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overcrowded apartments with relatives or neighbours, often in dire conditions, while others with
fewer resources slept in the public parks or streets of Damascus. Returning to Yarmouk quickly
became impossible because of the intensified fighting there and regime forces’ subsequent siege
in July 2013. In April 2015, UNRWA announced that lack of safe access had crippled its
humanitarian efforts there for the thousands of civilians trapped inside and under the control of
two extremist fighting groups, including ISIS (UNRWA, 2015a).

What is distinctive about the Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk, and from other Palestinian
camps in Syria, is the collective sense of loss that they have shared since their statelessness
began in 1948. They and their descendants are now reliving this through the Syrian conflict, yet
again leaving everything behind and seeking refuge elsewhere. In fact, as I showed in chapter
two, this new displacement once again challenges their conceptualization of home, identity,
return, and visibility as refugees. For the young generation, born and raised in Yarmouk, leaving
it created a new crisis of loss, with the district as the “home” to “return” to. For these young
people, Palestine had always been the lost “homeland,” which they knew only through the
stories of their parents, whereas Yarmouk presented their actual “home,” where they lived and
belonged.

Estimates suggest that more than 50 per cent of Palestinian refugees from Syria are now
displaced (BADIL, 2015). This new diaspora flows directly from their precarious legal status
and unresolved statelessness, as the Introduction outlined. Palestinian refugees have been
unable to practise their right of repatriation, arguably the only way to achieve recognition for
and preserve their collective identity, national narrative, and right of self-determination (Said,
1986). The systematic denial of their right of return is imposed by Israel and is maintained by
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excluding them from international protection. Ironically, this denial is sustained at a time when
some governments in the global north increasingly encourage repatriation as the ideal solution
for refugees, even against their will (Chimni, 1998). Thus Palestinians demonstrate how
stateless refugees become subject to other states’ (un)willingness to accept them as citizens and
how proposed solutions are the result of political and authoritarian calculations and international
relations, regardless of refugees’ rights and well-being. Even so, UNHCR statistics omitted
Palestinian refugees from Syria when it estimated that 10 per cent of the 3.2 million refugees in
Syria’s neighbouring countries were “acutely vulnerable individuals and need resettlement
elsewhere” (UNHCR, 2014b). Thus they could not resettle elsewhere or exercise their historical
“right of return” (an idea anathema to Israel, which made them stateless).

Those Palestinian refugees who left Syria for neighbouring countries entered legal limbo,
with no protection, restrictions on their movement, and social marginalization (Human Rights
Watch, 2014a, 2014b, and 2014c). Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt criminalize, detain, and
discriminate against some of them (ibid.). Hundreds have been detained and, on some
occasions, deported back to Syrian war zones, in a clear breach of the international principles of
refugee protection (Amnesty International, 2014a; Human Rights Watch, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c).

Since 1948, Lebanon has been host to approximately 450,000 Palestinian refugees (UNRWA,
2014a). Today more than half of these people live in refugee camps, all much poorer than
Yarmouk. In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees have always faced legal restrictions and structural
discrimination (Amnesty International, 2014a, 2014b), engendering poverty, overcrowding,
unemployment, poor housing, and lack of infrastructure. Lebanese political tensions towards
Palestinian political factions, a legacy of the mid-1970s’ civil war, make a bad situation worse.
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Officials in Lebanon often treat Palestinian refugees as a security burden and a political threat
(Nayel, 2013), and the xenophobic rhetoric against them is clear in, for example, politicians’
public statements (ibid.).13 Palestinians in Lebanon are prohibited from owning property,
entering a number of professions, including medicine and law, or obtaining social security (ILO,
2012), making them marginal socially and economically, so they crowd in slum-like camps that
lack even basic infrastructure (Amnesty International, 2014b).

The general Lebanese disdain for Palestinians extends to Palestinian refugees from Syria
(IRIN, 2012). The government was reluctant to receive them (IRIN, 2012), so they had to obtain
special visas and pay large fees before entry (UNRWA, 2014b). New rules of August 2013
restricted their mobility within the country and totally blocked any more of them from arriving
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). Further, authorities have detained many who were using forged
documents to leave Lebanon through Beirut Airport. These Palestinians are often deported to
Syria, which may detain, torture, even kill them (Human Rights Watch, 2014a).

Even Palestinian refugees from Syria who entered Lebanon before the total blockade of
August 2013 have no legal status or protection (ibid.). They lack the basics, including food,
housing, health care, and schooling, although UNRWA, which was already badly stretched
(BADIL, 2015; IRIN, 2012), offers them limited assistance. Even though Lebanon does not
recognize them as refugees, the UNHCR won’t deal with them because they are under
UNRWA’s umbrella, as I explained above. Yet in May 2015, even UNWRA, short of resources,
halted cash assistance to them for housing (UNRWA, 2015b). Severe poverty and costly housing

For example, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil announced on twitter that he “supports giving citizenship to children
of Lebanese female nationals, except if they were married to Palestinians and Syrians” (17 September 2016). He
later added: “This restriction will preserve Lebanon’s entity,” (An-Nahar, 2018).
13
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forced many families to share overcrowded shelters without furniture, clean water, and sewage
utilities. The adults may not work in Lebanon, leaving them on the margins.

In Jordan, Palestinians from Syria face similar restrictions and discrimination. Since the
Syrian conflict began, Jordan has further restricted their mobility (UNRWA, 2014c). In January
2013 the prime minister announced: “Jordan has made a clear and explicit sovereign decision to
not allow the crossing to Jordan by our Palestinian brothers who hold Syrian documents … They
should stay in Syria until the end of the crisis” (Al Monitor, 2014). Authorities would now detain
illegal entrants and deport them to Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2014b and 2014c), so any such
arrivals from before January 2013 would need to keep a low profile to avoid the same fate (Al
Monitor, 2014). This state of fear prevents such refugees’ integration within host communities
and increases their chances of facing exploitation and discrimination.

Making matters even worse, Palestinian refugees from Syria lack official legal status in
Jordan. Like Lebanon, Jordan does not recognize them as refugees, and – they are ineligible for
UNHCR protection as they are subject to UNRWA’s mandate. Thus they may not settle in
UNHCR refugee camps or seek humanitarian relief outside the camps. As well, lacking legal
status and UNHCR recognition, they may not work or receive Jordanian social services (Al
Monitor, 2014), all of which makes their situation almost unbearable.

As in Lebanon and Jordan, so in Turkey: the 10,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria who
went there experience similar precarity and illegality. Authorities there often refuse to recognize
their Syrian travel documents (BADIL, 2015). A Palestinian refugee whom I met in Kills, in
southern Turkey, had entered Turkey illegally with her family through a 3-m-deep tunnel:
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As Palestinians, we face another tragedy on the top of the horrible journey that
we went through to reach the borders -- they won’t allow us to enter. The
Turkish government does not recognize our travel document as Palestinian
refugees from Syria. They do not accept us as refugees the way they accept the
Syrians. (Palestinian refugee family in Kills, Turkey, June 2015)
Like other states in the region, Turkey does not recognize Palestinians as refugees. They have
limited access to health care and education and may not obtain work permits or legal status
(Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2016). Families lack aid and a sustainable income, and, although there
are no UNRWA services in Turkey, the UNHCR is outside their grasp (BADIL, 2015). The
husband of this Palestinian refugee described the struggle for survival:

I am now in debt of about $600-700 U.S., and I am not the only one. All of us,
all the families here, are suffering and are in debt for their food bills. I was
supposed to pay the rent two days ago. I do not have the money for that, and
many, if not all, the families are in the same position. (Palestinian refugee in
Kills, Turkey, June 2015)
As in Turkey, so in Egypt: Palestinian refugees from Syria who arrived after 2011 also lack
protection. In fact, the country’s political tensions have hurt them, particularly the close links of
such Palestinian political factions as Hamas to the currently banned Muslim Brotherhood. The
politicization of their situation affects their living conditions and limits their access to schools
and health care (Relief Web, 2014). Wassim, a Palestinian refugee from Syria, moved to Egypt
with his wife, Rajaa, and their sons, Rami and Shadi, in March 2013. Wassim explained to me:

The main thing was the legal limbo in Egypt. According to the Egyptian law,
if you are an Arab who is living in Egypt and you enrolled your kids at local
schools, you are eligible to receive a renewable temporary residence for one
year. Palestinians who came to Egypt at the early stages of the Syrian conflict
when Muslim Brothers were in power [June 2012-July 2013] were issued with
such residencies and were able to renew them. When Muslim Brothers came
out of power, there was a total mess. No one could take a decision, while
restrictions started to increase on the entry and residency of Palestinians from
Syria. For example, members of my family who arrived in Egypt before me
were able to obtain and renew their residencies. This was not the case for me.
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I used to check on my status regularly, and the officers used to send me away
without an answer. At the end, I had to pay a bribe in order to obtain a
residency. (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016)
Political unrest in Egypt has affected Palestinian refugees from Syria, as it has for other
refugees. Wassim, for example, wanted to set up a business and stay, but political events
interfered:

During this time, I established a business with an Egyptian partner. However,
while I was waiting for my residency, the partnership agreement was not
officially recognized. We were involved in exporting frozen vegetables from
Egypt to the Gulf States. I invested the amount of $300,000 in that business
and I was still without a residency. Things went really bad when the military
forces came in power [July 2013] and Gulf States stopped importing stuff from
Egypt. We were affected badly as the value of our products went down by
about 80 per cent. Electricity rates went up madly when President Sisi came
in power [June 2014]. The cost of freezing our product increased dramatically
from 200 Egyptian pounds to 700 pounds and we were not able to sell it. This
situation lasted until I left Egypt in July 2015. It lasted about two years.
(Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016)
The UNHCR, as I discussed above, may not help Palestinian refugees from Syria living in
Egypt to resettle outside the region (UNHCR, 2014b), and, as stateless refugees, they lack the
means to facilitate their “right of return.” As a result, thousands of them join other desperate
refugees from the region who seek protection and acceptance elsewhere, most of them in
northern Europe (Almustafa, 2018). As Wassim explained, “We were determined to try leaving
Egypt … We had no other choices. We were left with only one option, which was to depart for
Europe” (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016). Yet “non-entrée” regimes there have restrictive
border controls and visa policies against would-be arrivals from Syria, so such measures forced
them to travel illegally and through dangerous routes.

Such restrictions hit Palestinians from Syria hardest of all. In fact, restrictions against their
movement started early in their journey. For example, Egypt criminalizes refugees who attempt
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to depart illegally towards Europe (Amnesty International, 2014c), and while it might release
Syrians quickly, it often detains Palestinian refugees in shocking conditions and then deports
them to Syria (Amnesty International, 2014d; Human Rights Watch, 2013). The case of the
“Karmooz Refugees” is notorious. A group of 74 Syrian and Palestinian refugees fled Turkey by
boat on 23 October 2014 hoping for refuge in Europe. After a dispute, the smugglers left them on
Nelson Island, close to Abu Qir, Alexandria. Egyptian coast guards then arrested the group,
which included 15 women and 15 minors, seven under 10, and one only 10 months old. The
group was detained in poor conditions in the Karmooz police station in Alexandria for almost a
year and released in the summer of 2015 after being accepted as resettled refugees in Germany,
Sweden, and France.14 The last group departed the police station in September 2015, leaving
behind one Somali refugee, 17, whom no resettling country would accept (Center for Refugee
Solidarity, 2015). This example, like other similar cases, illustrates how lack of sufficient
protection and legal routes to claim refuge and rights has pushed many refugees into multiple
forms of precarity and irregularity. Their precarity expands from wartime Syria to include its
neighbours and all phases of their journey towards their destinations in Europe. The conditions
of these journeys are the focus of the following chapters.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have illustrated, using refugees’ own stories, the circumstances of wartime
that pushed them to escape Syria. Thereby displaced, they first sought to settle in neighbouring
countries. Later they journeyed to Europe in search of protection (see chapter four). Through
their words, I have examined the severe precarity that many experienced and that in turn shaped

14

I followed news of this particular group of refugees through a facebook page set up for them:
https://www.facebook.com/search/str/%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8A+%D9%83%D8%B1%D9
%85%D9%88%D8%B2%23karmooz+refugees/stories-keyword/stories-public
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their decisions about the journey. By using their stories and words, I have shown their experience
of insecurity, fear, and uncertainty during the war in Syria, and then their conditions of limbo
and inadequate protection during their displacement in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. In the
distinctive case of Palestinian refugees from Syria, I have showed how leaving added another
painful episode of statelessness and further distanced them from Palestine, their homeland, which
they or their families lost in 1948.

These precarious and vulnerable conditions emerge in the absence of protection and because
of restrictive policies on asylum and border control. Such circumstances turn refugees into a
“disposable commodity” (De Genova 2004:179), subject to normalized violence and
marginalization, all of which make them more socially vulnerable through further displacement.
It is these chaotic conditions that they reject when they decide to leave the region in pursuit of
greater protection and security. Their decisions to depart – first Syria, later the region -- are in
fact acts of survival that they make to protect themselves and their families from the horrors of
war and the vulnerabilities of displacement.

Through this understanding of the refugee journey, I aim to challenge the negative portrayal
of refugees as merely victims and show rather how their decisions to leave reflect high degrees
of agency. Their stories reveal their refusal to accept a vulnerable and marginal situation when
they decide to journey towards other destinations in search of greater safety and access to rights.
In other words, and as I noted in chapter two, they emerge as political actors, who reject
wretched conditions and strive for more rights and security, despite their reluctance to leave their
country or their region. Their agency is visible through their ability to create unexpected scripts
and trajectories (Squire, 2017). Yet, as their stories make clear, this agency is not a deliberately
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political move, as most did not wish to leave their home. They acted out of their fear and need
for protection as they sought to escape the precarious conditions and violence around them.
They usually decided to leave in extremely vulnerable and constrained circumstances. Thus their
agency here is interwoven with precariousness. Consequently, because of those unsettled
conditions, we should not overemphasize the notion of agency or romanticize the act of leaving.
Nevertheless, this approach to the journey can inform our understanding of the global crisis of
protection and reveal its harrowing impact on the lives and trajectories of refugees who escape
war for the confines of structures of control and a failing refugee regime incapable of protecting
them, as they deserve. I develop this discussion of the refugee journey hoping to help create new
ways to think about refugees and protection based on the human experience, which can
ultimately inform refugee studies and global frameworks of protection and acceptance.
As refugees continue their journeys towards northern Europe, they encounter European “nonentrée” regimes, which, as the previous chapters revealed, many states have set up to keep
refugees away. The resulting legal and official blockade leaves refugees with few choices but to
try risky, illegal routes, which further mess up their journeys and increase the human suffering en
route, as chapters four and five reveal.
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Images of Yarmouk

Yarmouk June 2012: https://arunwithaview.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/yarmouk-damascus/
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Yarmouk (January 2014): https://www.unrwa.org/crisis-in-yarmouk

Yarmouk (April 2015): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20773651
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Yarmouk (May 2018): http://www.actionpal.org.uk
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Chapter Four: The Non-linear, Messy, Complex Journey to Europe
Introduction
In chapter two, I developed a three-part framework for exploring the refugee journey:
survival and resistance, leading the refugee to escape from Syria and to displacement within the
region (chapter three); the non-linear, messy, complex journey to Europe (this chapter); and the
emotional, transforming, life-changing experience (chapter five). Chapter three examined the
escape from Syria and displacement within the region – as forms of survival and resistance.
Refugees talked about their insecurity and fear during wartime and their marginalization and
exclusion in displacement. I showed how refugees’ decisions, while in displacement or still in
Syria, to leave the region reflected a refusal to live with such poor conditions. Their devastating
situation, combined with restrictive border control shaped refugees’ decisions on how and where
to head, often through dangerous, illegal routes, to find protection and acceptance. A number of
the refugees I interviewed were determined to avoid the humiliation of displacement in
neighbouring countries and decided to journey towards northern Europe directly from Syria, but
they too had illegal and precarious journeys.
Through the refugees’ stories, I examine the messy, sometimes-violent unpredictability of
their journeys, notably the multiple loops of their non-linear movements. My approach speaks to
the literature of non-linear, precarious, “unauthorized” journeys made by forced migrants,
including refugees (Briden and Mainwaring, 2016; Crawley et al., 2018; Gill, Caletrioa, and
Mason, 2011; Hassan and Biorklund, 2016; Kaytaz, 2016; Khousravi, 2011; Squire et al., 2017).
Such endeavours often prove costly. Journeys often end with death, and survivors may emerge
with transformed identity, self-awareness, and positionality (discussed in chapter five), all of
which affect their new lives and trajectories.
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As I explained in the Introduction, I follow the storylines of refugees’ journeys and hold my
reflections until the end to avoid breaking the flow of the stories and to place refugees’ words at
the center of the analysis. I draw on the stories I collected during the spring and summer of 2016,
when I interviewed 60 refugees from Syria who made the journey to Sweden, and two of whom
ended up in Germany during 2012-16. I focus on a few of these stories -- for example, on one
family’s multiple routes, as they became separated and took multiple routes -- a powerful
instance of refugees’ messy, unpredictable, often-harrowing journeys in search of protection.

I consider these stories I concentrate on to be representatives of the many others I heard about
the journey from Syria to Sweden and treat them as such. I selected them because they reflect
clearly and deeply the intense messiness and unpredictability of refugees’ journeys and share
much in common with other journeys refugees made during the study period. Through these
stories, I explore the realities of the journeys, especially three. First, how did they decide who
should go and who should stay? Second, how did they choose certain routes and pathways over
others? And, third, how did they travel from Syria? what types of transportation did they use?
and how did they cross borders and engage with smugglers, coast guards, and other actors while
on the move?
I follow the refugees’ stories during their actual movements towards northern Europe, through
three main pathways (see maps of routes and journeys):

-

the ‘Egyptian route’: by sea from Egypt to Italy and thence with smugglers or by train to
Sweden

-

the ‘Turkish route’: by sea from Turkey to Greece and thence by air or on land through
the Balkan corridor to Sweden
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-

the ‘Libyan route’: by sea from Libya to Italy and thence with smugglers or by train to
Sweden

Migration and border scholars have examined these routes to map and document refugee
journeys towards Europe. “Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat” (Squire et al., 2017)
examines the impact of European policies 2015-16 on the journeys to Europe, especially through
the European Agenda on Migration, which aimed to provide legal routes and improve reception
facilities. “Unravelling Europe’s ‘Migration Crisis’: Journeys over Land and Sea” (Crawley et
al., 2018) explores patterns of migrant journeys to Europe and decision-making conditions. It
challenges the so-called European migration crisis and the notion of migrants’ linear journeys
from country of origin to that of resettlement. Both research projects explore Mediterranean
routes and shed light on conditions of the journeys (often non-linear and complex) and of the
arrival points in Europe. Both projects use in-depth qualitative interviews to unravel the impact
of immigration and border policies on refugees’ journeys. In my work, I engage with refugees’
stories, but do so as an insider. I observe the refugees as an ethnographic participant myself, and
my knowledge of the interviewees’ refugee community, and my personal journey of
uprootedness and loss, inform my research. My position as insider allowed me to explore
refugees’ detailed experiences, feelings, and transformations of positionality and identity while
mapping their journeys towards their aimed destinations. Through this process, I position
refugees as the prime source of knowledge and examine the painful, sometimes-tragic, yet nearheroic events refugees experience during their search for protection.
By using refugees’ personal stories, I explore the daily realities and conditions of their
journeys and reveal the diversity of their experiences, backgrounds, and aspirations, as well as
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showing how messy and complex their journeys can become. My work engages with refugees’
stories to explore the personal impact of the global crisis of protection on their bodies and lives. I
examine the journey’s transforming impact and draw on refugees’ emotional and innermost
struggles en route, which change them dramatically. By doing so, I conceptualize refugee
journey as a friction between the global structures of governance and the intimate space of
refugees’ bodies. I argue here that refugees’ words uncover these connections and help us fathom
the global crisis of protection, which, as discussed in chapter one, results substantially from
containment and deterrence policies of parts of the global north – especially, in this study, the
EU -- against refugees from the global south. The suffering of refugees on their journeys brings
home the effects of these policies on the ground, as this chapter reveals. As I said in chapter
three, refugees rarely share these sentiments with foreign researchers, but I was able to learn
about these particular feelings due to my positionality as a Syrian researcher, who had
undertaken a journey, and had been through similar experiences. Most of my interviewees
treated me as an insider who could feel their pain and who, in addition, shared similar sentiments
of loss and helplessness, but also determination and hope.

The Egyptian Route
On this route, refugees use the services of smuggling networks to depart from illegal points
on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast near Alexandria and take fishing boats across the sea in towards
Italy – usually Sicily -- and then head north by land towards Milan. From there, they continue
north, either with smugglers in their cars or by train, to Sweden. Until July 2013, Syrians did not
need an Egyptian visa and could fly from Damascus to Cairo using passports, making it a
popular route. When Egypt’s military overthrew President Morsi, they imposed visa rules on
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Syrians (Fox News 2013; The Guardian; 2013).15 Palestinian refugees from Syria had until then
used travel documents issued by the Syrian authorities.

In Egypt, smuggling networks target refugees from Syria by using mediators (middlemen),
often Syrian. Some ‘mediators’ are themselves refugees trying to collect money for their own
journey or working in exchange for a trip with the smugglers’ help. The mediator facilitates
payment for the smugglers -- usually $3,000-$4,000 U.S. per person. The mediator holds onto
the money and pays the smugglers only after refugees arrive in Italy. Refugees link “payment
upon arrival” to their safe arrival in Italy, whereas many smugglers ask for it as soon as their
vessel reaches Italian waters, assuming that the Italian coast guard will rescue the refugees. As
refugees’ stories reveal, rescue often takes a few days and can be dangerous and troubling. The
Italian government’s recent refusal to receive boats of migrants and refugees indicates that
rescue is not always possible (MSF, 2018a).

I examine the Egyptian route here through the journeys of Wassim and his family. Wassim, a
Palestinian refugee from Syria, ran a catering business in Damascus. He moved to Egypt in early
2013 with his wife Rajaa and their sons, Rami (early 20s) and Shadi (16). I introduced them at
the start of chapter three. Rajaa did not want to leave Syria, but her family, concerned about her
mental and emotional condition, forced her to depart with them to Egypt, where Wassim hoped
to build a new life and set up a business. But political instability and growing hostility to
Palestinians from Syria, particularly after July 2013, changed his plans. Compulsory military
service ruled out Syria, so the family decided to try for Europe: “We were determined to try
leaving Egypt … We had no other choice. We were left with only one option, which was to

15

Syrians in Egypt were considered supporters of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which was banned
in Egypt after the summer of 2013.
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depart for Europe” (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016). But they could not obtain European visas
due to restrictive European polices against Syrians and Palestinians from Syria, so Wassim
decided to send the sons with relatives who were planning to travel from Egypt to Italy using the
services of smugglers. Wassim and Rajaa, who did not want to travel illegally, were planning to
join the young men in Sweden through family reunification. Shadi, as an unaccompanied minor,
would be able to apply for his parents to join him in Sweden after his arrival there. Yet, like
many other refugees, who were forced to make such journeys, Wassim and his family ended up
making separate, unpredictable, and complex journeys to Sweden by different routes. The
journeys cost them all their savings and lasted for several months.

After several failed attempts to depart Egypt for Italy with the help of smugglers, Rami finally
left, with a number of relatives. Shadi decided to stay. On the Egyptian route, Rami, like other
refugees, experienced vulnerability, violence, and yet high degrees of agency.

Rami departed on 2 December 2013 with two uncles. That night, they met the smugglers and
were taken to a gathering point, where they met up with hundreds of other refugees, some of
whom had been waiting for days, even weeks. For each would-be departure, the refugee pays the
mediator; wraps passports, IDs, and phones in plastic bags; and prepares life-jackets, snacks, and
water. Each person may take one backpack of clothes. Some sew special pockets inside their
underwear for passports, money, and phone cards. A failed attempt means doing all this again.

Smugglers transport the refugees in small, covered, crowded vehicles, sometimes for hours, to
departure points -- usually abandoned houses near the beach. Refugees must then walk through
the sand for a few hours to reach the beach itself. In many cases, Egyptian police arrest the
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refugees, with smugglers often ‘escaping.’ Rami described his fear and uncertainty the night of
his departure when people hid from the police:

It was in the dark. People were terrified. They started feeling things moving
around them like animals and insects. Many of them thought of going back.
We encouraged them to stay and to continue after all of this, and also no one
knew the way back or how to reach the main road, since we walked a lot to
reach our location. We were worried about people’s safety if they left the
place. There might be gangs out there. Nobody was certain of anything.
(Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016)
Even after several attempts, and despite the fear and uncertainty, many refugees still want the
journey, such is their desperation to leave. Many refugees have put all their savings into the
endeavour so must continue. As Rami said. “We were convinced that this was our last chance -we either use it or we will lose everything.”

In such circumstances, departing from the beach can be chaotic, especially if armed smugglers
force refugees to board small rubber or wooden boats to go to the bigger fishing vessel in the sea.
Many families become separated at this early stage:

There was a Syrian woman with a baby boy and three girls who were
between two and twelve years old. Her husband did not manage to get on
the boat. There was not a place for him. He was left behind and was then
caught by the police who arrived later and stopped those who did not
manage to get on the boat. So this woman continued her journey with her
children and her brother in law. (Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016)
The trip in these small boats takes usually less than 15 minutes, but many refugees reach the
fishing vessel wet and exhausted. The approach occurs usually in darkness and through high
waves. The refugees are then pushed or thrown up to the larger vessel by the smugglers, whose
colleagues grab them and drag them onto the deck of the fishing vessel -- any mistake can mean
drowning. This transfer was particularly terrifying for children and embarrassing for women,
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totally wet, some of them separated from their husbands or children, and pushed and grabbed by
strange men. Some journeys may include several such transfers. As they approach Italian waters,
smugglers move their passengers from the fishing vessel, usually steel, to a smaller, perhaps
dilapidated wooden boat and send the fishing vessel back to Egypt for other journeys.

After this trying launch in Egypt, most refugees reach the fishing vessel without their
belongings and life-jackets. Rami’s uncle lost his glasses while being pulled up onto the fishing
vessel and was hardly able to see during the whole journey. A mother lost her baby’s milk bottle
and struggled to feed her infant for days. Once on the vessel, refugees often wait days as
smugglers await more refugees – and more profit. Most refugees who waited describe becoming
sick and dizzy during this hiatus, and newcomers often leave some earlier boarders unable to sit
properly or move. Additionally, as Rami explained, most of the food the smugglers provided was
rotten and the water tasted bad. In most of the journeys described to me, people ran out of food
and water even before sailing towards Italy. In Rami’s case, they did not have food or water for
the last thirty hours before being rescued and received proper meals only when they reached the
camp in Sicily.

Yet, according to the stories I heard from refugees who travelled this route, the scariest
experiences are the storms. Most of them happen near Derna, in eastern Libya, known for bad
weather even in summer. Rami’s boat was sailing in December. He, and most of the other
refugees, spent the whole journey on the deck, while young Egyptian men, who paid less,
crowded in a room under the deck. At one point, Rami explained, “the waves were very high …
We had to sail for about 12 hours through that area where the waves were horrible … The waves
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were very high so the boat used to go deep and get full of water and then go up again and the
water goes out from the sides. People were really terrified.”

Another terrifying experience occurred when the vessel stopped in the middle of high waves.
This happened during their fourth day of sailing, while they were already running out of food and
water:

Then we had the most dangerous night during the journey. The boat went up
and down sharply and seemed totally out of control. It was horrible. People
believed that the boat is sinking and that they were all dying. They started
praying and reciting Quran loudly. They created a horrible atmosphere. It was
as if we were surrounded by death. And the problem was that we could not
stop them because for them this was praying and asking God for help. The
boat driver could not do anything. He kept the engine running, but things were
really out of control. He told us that we were going backward by the current
and we were losing time. (Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016)
The captain and other smugglers on board left the cabin and joined the refugees on deck. Rami
and a group of Syrian and Palestinian refugees decided to take control and sought to send rescue
calls. They discovered that there were no telecommunication kits in the captain’s cabin, except for
a simple old radio device – even though the smugglers had promised a number of satellite phones
for such moments. The group managed to send an SOS and heard from an Italian fishing boat in
Italian, which they could not understand. Hours later the Italian navy inquired about their
location. None of them knew it, but the navy vessel spotted a flashing light on their boat’s top.
Rami said that everyone then rushed to the deck, looking desperately for the lights of the rescue
ship.
The rescue vessel’s arrival caused further chaos. When the rescue team started to throw lifejackets to the boat, refugees rushed towards them, and the boat threatened to capsize. Rami and
his group took the lead again and tried to calm everyone. They had to hit those who would not
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listen, as the Italian officer refused to provide more jackets due to the confusion. After a few
hours, all the passengers were transported to the deck of a Red Cross boat, where they soon
became soaked. Rami explained to the rescuers that they were shivering from cold and exhaustion
and finally convinced the team to allow them inside for a few minutes.

After 12 hours of sailing in such conditions, they reached the port of Catania in Sicily. To their
surprise, the port was full of police cars, media with their cameras, and medical teams as well.
Doctors examined the refugees as soon as they departed the boat. The police then provided each
of them with a sign that had a number written on it and took pictures of them holding the signs. I
heard stories of refugees who were wiped down with sterilizers by medical teams before receiving
bracelets with numbers on them. I heard stories where Italian police interrogated refugees before
they were allowed to receive any food or water or change their wet clothes. Most of these
refugees recalled deep humiliation and outrage about such shocking treatment, which seemed to
alter them from refugees deserving protection to contaminated criminals who needed to be
examined, sterilized, and then detained rather than being rescued and assisted.

The refugees were then transported to camps, where they received new clothes, proper meals,
pillows, and blankets. Rami explained that the Italian police were not keen on keeping Syrians
and Palestinians there and left the camp entrance open most of the time. He did, however, have to
sign a number of documents in Italian, which he did not understand. In later years Italian security
increased. and I heard stories of refugees forcibly fingerprinted on arrival, particularly during
2015, when Italy imposed the system of hotspots after thousands of refugees started arriving in
Sicily and Lampedusa each day (Tazzioli and Garrelli, 2018). The same stories spoke of refugees
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organizing protests and strikes against such treatment. They sought to avoid fingerprinting and to
leave the camps for Milan to take trains or use smuggling services to reach northern Europe.
In Rami’s case, after he spent two days in the camp, a family friend helped him to escape. The
friend had driven there from Sweden and brought Swedish passports for Rami and his uncles to
use in Italy. He helped them to cross police checkpoints at the port in Sicily and drove them to
mainland Italy. He had to leave them afterwards to avoid being caught by the police for human
trafficking. From there, the group took a train to Milan and then paid a smuggler $6,000 U.S. to
drive them to Hamburg, Germany. There, they met Rami’s other uncle, who drove them to
Copenhagen, Denmark, whence they took a train to Malmö, Sweden. They made their way to
Stockholm, where family members, who had arrived earlier, received them. After his two-week
journey from Egypt, Rami applied for asylum in Sweden, but he had to wait for months for the
rest of his family, who journeyed through different routes and had different experiences of
illegality and precarity, as the next section reveals.

The Turkish Route
This route involves a journey across the Aegean Sea from Turkey to one of the Greek islands,
from which refugees continue to Athens and then either fly from Greece or walk through the
western Balkan corridor. Refugees who can afford to buy forged travel documents from
smugglers in Athens, or receive genuine European travel documents from family members or
friends in Europe, may fly to Sweden from one of the Greek airports. Others refugees, with
fewer resources or who fail to pass through Greek airport security, travel from Greece through
the western Balkans. The western Balkan route, or corridor, involves crossing from Greece to
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Macedonia and through Serbia, Hungary, and Austria to Germany – and some then travel
through Denmark to Sweden.

In 2015, more than 880,000 people used this route by crossing from Turkey to Greece.
According to European Commission (EC) records, the majority took the western Balkan corridor
(EC, 2016). However, on 8 March 2016, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia closed their borders,
stranding about 55,000 refugees and migrants in Greece (Danish Refugee Council, 2016)).
Crossings from Turkey to Greece slumped from 885,386 in 2015 to 182,534 in 2016 (Squire et
al., 2017), due mostly to the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016 (see chapter one). By that
arrangement, Turkey prevents “irregular” crossings to Greece, which returns all new arrivals to
Turkey (Crawley et al., 2018). Also in early 2016, NATO and Frontex increased their bordercontrol operations in the Aegean to prevent “unauthorized” crossings from Turkey to Greece
(Düvell, 2018). I examine both paths (air and land) of this route through the story of Shadi,
Wassim’s younger son, as he tried both after his failed departure from Egypt.

I explained in the previous section that Shadi, had joined his older brother, Rami, in many
failed attempts to leave Egypt but was not with him when he finally succeeded, via sea. Shadi
was terrified and discouraged from trying again until April 2014, when he decided to join some
relatives who were departing also by sea, but with different smugglers. Egyptian police stopped
him at the beach and detained him with a number of relatives, including his aunt and cousins.
Shadi, who was now 17, was imprisoned with adult criminals. Wassim, his father, still in Egypt
with his wife, Rajaa, was trying every day to get his son out of prison:

The prison experience in Egypt was unbearable. You cannot imagine the real
situation. I used to be at the police station from 9 a.m. till 7 p.m. every day. I
used to hear horrible stories while I was there. We [Wassim and Rajaa] used
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to spend our days between the police station, the court, the judge, and the
offices of State Security. They used to take us around and around just to take
our money … I used to cry while waiting for one of them to take my money,
knowing that he was lying. I used to pay money for officers in order to take
me to see a judge, and at the end there was no judge and no court. (Wassim,
Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016)
Being a Palestinian refugee in Egypt, Shadi was at risk of being deported to Syria for trying to
leave Egypt illegally. This risk pushed his father to pay a huge bribe to secure Shadi’s release.
Many Palestinian refugees from Syria detained while trying to leave for Europe live in fear of
deportation to Syria. When Shadi was released, his father arranged for him to obtain a Turkish
visa through some business contacts in Turkey. The plan was that Shadi, together with some
relatives, would cross illegally from Turkey to Greece and then fly from Athens to Sweden,
assisted by a smuggler who would provide him with a fake travel document.

Flying from Greece

Compared with other stories of crossing from Turkey to Greece, Shadi had a relatively
smooth trip. His father arranged for him to be smuggled on a luxurious yacht that cruised from
Marmaris in Turkey to the Greek island of Symi. Yet the Greek coast guard intercepted the
vessel while it was approaching the island. The guards detained the yacht‘s captain after beating
him, seized the passports and phones of Shadi and his group, and took them to the police station
on the island. The refugees had to stay in jail for a few days on Symi before obtaining the kharti,
a Greek permit that allows six months’ residence in Greece, crucial if Greek police stop the
holder.

Shadi, who arrived in Athens with relatives, was planning to fly to Sweden with a forged
travel document. All his relatives managed to depart from the airport, but security stopped him
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every time he tried and was stranded alone in Greece for more than six months. Each new
attempt to leave failed. Eventually his mother, Rajaa, travelled from Egypt to Turkey and then
made a similar crossing to Greece. They tried to depart together from Santorini island after a
smuggler provided them with fake travel documents. Rajaa was able to pass the security point at
the small airport and board the plane, but Shadi failed again. The security team interrogated him
but did not detain him. He returned to Athens to try again while his mother headed to Sweden.
On one of the attempts, he was stopped at Athens airport while pretending to be the son of a
Swedish smuggler and was detained at a juvenile detention center in Athens. He was supposed to
stay until he turned 18 but was released a week later thanks to his uncle, who travelled from
Germany to act as his guardian. Shadi continued to try to leave Greece and even departed from
western Greece to Italy on a fishing boat, but the Greek coast guard stopped that vessel at sea
because of its bad condition – it could easily have sunk.

Traveling the Balkan Corridor
In addition to Shadi’s story, I look again at the journeys of Khaled and Ammar, who travelled
from Turkey through the Balkan route in the summer of 2015 -- the most popular route for
refugees that extraordinary summer.

Shadi

After his multiple failing attempts at Greek airports, Shadi decided to travel by land out of
Greece, starting a new chapter of his precarious journey by joining the tens of thousands of
refugees who trekked the Balkan corridor before it closed in March 2016. He was detained in
horrible conditions in Macedonia for 40 days and was released only when the same uncle
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travelled again from Germany to assist him. He then pushed on through Serbia and used
smugglers to cross into Hungary and thence into Germany, where his uncle helped him to
continue to Sweden. He arrived there on 26 February 2015, about nine months after he left Egypt
and two years after departing Syria. His journey cost more than €40,000 and involved detention
in Egypt, Greece, and Macedonia.

Wassim, his father, who tried initially to avoid such a journey and was looking forward to
family reunification in Sweden, finally could not bear Egypt any longer. He applied for visas for
himself to various EU countries but was rejected every time. He then travelled to Turkey, made
the same crossing to Greece, and used a fake travel document to fly to Sweden, where he joined
his wife and two sons.
The unpredictability and precariousness of this one family’s journeys towards Sweden
resemble those of thousands of other EU-bound refugees who became trapped in similar
challenging circumstances. The stories about this route show most refugees passing through the
same borders and with similar raw experiences because many EU governments have further
restricted entry (see chapter one), leaving refugees to travel illegally through dangerous paths,
using smugglers who often treat them badly.
As with Shadi, Khaled and Ammar’s stories, which I introduced in in chapter three, reflect
refugees’ messy journeys and provide rich insights into their devastating yet courageous
experiences on this route.
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Khaled

In chapter three, I explained how Khaled, after two years in Jordan, decided to journey to
Europe through Turkey. He did not have a detailed plan and simply worked it out en route. His
goal was to enter Turkey via Syria, cross into Greece, and continue towards northern Europe. He
planned to seek asylum there and then apply for family reunification. However, his journey
became precarious inside Syria, as smugglers moved him from one war zone to another in
disturbing conditions. On one occasion, a careless smuggler locked Khaled and 11 other
passengers in a small truck:

Suddenly the truck stopped in front of a Military Forces Club. We ran out
of gas, so we had to wait for half an hour until the driver got some and then
continued the journey. During this half-hour, I felt I was going to suffocate
and die, the truck was boiling hot, and we were overcrowded like sheep
inside. There was no oxygen inside, and suddenly I felt immense fear, I
panicked, and started hysterically knocking on the walls of the truck. People
were afraid of the noise I was making and tried to calm me down but I felt I
was fighting for my last breath ... When we finally got out of the truck we
were soaked wet. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)
Khaled crossed the Syrian desert in a convoy with 80 other people, including women and
children, and the trip took almost 3½ days because the drivers avoided the main roads. Khaled
was on the back of a truck that usually transported sheep. The passengers were covered with dust
and had no food or water and no idea about their destination. They were received by Islamic
State forces (ISIS) in Al Maydeen, who moved them to their capital, Al Raqqa. After difficult
negotiations, they were allowed to continue and headed to the countryside near Aleppo, whence
they proceeded to Rehanieh, which was under the control of the Free Syrian Army and Al-Nusra
Front militia. From there they were taken to Khirbet Al-Jouz, near the Turkish border, a major
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hub for smuggling, with offices and agents operating openly. Thousands of people moved around
in groups trying to negotiate deals to cross to Turkey. Khaled explained what happened next:

We were a group of ten, including women and elderly people; our smuggler
was a 16-year-old boy. We started walking around 1 a.m. after midnight, as
we heard the Turkish police shouting through microphones and shooting in
the air. That was our sign to stop and move forward again when the shouting
and the shooting stopped. It took around six hours to cross a relatively short
distance. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)
While Khaled and his group were crossing the border fence, the smuggler shouted that the
Turkish police were nearby. Scared, they ran in all directions, as the police shouted and shot
bullets in the air. The smuggler ran away, and Khaled and his group hid for half an hour, until
another smuggler appeared and gathered them into one group again. This time they took a
different route and were ordered to run across a road that was usually used by the Turkish
border police. Khaled’s voice broke as he explained:

While running, I saw a dead body, the body of a man with one leg, who looked
exactly like someone from our group. I rushed to him and performed CPR,
when, suddenly, I saw the man who looked like him standing over my
shoulder, asking me about the dead person. Shocked, I left the dead man on
the ground because the police were approaching. I think he had a heart attack
... We could not get back to bury him. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)
Khaled continued to Izmir, on Turkey’s Aegean coast, where he met up with his youngest
sister, her husband, and their three young boys. They had left the United Arab Emirates after the
authorities cancelled their work and residency permits and had decided to journey to Europe to
avoid returning to Syria. In Izmir, Khaled and his brother-in-law looked for a smuggler to
convey them to Greece in the city’s Basmane district, which has a plethora of smugglers who
operate openly.
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Rather-precarious “deposit offices” accept refugees’ payments for their crossing to Greece -about €3,000-€5,000 per person. The offices keep these payments in trust and give refugees
secret codes to pass to the smugglers on arrival at the Greek island. Refugees know that
smugglers and deposit offices are part of the same network and that they offer no guarantees of a
safe or timely journey. In fact, after making their deposits, most refugees are subject to delays
and false promises, which may make them desperate to leave and willing to accept any
conditions when the actual journey starts. For example, Khaled reported that his smugglers
changed plans and routes many times without informing the group: “Why would they consult
with us? They treated us like sheep.”

The trip across the Aegean often takes place in the dark. Smugglers usually load refugees into
closed trucks, where they might spend hours en route to their departure point. Most trucks are
overloaded: Khaled’s had another 30 people, and they travelled for about five hours. At the
shore, they joined hundreds of other refugees who had been waiting for several days, under the
control of armed men, and with no idea of when and how they would leave. Some had to help
prepare the inflatable rubber dinghies, or balams. They would unload the balams and carry them
a few kilometers. Khaled and other interviewees assumed that Turkish police were aware of the
smuggling operations and intervened only selectively:

We were about to board the balam when a helicopter appeared above our heads.
We tried to escape and took the balam under the trees, but soon realized that
we were surrounded by the police, and the smugglers just disappeared. The
police took all of us in seven buses to a police station that overlooked the shore
and all of the smuggling operation. It was clear that the Turkish police were
aware of the whole process. They only intervene when they receive an alert
about a particular smuggling activity. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)
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Khaled and his group were held for two days. A few days later they tried again. Under the
supervision of armed men, they were transported again to the shore and departed in two balams.
Khaled recalled:

The water reached our necks ... We had 12 children and 20 women with us,
and they were really scared. In fact, everyone was terrified. People prayed
and recited the Quran loudly … At one point, the engine stopped because
someone stepped on the cable. We silently sat holding our hearts in our
hands, until my brother-in-law managed to fix the problem. Yet hostility
started to increase between refugees as they shouted and fought with each
other. This is when my brother-in-law purposely stopped the engine and
refused to move ahead until everyone calms down and listen to him. He even
threatened to kill anyone who does not listen and reminded everybody that
he was in charge, and he would not accept any complaints or resistance.
Everyone complied until we reached Samos island. (Khaled, Berlin,
Germany, April 2016)
At the Greek islands, conditions were very harsh, particularly during the summer of 2015, as
refugees waited for the (six-month) kharti [introduced above]. Khaled and his group took a long
and exhausting walk to the town of Samos. The island had no registration camps then, but hotels
refused to receive them, so they slept without blankets on cardboard boxes in the streets, among
thousands of refugees, with whom they shared three public washrooms. Three days later, the
police issued them khartis, and they boarded a ferry for Athens.

When Khaled reached the Macedonian border, it was open, and refugees were crossing under
the aegis of several NGOs and charities, which provided food and water generously. This “fivestar treatment,” as Khaled called it, was due to the presence of a Greek minister, who was
supervising the situation after several days of border closure. Macedonian police then organized
the refugees into groups and helped them book train tickets for Serbia, where they pushed on
towards Hungary.
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Serbia’s border with Hungary proved precarious and violent. Refugees heading to northern
Europe were keen to cross Hungary without applying for asylum or being fingerprinted, because
that would keep them in that country, which, they knew, offered few rights and growing antimigrant and anti-refugee sentiment. The EU’s Dublin Regulation – version I (1990), II (rev.
2003), and III (2013) -- determines which member state examines asylum claims – usually the
one where a migrant first enters the EU (European Commission, 2017a). Those who apply in
another member state face deportation to that initial country. Although most refugees were aware
of this rule, the majority did not know about the changes taking place that summer, as thousands
of refugees were arriving daily on Europe’s shores. Germany suspended its regulation vis-à-vis
refugees from Syria and instructed its immigration officers not to deport them to the initial EU
country of arrival (The Telegraph UK, 2015), while Hungary closed its border with Serbia as part
of its harsh policies against refugees (The Guardian, 2015b).

Even refugees with high-tech communication connections to family and friends in Europe
could not keep track of the changes when the journey’s harsh conditions interrupted such links,
which added to their uncertainty. Such ruptures exposed them to further official harshness and
violence at borders such as Hungary’s.

Khaled aimed to reach the Netherlands after learning that it processed applications for family
reunification faster than its neighbours -- a crucial matter for him. He and his group decided to
cross from Serbia into Hungary under police supervision, unwilling to cross illegally and
jeopardize the safety of Khaled’s sister and her children. But, with Germany’s policy changes
and Hungary’s tightening borders (except towards Germany), the group’s decision made
Germany, rather than the Netherlands, Khaled’s ultimate destination. He could not afford to
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continue by himself, so he followed his group towards Germany. Yet, despite crossing into
Hungary under police supervision, the group ended up in a detention center there:

The borders were heavily militarized, with drones and helicopters. Those
who tried to escape and cross the borders through the corn fields were
captured and brutally treated ... We crossed the borders under heavy police
supervision … After, we walked for about 500 meters and found thousands
of people sitting on the floor. We sat there for about ten hours through the
night. At 6 a.m. in the morning we boarded one of the buses, and it drove
ten minutes and dropped us at a prison … Yes. It was a real prison. (Khaled,
Berlin, Germany, April 2016)
This facility denied the refugees basics, including food and water, and security forces treated
them viciously:

A policeman placed colored bracelets around our arms and took us through
another fence to an area that was full of military tents … Thousands of
people were there; some have been waiting for days and others for weeks.
We thought that we will have our fingerprints taken and we then continue
our journey, but soon discovered that we were actually detained. We were
in a prison with our children, with no food and no water for days. The police
refused to give water even for children, and they treated us extremely bad.
(Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April 2016)
Such practices subjected Khaled and his group to violent border restrictions. Yet they
resisted:

The situation in Hungary was the worst. We were hungry, humiliated, and
imprisoned … We were getting very frustrated as they shouted and
threatened with sticks at anyone who complains. My brother-in-law found a
carton board and wrote in English that we needed to drink water. He went
around tents trying to get as many people as possible to join in carrying the
board in front of the media who were standing outside the fence. We
immediately managed to attract the media’s attention, and they started asking
us questions about the situation inside. (Khaled, Berlin, Germany, April
2016)

159

As a result, the police took them water and sandwiches, but not enough, and many starving
refugees, mostly devout Muslim,16 refused to eat the ham sandwiches. These conditions
continued for a few days, until Khaled and his group, like other refugees in the camp, were
forced to provide fingerprints and sign Hungarian-language documents in exchange for food and
water. Later, Khaled learnt that the papers stated that the authorities treated them in accordance
with international human-rights agreements and provided them with both food and water. They
were then handed official documents stating that they were asylum seekers in Hungary, which
was not their intention.

Finally, they made their way to Budapest, where they joined thousands of people who had
been trapped there for more than ten days. Smugglers were charging €700 per person to take
refugees to Germany, which many refugees could not afford, including Khaled, who contacted a
cousin in Germany. His cousin reached out to a group of activists, who were part of a large
solidarity network that helped refugees stranded in Hungary to travel to Germany.

It was the end of August 2015 when Khaled finally reached Germany and was granted
temporary protection, subject to annual renewal. This status did not allow him to apply for
family reunification, his journey’s ultimate goal. Thus, for him, the journey had not ended. He
was desperate to reunite with his family after more than three years. He wanted to offer his
children a new life and to save them from the horrors he had seen during the war in Syria and
through his long journey of displacement and statelessness. In February 2018, Khaled finally
received German permanent protection, and in April, he brought his family to Germany after six
years of separation.

16
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I could not stop my tears when I watched the video of him meeting his children and wife at
Berlin Airport. I recalled the details of his horrible journey, which he shared with me, while I was
thinking about other refugees who are still waiting or who are unable to reunite with their families
due to their temporary status in Europe.

Ammar
The third journey I examine here is Ammar’s. His story reveals further realities of refugees’
journeys through the Balkan route, where refugees experience extreme precarity and yet agency.
Like Khaled, Ammar arrived in Turkey in the summer of 2015 heading to northern Europe. As
explained in chapter three, he had a disturbing displacement experience in Lebanon and
Thailand, where he did not find sufficient protection and could not obtain UNHCR resettlement.
After his arrival in Istanbul, Ammar sought help from smugglers:

Everyone knew what was going on in those gathering places. Refugees who
were about to embark on their journey to Greece gathered in big numbers.
There are shops filled with life-jackets … I mean it was so obvious. It was
ironic that some Turkish locals started waving goodbye to us while policemen
ignored us totally. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
In the absence of legal and safe routes, refugees take this illegal path to Greece. Public
awareness and official indifference leave the refugees at smugglers’ mercy and render the route
even more precarious and chaotic. Refugees such as Ammar were unable to complain about any
violations or poor treatment because they have little or no legal or social protection.
On the night of Ammar’s departure, the Turkish coast guard appeared at the gathering point
and started shooting in the air, but the armed smugglers shot back and forced the police to
withdraw. Ammar spent the night in the woods near the shore among hundreds of refugees. It
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was still dark when more refugees arrived and the smugglers gathered people in groups of 40-50
and ordered them to board the balams. Ammar recalled that the smugglers, who threatened them
with guns, did not allow people to carry any of their belongings on to the boat and forced them to
throw everything in the water. They attacked those who complained and even beat some of the
men. The Turkish coast guard intercepted the first balam. However, the smugglers continued to
send one balam after another. Ammar and other refugees experienced a waking nightmare:

The situation was horrifying. The balam behind us capsized, and the fate of
the people in it became unknown. As we reached international waters, another
balam capsized too. It was terrifying in the true sense. The loud cries of the
women and the children filled the air. We threw our life-jackets to the people
who were struggling in the water. Happily they were then rescued by Greek
coast guards … A group of six young men on our boat, including myself,
decided to jump into the water and swim next to our boat in order to make it
lighter and faster. We held the ropes on the sides of the boat and swam. The
plan worked, and we made it to the shore in one hour. Unfortunately, only 13
of the 18 balams that departed that night reached Mytilene island. (Ammar,
Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
Like Khaled, Ammar experienced harsh conditions in a registration camp on the Greek island:

Thousands of Syrians, Africans, and Afghans were waiting there. People
waited in long queues to register their names. Then, they had to wait at the
camp for their names to be called so they can obtain the passing papers. The
camp was an olive-tree orchard outside the town, where people had to spend
about a week to obtain their papers. There were no services, no NGOs, and
no humanitarian agencies. Hostility between refugees started to increase as
people were frustrated and tired. The Greek police intervened on many
occasions and used violence against refugees. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany,
April 2016).
During the summer of 2015, thousands of refugees boarded buses that headed from Athens
towards the Macedonian border. Ammar noted that the Greek police stopped their bus in order to
verify that each refugee held the kharti permission, but he felt they were not serious, because, in
the end they allowed everyone to depart, with or without the card.
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The arbitrary treatment and unpredictability intensified at the Greek-Macedonian border.
Compared with Khaled’s smooth crossing, Ammar, who arrived at the same point of border a
few days later, in August 2015, had a startling experience. He encountered an entirely different,
more militarized border. Thousands of refugees had arrived at the fence that runs along the
border. However, the Macedonian army blocked them from moving forward while Greek police
prevented their return to Greece. Ammar explained the situation:

The Macedonian army were heavily present at the borders, which was a razorwired fence. The army used violence and tear gas to deter refugees from
approaching the fence. Clashes between refugees and the Macedonia army
increased in frequency and violence. The Red Cross teams, who were initially
trying to assist pregnant women, the sick, and the elderly, started to focus on
those who were injured by the army … Many families and groups were
separated because of this situation, and I lost the group that I hanged out with.
(Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
As Ammar’s words illustrate, such violence rarely deters refugees, but only worsens their
situation. He explained that masses of desperate refugees faced the Macedonian army and
demanded the soldiers let them proceed. He and several other young men helped the Red Cross
teams by translating for and moving injured people, and eventually the Macedonian army
rewarded them: it let them cross into Macedonia. Ammar boarded a train from the border with
Greece to the Macedonian border with Serbia, only to join thousands of refugees in a prison-like
registration center there, in extremely hostile and miserable conditions that exacerbated
hostilities between groups of refugees:

In Serbia we were gathered by the security forces in an old, abandoned
factory building surrounded by heavy security. We were left with no food
or water. The movement was strictly restricted until authorities collected
our personal information. This process took two days to complete, during
which basic needs and services were non-existent. It was a miserable
situation ... Add to that the frequent and harsh attacks by Serbian police. At
one occasion, violence broke out between Syrian and Afghani refugees due
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to accumulated sensitivities between the two groups. The Serbian army
intervened and detained young men from both sides. I was detained with
the Syrian group. We were released after two days and continued our
journey towards Belgrade. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
The changes in European asylum policies and border control during the summer of 2015
added ambiguity and unpredictability to refugees’ journeys as they made their way north. As
Ammar recalled:

The border fence between Serbia and Hungary was three meters high, with
police forces all over the place. It was impossible to get through without being
caught. The police made accessible one exit through the fence for refugees to
cross, in order to take them to gathering camps. Refugees were forced to
provide fingerprints to the Hungarian police, which meant that they cannot
seek asylum in Germany. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)
Stranded refugees had to make crucial decisions. Ammar, unaware of Germany’s new policy
on refugees from Syria, was desperate to avoid Hungarian border control and attempted to cross
illegally. Serbian armed gangs attacked him as he neared the border, and smugglers made false
promises to help him. He tried to cross through the fence with a group of Afghani refugees but
failed after a horrible experience at the border fence:

I decided to join a group of Afghani refugees whom I communicated with
in Persian. Our plan was to cut through the fence and escape. At 5 a.m., we
entered a swamp close to the borderline accompanied with women and
children. The Afghani group had special scissors, which they used to cut
the fence, but only a few seconds after crossing through the hole in the
fence we were attacked by the Hungarian army forces with a helicopter
above our heads. They captured the guy who made the hole, while we
escaped through the swamp and hid in the waters for close to five hours.
They released the guy who was captured, and he soon joined us. Signs of
torture marked his body as he limped towards us. His money was stolen as
well. While in the water I saw a snake passing by me and felt hopeless that
we are not going to make it through. I convinced the group to return to the
forest and decided to try again at night. We were certain that we will be
caught, but we had to try. (Ammar, Hanover, Germany, April 2016)

164

Ammar’s words convey both powerlessness and determination -- common, contrasting
motivations for refugees and their movement. He and his group were desperate to avoid border
controls, and, after many attempts, and with guidance from his smartphone’s system navigator,
Ammar reached a Hungarian gas station well-known to refugees for taxi drivers who can convey
them to Budapest. Ammar found one who would take him there for €100.

In Budapest, however, Hungarian authorities had stopped all trains from running, trapping
thousands of refugees in front of the central station for days. Even though there were no trains,
smugglers refused to take refugees because of new restrictive measures. That was the week a
truck full of refugees’ bodies was discovered on an Austrian highway (BBC, 2015a). Due to this
tragic incident, smuggling stopped briefly in Hungary, and Ammar was stranded at the central
train station. With disbelief, he saw 20 buses arrive and start loading refugees to take them to
Austria without asking for documents or fees. Thus he joined hundreds of refugees on a journey
to Vienna and went on by train to Munich, where groups of Germans cheered their arrival at the
station. Ammar moved on to Hanover, where he currently lives, after receiving renewable three
years of protection in Germany.

The Libyan Route
The third route to Europe for refugees from Syria (and elsewhere) originates in Libya, where
smugglers take them to Italy in fishing boats. They arrive in either Sicily or the island of
Lampedusa and then continue their journey to Milan. From Italy they either take the train or hire
smugglers for the trip to northern Europe. In December 2012, Libya attempted to restrict the
number of refugees seeking to enter the country and imposed visa restrictions against Syrians
and Palestinians (Lifos, 2016). After July 2013, when Egypt did the same, illegal crossings from
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Egypt to Libya none the less escalated (ibid.). Yet insecurities continued in Libya as violence
between militia groups intensified. Thus, after 2014, many refugees, particularly those with
families, avoided the Libyan route. In January 2015, the Libyan government decided not to admit
any Syrian and Palestinian refugees from Syria17 (ibid.), which made it even more difficult for
them to use this route.
Refugees’ journeys through this route become particularly messy because of the shocking
violence and brutality of Libya’s smuggling networks, which render these refugees extremely
vulnerable. The stories I heard show that such incidents traumatized refugees. I was able to trace
their scars in their words and tears during our interviews. Perhaps even more poignant: the
pauses between their words.
To examine refugees’ journeys through Libya, I draw on the story of Fares, which provides
profound revelations about the horrifying conditions they encounter on this route. Fares, whom I
introduced in chapter three, departed Syria because he feared further detention. The details of his
story illustrate clearly refugees’ experiences through wartime, displacement, and the trip to
Europe via the Libyan route.

In chapter three, I explained how Fares felt that his journey from Syria started emotionally on
his wedding day, when his best friend was killed by the security forces in Hama. He himself was
then detained near Hama by one of the country’s most brutal security departments. Fares shared
with me the details of the unspeakable torture he experienced there -- another turning point in his
life and departure, when he began to feel that he could not protect himself from oppression and

17

Syrians and Palestinians were accused of being connected to radical Islamist groups such as Ansar Al Sharia
(Lifos, 2016).
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torture. His physical departure became imminent when, a few months after his release, he
learned that he was still wanted by the security forces. He paid a huge bribe to a security officer
in Hama to obtain passports for himself, his wife, and their two-year-old son. The same officer
facilitated their safe departure from Damascus airport to Cairo.

The three arrived in Cairo in August 2012 without any plans or contacts. Fares had chosen
Egypt because its government did not require Syrians to obtain visas. Yet within a week he
realized that he would not be able to find a job and a decent income there. He shared the same
concerns that I heard from other refugees: “There was nothing for me in Egypt. There were no
jobs, no income, nothing at all … I stayed there for one week only. I could not stay longer”
(Fares, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016). Additionally, during his brief stay in Egypt he could feel
what many Syrian refugees feel there. He believed that “the humiliations of Syrians there, and
particularly of Syrian women, were unbearable.” He did not elaborate, but during my interviews
I heard many stories about refugees from Syria having to beg in the streets. Accordingly, Fares
decided to continue his journey towards Libya.
Fares grasped the reality of Libya’s degrading conditions at the border, when an armed gang
attacked his bus and forced each and every passenger to pay $3,000 U.S. in order to continue
towards Benghazi. Benghazi was complete chaos. The terrible accommodations and extortionate
rents appalled Fares. He spent all his savings within a few weeks. In the absence of any aid or
social assistance, he had to find a way to support his family. Despite lack of experience, he
rented a small shack and turned it into a falafel shop. He soon became popular in the
neighbourhood and established good relations within the community, enjoying a level of social
acceptance: “There was no state, no system, and no rules. But the Libyan people were
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sympathetic with us, the Syrians. They considered us as brothers” (Fares, Stockholm, Sweden,
July 2016).

After the humiliation he experienced in Egypt, the supportive atmosphere he found in
Benghazi enabled him to survive the difficult living conditions. He felt some protection, even
though his area was a hub for drugs and weapons. Fares was able to create his own social space
and to build a network of contacts that prevented the sort of discrimination and social
marginalization other refugees suffered in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt. Because
Benghazi, like most of Libya at the time, had no meaningful official institutions or structures of
authority, Fares escaped the legal precarity that other refugees from Syria experienced in the
region.

In early 2014, after about 18 months in Libya, Fares was finding life increasingly tough. The
intensifying political unrest and extreme insecurity made him consider looking for protection
elsewhere. Like thousands of refugees, he set his sights on Europe:

We were surrounded by death. It was everywhere. We escaped death back
home to find death in Libya. Death is around us. The way ahead might bring
death or life. We did not know. We were not sure. We were not sure of
anything, except of the death that was around us. (Fares, Stockholm, Sweden,
July 2016)
It was in such a precarious and violent context that many refugees decided to leave and began
to make plans. Forced first to escape death in Syria, Fares was now planning another chapter of
his journey to escape death in Libya, knowing that the trip too could bring death. His awareness
of the danger prevented him from forcing his decision on his wife, who opposed the idea, which
terrified her. However, when Fares was beaten by a group of armed men, who stole his money
and his car, his wife changed her mind.
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Fares did not have enough savings so labored in the building sector to collect money for the
journey. During this period of immobility, he continued to learn about the journey to Europe. He
discussed the available options with his Syrian friends, who were also desperate to leave. They
navigated the internet, looking for stories of refugees who made the journey from Libya. They
investigated particularly any social media sites where refugees shared the details of their
journeys and provided tips for those who were thinking of doing the same. They examined the
conditions of the journey, the smuggling networks, rescue stories, and all the other related
details.

A few months later, Fares and his Syrian friends moved to Tripoli with their families and
began to organize their journey for 25 people to Italy. They met 14 smugglers during their first
visit to the coast at Tripoli, where such services were openly peddled. They were asked to pay in
full in advance and were given no definite departure times. They insisted on two conditions:
they would buy their own life-jackets, and they would leave Tripoli only on the day the boat
was to depart from Zuwara, about 118 km west of Tripoli – they refused to stay at gathering
points, where refugees were treated badly. The group of 25 was promised a two-storey boat, with
a capacity of 60 passengers and with washrooms and storage facilities. They agreed to pay
$1,400 U.S. per person -- $35,000 for the group. The price included food, water, and necessary
medication.
On the day of departure, Fares and his group (including his own family) received 15 minutes’
notice. They had to leave without their life-jackets and headed towards a gathering point in
Zuwara, where they were to be “stored” (Fares’s word) with other refugees in a gathering house.
They were shocked by the conditions and decided to return home, as they had not yet paid the
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smuggler, but he arrived with four armed men and forced them to continue. They were locked in
that house, forbidden to move or make any noise The armed men brought them boxes of bread
and canned tuna.

Most refugees who travelled the Libyan route experienced similar conditions. Smugglers kept
them in such houses for weeks or even months, unable to predict what would come next or to
decide or act. Fares and his group spent three days locked up, until the smugglers told them they
would depart by midnight and in 24 hours reach the gas pipeline in the Mediterranean near Italy,
where the Italian coast guard would rescue them. The smugglers collected the money and took
Fares and his party to another house, where they joined some 400 people. Next, the smugglers
forced them onto a meat truck and drove them for half an hour, to the beach, where armed men
forced them onto small rubber boats, which would transport them to the fishing vessel, and many
families became separated. One of Fares’s friends had a panic attack, which almost paralysed
him.
Each rubber boat carried about 70 people, and Fares gathered his and his disabled friend’s
families in his arms to protect them as they sailed at gun point, in complete darkness. Like the
refugees in Egypt, they were transferred to the fishing vessel in harrowing circumstances. Some
470 people filled the old, 13-m-long vessel, with no room to move or sit. They were soaking and
lacked life-jackets, food, and water. People soon started feeling sick, children were crying, and
more men had panic attacks.

After six hours, they discovered that there were another 200 people under the deck -- Africans
crowded inside one room and trying to climb up to breathe. Fares and a group of other Syrians
worried about the boat’s balance and negotiated with the Africans to coordinate their movements
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so it wouldn’t capsize. Suddenly, the boat came to a complete stop and water began to seep in.
Fares believed that someone had stopped the engine in order to force the driver to let the
Africans onto the deck. The captain could not restart the engine. Someone contacted the Libyan
smuggler, who promised to send support, while they waited in high waves, close to Tunisia. The
Tunisian captain wanted to ask his national coast guard for help – as a citizen, he would spend
perhaps a year in prison there, while Italy imposed harsher penalties. Yet, for the refugees from
Syria, Tunisian assistance might lead to their being detained and deported to Syria, so they
prevented the captain’s call.

Instead, they used satellite phones to contact activists in Italy, who were assisting refugees in
the Mediterranean.18 After providing the boat’s location, they learned that they were too far from
Italy and still in Libyan waters. Five hours later, a rubber boat appeared in the distance. The
excited refugees started moving towards the approaching craft. As happened on Rami’s journey
from Egypt, Fares and a group of Syrians and Palestinians took control to prevent a disaster.
They urged calm, but ended up beating those who did not listen or refused to cooperate,
including members of Fares’s own group. It quickly became apparent that the approaching boat
was the Libyan smuggler, who gave them new batteries for the engine but was afraid to board.
They fixed the engine and were able to sail again.

It was at this moment that Fares wept for the first time on the boat. He paused before telling
me: “When I looked at my wife, I could sense the blame in her eyes. She was silent, but I could

18

Many groups of activists have been assisting people crossing the Mediterranean and Aegean to Europe.
WatchTheMed Alarm Phone is a prime example. Established in October 2014, it runs a ‘24/7’ hotline to assist
people at sea. It thereby provides European coast guards with GPS positions of boats in distress, monitors rescue
missions, supports and calms people waiting for rescue, and provides credit so people at sea can keep using their
satellite phones during the journey. The project also documents deaths at sea and advocates for solidarity with
migrants at sea (www.watchthemed.net).
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hear her shouting that she would never forgive me for this experience.” Fares could not stop his
tears when he recalled the moment on the boat when his son asked him for food. They had none,
but Fares could not bear to see his son hungry. He attacked the captain and forced him to open
the locked fridge in his cabin, where he found some chocolate bars, which he quickly distributed
among the starving children, including his son.

They sailed for almost two more days, without food or water, until they reached Italian waters
and spotted flames on the horizon from the notorious pipeline. They contacted Italian authorities
and gave them their location. Soon a helicopter flew above them, took pictures, and disappeared.
Four hours later, a rubber boat approached them, and the occupants informed them of the rescue
plan but departed without offering food or water. The driver stopped the boat and started to
mingle with the people to avoid arrest. Everyone was wet, cold, and exhausted and had no idea
when rescue would come. The rubber boat returned after more than an hour and dragged the
fishing boat to an oil tanker, which they boarded. They were told to sleep on the deck. After
some negotiations, the tanker team agreed to let the children and women stay inside, while the
men remained on deck without food or covers. They formed groups of four or five to hug each
other and warm their wet and shivering bodies. In the morning, the tanker crew gave them boiled
potatoes. The male refugees spent two days on the deck, until the vessel reached Sicily.

The port of Catania was full of Italian police, the Red Cross, and media teams. Fares and
other refugees refused to disembark with the police to avoid fingerprinting. Instead, following
advice from the activists in Italy, they asked for Red Cross members. Fares was shocked to see
the Red Cross team documenting the rescue operation before assisting the distressed refugees.
This action upset and humiliated the refugees. They learned that Syrians and Palestinians would
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not be fingerprinted in the port, while other arrivals would remain under police supervision as
detainees. They were all taken to a reception center, where they spent two days. Fares explained
that the Italian police did not force them to stay at the camp and did not ask for their fingerprints
at all. He and other members of his group were told that they were free to leave, and the police
helped them find the train station, where they boarded a train for Milan.

In Milan, Fares and members of his group stayed at the Islamic Society while they looked for
a smuggler to take them to Sweden. They were afraid of taking the train by themselves.
Refugees’ fear of being stopped by police, their lack of trust after such perilous journeys, and
misleading information from other refugees pushed thousands of them, including Fares, to pay
smugglers sizable sums to reach northern Europe.

The Islamic Society in Milan offered Fares and his family beds in a basketball stadium that
held over 200 men, with no privacy dividers or walls. After ten days there, Fares found a Syrian
smuggler who agreed to take them to Copenhagen for €3,500. They drove for 36 hours through
Italy, France, Austria, and Germany. When they reached Copenhagen, Fares, who could not
figure out how to buy tickets to Malmö (only €12 each), hired another smuggler to take them
there. They arrived at the immigration reception center in Malmö in May 2014 -- not yet
journey’s end for Fares. A new chapter began in his search for protection, with new forms of
vulnerability and precarity vis-à-vis privately managed reception centers and government
‘migration’ offices.

Reflections on Refugee Routes
The stories discussed in this chapter inform us that many journeys lack a definite point of
departure or arrival but rather involve unanticipated loops of movements and periods of stillness.
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Journeys turn out to be a set of complex and chaotic actions unreeling in precarious and violent
conditions, with refugees becoming victims in disastrous circumstances. Nevertheless, they can
also bring moments of individual and collective agency, where refugees challenge inhumane
conditions and restrictive border controls and create their own spaces and trajectories (Johnson,
2014; Squire, 2017).
The stories detail conditions on the three routes – Egyptian, Turkish, and Libyan. Yet, as I
noted earlier, I sought to answer particularly the following questions about refugees from Syria
and the three routes. How did they:

- decide who should go and who should stay?
- choose certain routes and pathways over others?
- travel -- with what types of transportation? What about negotiating border crossings with
smugglers, coast guards, and others?

These are important elements of the journey and can help in revealing the realities and
conditions through the three routes. Based on the details of the stories described in the above
sections, the following information about the journeys can be summarized as follows:

Deciding Who Should Travel

In some stories, families chose to send their children, particularly boys, with relatives or
friends so they could apply for family reunification and bring their parents to Sweden. The child
had to be under 18 and hence an unaccompanied minor, with the right to be reunified with his
parents in Sweden. Some families chose this method because they could not afford the journey
for the whole family: for example, at least $12,000 U.S. for a family of four via the Egyptian
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route. Other parents, such as Wassim and Rajaa, sent their sons with other relatives so as to avoid
travelling illegally themselves.

Deciding on the Route

Circumstances compelled members of some families to travel through different routes. The
trip from Egypt or Libya to Italy is cheaper ($3,000-$5,000 U.S. per person) than that from
Turkey (sometimes more than $10,000 per person). Yet leaving from Egypt or Libya is more
dangerous and risky. Crossing the Mediterranean -- for many refugees the journey’s hardest and
scariest part -- can take a few days, with the constant threat of storms and high waves, and the
trip across the Aegean, only a few hours. Additionally, and as the stories highlight, smuggling
networks in Egypt and Libya (especially the latter) are more violent, and refugees cannot resist
or complain.

Methods of payment may add additional insecurity. In Turkey, refugees place money in
deposit offices, and pay the full amount (usually $2,500-$5,000 U.S. per person) to the
smugglers only on reaching the Greek island. Similarly, in Egypt, smugglers’ mediators deposit
payments (usually about $3,000 per person) and pay the smugglers when the refugees reach
Italian waters or ports. In Libya, in contrast, refugees pay the full amount ($1,400-$2,500) to the
smugglers on the night they depart.

In addition, the choice of route is always subject to political unrest, security conditions,
border controls, and mobility restrictions. When refugees from Syria were required to obtain
visas to Egypt beginning in July 2013, more chose Turkey instead of the Egyptian and Libyan
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routes. Yet the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016, controlled the Aegean crossing tightly and
slashed the number of arrivals in Greece.

Methods of Travel and Encounters with Various Actors

The stories also show how many refugees failed several attempts at departure, despite
extensive preparation. In Egypt, police may interrupt departures: Palestinian refugees risk
deportation to Syria, while most Syrian refugees obtain relatively quick release. In Turkey, the
police detain refugees for one or two days and then release them; anyone with a valid passport or
travel document is able to continue their journey.
Refugees may hear smugglers’ false promises of luxurious journeys on lavishly equipped
boats. In reality, particularly in Egypt and Libya, refugees crowd on the deck of dilapidated
fishing boats that lack basic facilities, even water and food. Chaotic departures and the tense
transfer to fishing vessels cause many refugees to lose their belongings. I heard stories about
people with conditions such as diabetes and high blood pressure losing their medication. In the
end, refugees often find themselves sailing on treacherous journeys without life-jackets or even
the basic elements of care.
On the Egyptian and Libyan routes, the arrival of rescue teams does not always end refugees’
hardship. Chaos and tension with the captain may result from conflicting interests, as we saw in
Fares’s story. Most captains try to avoid arrest for human trafficking and pretend to be refugees.
Tension also occurs between refugees themselves on the journey, particularly when rescue
vessels pull up and refugees are desperate and excited after their difficult journey. As well, the
rescue process takes time, with unpredictable outcomes for refugees. At Italian ports, many
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refugees receive humiliating treatment. The stories show that refugees arriving from both Egypt
and Libya experience similar conditions at the receiving camps in Italy and take the same route
to Milan en route to northern Europe.

Through the Turkish route, refugees have fewer encounters with smugglers, but must go by
truck to gathering points and along the coast and may encounter Turkish police and coast guard
along the coast. Their short Aegean crossing is dangerous because of its precarious conditions.
Many balams sink, as Ammar described, and most survivors face dire conditions in the Greek
islands before they depart to Athens to continue their journey. In Athens, refugees who can
afford airfare and forged travel documents can try to fly, hoping airport security does not
intervene. Many refugees end up stranded in Greece for months before they succeed in boarding
a plane out. Alternatively, they might walk the western Balkan corridor, like thousands of other
refugees who could not afford to fly. Along this path, refugees encounter multiple forms of
border control, and many are detained in terrible conditions, as happened to Shadi and Khaled.

Conclusion
The stories I described in this chapter reveal how each journey consists of complex and
chaotic actions that occur under precarious, even violent conditions, which make refugees
victims and often end up in disaster. Nevertheless, the journeys may bring moments of individual
and collective agency, where refugees challenge inhumane conditions and restrictive border
controls in order to create their own spaces (Johnson, 2014; Squire, 2017). By following the
storylines of these particular journeys, I have sought to highlight messiness, violence, and agency
as three key aspects of refugee journey.
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Messiness
The messiness and complexity of refugee journey are revealed through the refugees’ multiple
loops of non-linear movements, often under stressful conditions, which are chaotic and
unexpected. We see these features also in multiple moments of departure, including emotional
experiences in advance of physical leaving, where one disconnects from one’s own community.
Home is no longer a secure place for such people, especially when violence and precarity touch
them in their own communities. Hence many refugees mark multiple moments of departure.
Fares, for example, had two: the murder of his best friend and his experience in detention, both
months before he left Syria. As well, many refugees do not describe their arrival at their
intended destinations as their journey’s end, especially -- as we see in chapter five -- those who
have had to wait months or years to reunite with their family.

Messy and complex journeys may crisscross borders and continue after physical completion - examples (see chapter three) of the refugee journey as “a trajectory of wandering” (Khosravi,
2011: 51). Ammar’s loops of movements included Lebanon and Thailand before he journeyed
from Turkey through the Balkan corridor to Germany. Wassim’s family had their own circular
movement when they left Syria for Egypt and made complex and separate journeys to Sweden
that spread out over more than a year and involved teenaged Shadi’s detention in Egypt, Greece,
and Macedonia.
Additionally, as the stories here detail, refugees’ journeys can be extremely unpredictable and
ambiguous, combining mobility and immobility (Brigden and Mainwaring, 2016; Innes, 2016;
Kaytaz, 2016). Even during periods of stillness, refugees were navigating the next chapter of
their journeys. Fares was learning about the conditions of the journey while waiting for his wife
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to make a decision to leave. Similarly, Shadi, who was stranded in Greece for months, made
many attempts to leave for Sweden before departing via the Balkan corridor. Refugees’ abilities
to navigate different options and paths along their journeys depend substantially on their
economic and social resources. For example, Wassim could pay for his family’s journeys, which
cost about half a million U.S. dollars. His social networks in Europe, which included friends and
relatives, helped his sons when they were stranded in Italy, Greece, and Macedonia. Other, less
affluent refugees may experience much more challenging conditions and long periods of
immobility.

Violence
Refugees’ actual movement often proved messy and unpredictable: illegal crossings of
multiple borders and encounters with structures of control, all while using smugglers, some of
them rough, even violent. The stories showed extreme violence, sometimes encounters with
death, as with Khaled, who recalled with distress the dead man at the Turkish border. Ammar
spoke about crossing the Aegean when three boats capsized, leaving dozens of people to drown
in the dark water. In fact, refugees’ encounters with smugglers were usually nasty, as most of the
stories indicated graphically -- especially on the Egyptian and, above all, the Libyan routes. The
stories implicitly referenced the racial hierarchy of refugees’ vulnerability and their treatment by
smugglers and coast guard – most pointedly in Fares’s story about the treatment of African
people, locked below deck on the fishing vessel.

As well, the stories show how through the journey, refugees can be criminalized and
penalized, changing them from people deserving protection to illegal migrants, simply for
challenging sovereign borders (Schuster, 2011). I analyse this transformation in chapter five, but
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I did touch on the impact of such unpredictable treatment and the feelings of humiliation that
Rami described upon his group’s arrival in Sicily and which was common to many of my
interviewees. The criminalization of refugees at the Serbian border and Khaled’s experience in
detention are further examples of transformation. Through these stories we can see that refugees
often find themselves in real prisons, together with their children, facing “biopolitical
amendment” (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), which deprives them of their basic needs and rights.

Agency
Through the storylines I have also addressed refugees’ notable agency and resilience despite
the precarious conditions of such journeys. In fact, their agency is clear in their very decisions to
leave in the first place. Many decided to make the journey despite genuinely not wishing to
leave, as Khaled, Fares, and Rajaa indicated. At many points of the interviews, refugees
reiterated their reluctance to leave their homes and explained that lack of safety and protection
forced their hand. For example, Wassim and Fares, like many other refugees, wanted to establish
new lives in their new localities within the region, but political unrest and increasing insecurity
changed their plans. The journey is indeed complex, right from the early moments of departure.
The stories showed how refugees felt they were left with no other choice but to leave for Europe,
often against their wishes.

The notion of complexity also involves individual and collective expressions of agency. As
Ammar, Rami, Khaled, and Fares told us, their moments of agency were usually acts for
survival. Many refugees clearly had no intention of acting politically but ended up taking control
and creating unexpected scenarios in order to survive. Some moments of agency were
controversial and painful, as when Rami and Fares attacked other refugees on board in order to
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maintain order and to avoid capsizing. This relates to my caveat in chapter two about
romanticizing refugees’ agency or making it appear deliberate.
The stories also revealed constraints on refugees’ agency and ability. At the gathering points
or when boarding the boats in Turkey, Egypt, or Libya, refugees were clearly at the mercy of
armed smugglers and could not resist or even change their minds, as was explained by Fares,
Khaled, and Ammar. Refugees travelling the Balkan corridor confronted heavy security and
militarized borders. The stories of Ammar, Khaled, and Shadi share multiple elements of
helplessness and surrender at the securitized borders of Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. Yet, in
moments of agency, refugees engaged, navigated, and maneuvered through such border controls
and were able to continue their journeys. Protests at gathering camps, multiple attempts to cross
through border fences, and even refusals to leave rescue boats were all cases of agency and
resistance where refugees challenged the structures of control and tried to create their own spaces
and assert their rights as refugees and as human beings. Through such practices, the stories
revealed illegality and increasing human cost at the borders and showed how refugees transform
borders into sites of resistance and places to exert agency (Johnson, 2014; Squire, 2011).

At the end, the intense messiness and precarity of these journeys, demonstrated by the stories
detailed in this chapter, reveal the human cost of the global crisis of protection. It is the price
that refugees from the global south must pay for challenging the structures of governance that
aim to contain and deter them from the global north, regardless of the inhumane circumstances
of war or of displacement, when sufficient protection and access to rights are limited, if not
absent. In the next chapter, I examine the emotional impact of their experiences en route as part
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of the human cost of the protection crisis, which transform refugees after their frequently
traumatic journeys.
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Chapter Five: The Emotional Toll of the Refugee Journey
Introduction
In chapter two, I proposed a three-part approach to the refugee journey. Chapter three dealt
with survival and resistance through its “stories of escape and displacement.” Chapter four
explored the “non-linear, messy, and complex” nature of the trip to Europe. The third dimension,
which I discuss in this chapter, is about the journey as an emotional process that transforms
refugees’ identities, positionalities, and perspectives towards self, family, and life. The journey is
a life-changing experience that is highly intense, emotional, and transformative (Benezer, 2002).
As I noted above, this emotionally transformative element of the journey occurs substantially
because of the global crisis of protection and is part of its human cost. For this reason, this
chapter aims to expose and explore the journey’s emotional toll on refugees who have escape the
horrors of war and the challenges of displacement only to come up against closed borders.

As in chapters three and four, the stories of the refugees themselves, as they shared their
experiences and feelings with me during my field research, inform my analysis. By relying on
their stories, I hope to draw attention to the emotional element of refugees’ journeys and reveal
the fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion that were common to most of the stories
I heard. I focus on stories of mothers who journeyed with their children and, some of them,
without their spouses. These cases were intense experiences for both mothers and children. They
also highlight the mothers’ substantial agency as they created ways to survive the fraught
journey. The remainder of the chapter also shows refugees encountering intense physical and
psychological challenges that may undermine, even shatter their positionality (second part of the
chapter) and their identity (third part) as a result. I aim to examine these transformations, which
in turn affect refugees’ integration within their new communities. I look, especially at the
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experience of Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk in Damascus, who, as I showed in chapters
three and four, are reliving the trauma of their people’s statelessness through their new
displacement from Syria. Their journeys in search of protection result in unique identity
transformation.

The Journey’s Physical and Emotional Toll
In chapter four especially, I proposed that the refugee journey is not only about the physical
movement from one land point to another but also involves moments of emotional departure.
When people can no longer cope with precarity and violence, they may leave their home
communities emotionally, even before their body moves elsewhere. This shift may rupture their
deep psychic ties to home, leaving some of them feeling powerless, alienated within their own
communities. Such emotional departures reflect extreme social vulnerability, where
“hopelessness” and “purposelessness” may prevail (Khosravi, 2017). This was probably the case
after spring 2011 for millions of refugees from Syria, who lost emotional connections with their
home communities, because of wartime insecurity and violence, and later, during displacement
elsewhere in the region.

The stories in chapter four showed how this form of emotional departure often precedes the
physical action of leaving departure, which may take time and require resources and planning.
As well, refugees often feel torn between the need to leave and their desire to stay either at home
or nearby. The examples of Rajaa and Khaled showed that refugees may resist leaving but
eventually have to because of the extreme conditions. The cases of Wassim and Fares revealed
how refugees may try to establish new lives within their region, but have to leave again and
journey even farther. For Wassim, hostilities in Egypt against refugees from Syria became
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unbearable. Similarly, insecure conditions in Libya intensified, forcing Fares to flee. Yet, as
chapter four pointed out, the precarious and messy journeys make refugees more vulnerable
emotionally and socially. They leave many refugees with traumatic stories and transform their
lives.

In the remainder of this section, I discuss four powerful sets of feelings -- fear and exhaustion,
anxiety, humiliation, and confusion -- which refugees may experience during their journeys.
These feelings have emerged in most of the stories I heard about the journey and reflect the
impact of the precarious conditions on refugees’ perceptions of self and others. The second and
third sections examine the transformation –of refugees’ ‘positionality’ and, of their identity -while highlighting the emotional elements of uprootedness in refugees’ journey and experience
of exile, which is undertheorized in the literature of refugee journey. Through this approach, I
aim to present refugees as real individuals who suffer from normal fears and anxieties when
facing extreme precarity and humiliation while they search for acceptance and safety. My
approach here speaks to the argument of Anderson and Smith (2011) for examining emotional
relations and challenging the absence and marginalization of emotions and feelings in social
research. In their work on emotional geographies, Anderson and Smith call for “a fuller program
of work, recognizing the emotions as ways of knowing, being and doing in the broadest sense,
and using this to take geographical knowledges – and the relevance that goes with them – beyond
their more usual visual, textual and linguistic domains” (2011: 8). I build on this discussion and
suggest that exploring the journey’s emotional and transformative elements can both help us
grasp refugees’ predicament during their search for protection and also challenge the dominant
perception of them as faceless and voiceless people who must prove legally their need for
protection to obtain recognition and protection as refugees. As I explained above, these feelings
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and transformations epitomize the human cost refugees pay for challenging control structures
and border practices. These feelings demonstrate at the human level the emotional toll of the
global crisis of protection and how it invades the intimate space of refugees’ bodies and minds.

Fear and Exhaustion

As I discussed in chapters two and three, refugees experience greater precarity and fear
during their journeys. Their unfamiliar situations start with their first encounters with smugglers
and extend to include natural hazards, dealing with border control, and even coping with other
refugees. In the absence of legal and safe routes to intended destinations, refugees remain
invisible while encountering border controls or police forces. They may have to travel in the
dark, avoid main roads, and cross through wilderness, often guided by smugglers who rarely
show compassion. In addition, they often face natural dangers and police rides by themselves, as
their smugglers often disappear at critical points. On the Egyptian route, as Rami explained,
refugees had to hide every time the Egyptian police showed up, just as the refugees were
departing by sea, while the smugglers always managed to disappear:

It was in the dark. People were terrified. They started feeling things moving
around them like animals and insects. Many of them thought of going back.
We encouraged them to stay and to continue after all of this, and also no one
knew the way back or how to reach the main road, since we walked a lot to
reach our location. We were worried about people’s safety if they left the
place. There might be gangs out there. Nobody was certain of anything.
(Rami, Stockholm, Sweden, July 2016)
Thus anxiety and stress may start early in the journey. Rana’s story of crossing from northern
Iraq to Turkey also revealed how stressful the moments of departure were. In chapter three I
talked about her initial journey, with her husband and two sons, from Yarmouk to elsewhere in
Damascus and then to Irbil. In Irbil, they decided that she would go to Sweden with her mother,
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who was in her late sixties, and her younger son. Rana and her group crossed from Zakho in
northern Iraq to Silopi, in eastern Turkey. Travelling in the dark, they passed through a swamp
and became covered with mud up to their necks. They had to climb a rocky mountain and up a
steep cliff, walk through a forest, and then move through cornfields. They were not allowed at
any point to light a fire, use their phones, or make noise. Despite these hardships, her mother was
concerned and ashamed more about their illegality:

She was not literally afraid. She was emotionally exhausted more than being
physically tired. She was stressed about the idea of being smuggled illegally
in the middle of the night where it was totally dark and we could not see
anything while we were crossing through a forest, cornfields, muddy water,
and mountains. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
After a long bus journey from Silopi to Izmir, on Turkey’s Aegean coast, Rana was joined by
her two elderly aunts, from Damascus, who hoped to cross to Greece with her. The family spent
almost a month in Izmir, with smugglers promising to leave every night. Rana explained the
stress:
We were emotionally exhausted because of the false promises … It was very
stressful to get everyone ready for departing, including the old ladies and my
son. We went through this stress every night. We used to call the smuggler
every day to inquire about the trip. In fact this was the first thing we used to
do every morning. He never called. He used to tell us to prepare ourselves for
departing by midnight and keeps delaying until there is no chance for
departing that night. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
Smugglers’ promises proved false, and Rana and her group ended up exhausted and
frustrated. Sometimes the smugglers would walk them to the shore, only to discover that either
the time was not right to leave or conditions were not convenient for travel. Rana noted:
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So every time we failed to travel, we had to walk back the long distance
carrying our life-jackets and our bags to return to the hotel, by ourselves most
of the time. At one attempt, the old aunts were carried by the men in the group
because both of them were too exhausted and were not able to walk. One of
them started crying. She felt humiliated. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
The intensity was so great that one of her aunts decided to return to Damascus; as Rana
explained, “She was not emotionally able to continue and was too stressed and scared. She could
not handle the stress of the journey” (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016).
As I noted in chapter four, the exhausting waits, combined with smugglers’ false promises,
pushed many refugees to accept horrible circumstances for their departure -- they become so
desperate to leave that they will agree to any price and any condition. Those who manage to
depart, however, still have hurdles to surmount. For example, Safieh, in her mid-sixties, whom I
introduced in chapter three, shared with me her fear during her journey from Turkey. She and her
husband were forced to leave their home in Yarmouk in December 2012 and moved to Tartous
on the Syrian coast. They then decided to join their son and his family in Norway. They travelled
via the Turkish route and experienced the sorts of conditions we saw in chapter four. They
finally reached the uninhabited part of Rhodes island in Greece with no assistance or guidance
from the smugglers: “It was totally desolate. There was nothing around us. I was so afraid and so
tired. I could not catch my breath. I felt the blood freezing in my veins” (Safieh, Stockholm, July
2016).

Yet natural hazards of the Egyptian and Libyan routes (chapter four) created the most
terrifying experiences for many refugees. Like Rami and his group, with the terrible storm in
Libyan waters, Qamar and Issam, Palestinian refugees from Syria travelling the Egyptian route
with their five children, faced a similar scare:
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Issam: During the storm, the front point of the boat was broken. It was a
horrifying hurricane. We felt as if we were on the top of a mountain and then
down in a deep valley. The boat was carried high by the waves and then used
to go down in the water. We were all wet. Everything was totally wet. The
boat was surrounded by high waves from all sides. People were not able to
talk. They were all pale.
Qamar: When the captain had his life-jacket on, I was really scared. I felt
that we were done.
My question: Did you have life-jackets with you?
Qamar: No. We paid for them, but smugglers did not get us any.
Issam: The storm lasted for 28 hours.
Qamar: We were dying.
Issam: The storm stopped after midnight, and the sea became flat.
Qamar: Those hours were from hell. It was really scary.
(Qamar and Issam, Stockholm, July 2016)
Qamar summed up her feelings: “I have forgotten my pain in Syria, but I will never forget
those moments on the boat. It was horrifying.” She also spoke of her physical pain during and
after the journey. En route from Egypt to Italy, the boat was overcrowded, and she had to hold
her five children close to her chest for most of the eight days: “There was not enough space to sit
… My five children had their heads on my chest for the whole journey. I still have pain because
of their pressure on my chest. It has been two years and I am still in pain” (Qamar, Stockholm,
July 2016).

Those who survived the sea journeys still felt fear and anxiety due to their illegal crossings.
Khosravi’s work explains:

Border crossing can be experienced in terms of honor and shame. A legal
journey is regarded as an honorable act in the spirit of globalism and
cosmopolitanism. The legal traveler cross[es] the border gloriously and, in
so doing, enhances his or her social status, whereas the border transgressor
is antithetical, being seen as shamed and anti-ethical. (2011: 66)
Khosravi illustrates how refugees may perceive illegal crossings as morally wrong and
therefore shameful, adding to their vulnerability. Their illegality and the need to remain invisible
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may generate fear and anxiety at any encounter with security officers and border control. For
example, those on the Turkish route who attempted to fly from Athens experienced stress in
every direct contact with airport security, which made them visible. Their experiences speak to
Khosravi’s argument about “a kind of gambling. Information, payment and networks are crucial
and necessary components of an ‘illegal’ border crossing, but it is, after all, always a matter of
chance” (2011: 62). The story of Rana at Athens airport provides a compelling example. Rana
spoke of the first of her many failed attempts:

I did not have any idea about how to behave and what to do. So, when I
reached that point, I was looking directly at the security, and that was my
biggest mistake. One of them noticed my looks and recognized that I was
nervous. He was so smart, as it took him one second to discover me. So, he
called me out of the line and asked me for the passports. I am not sure about
the reactions on my face because it was my first time and I was really nervous
... I believe that being confident and calm is very important. You should not
have any eye contact with the officers. You should behave as a normal
passenger. I am talking from an experience because I tried four times and
only managed to fly in the fifth attempt. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
Rana confirms Khosravi’s argument about border crossing being “a matter of performance”
(2011: 62). Refugees need to look and behave in certain ways in order to be trusted as genuine
and legal travellers. Otherwise, they will end up as illegal figures, who may be criminalized.
Salam, from chapter three, who crossed from Turkey to Greece before his attempt to fly from
Athens airport, shared similar anxiety. However, Salam prepared himself by going to the airport
the night before and observing the procedures at the gates for a few hours. He described his
departure the next day:

At the time, I had no idea where they check the boarding and where they
check the IDs. So, I approached the gate and passed. I learnt that I should not
look straight to the security guards. I should avoid any eye contact. I was left
with one security check to pass, which was the gate of the plane. So, I stood
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in the line and passed my ID and my boarding pass to the officer, who
checked everything and said OK. Those moments were too long.
I could not feel relieved yet, because I heard about people who were stopped
inside the plane. We took the shuttle from the terminal and went inside the
plane. By the way, that flight was the only flight available for that week, and
I had to book business class to avoid waiting for another week in Athens. It
cost me around €300. I sat in the business seat and was keen to see the door
of the plane closed. I only felt relieved when the plane took off. (Salam,
Stockholm, July 2016)
Salam flew to Warsaw and then to Stockholm. His words summarize most refugees’ anxiety
and fear at airports. He was able to behave as a legal traveller and passed the security check.
Illegal travellers experience airport procedures differently from other passengers. The routine
waiting periods at the gate, the shuttle trip to the plane, and the preparations for takeoff change
into anxious waits for refugees, who feel relief only when the plane takes off.

And refugees often suffer from other forms of anxiety, and the pain of separation, at the
airport. The story of Rajaa, introduced in chapter three, who travelled from Egypt to Turkey and
then to Greece to meet her son, Shadi, so she could accompany him to Sweden, provides another
typical example. In chapter four, Rajaa passed airport security in Santorini island while Shadi
was not allowed to board the plane:

Rajaa (weeping frequently): I did not know what to do. I called my family and
asked them what to do. I came all the way to Greece for him. How can I leave
him now? They all encouraged me to continue my way to the plane … Even
Shadi himself encouraged me to continue by ignoring me. I was crying while
I am watching him caught by the police.
Shadi: … I left the room and found my Mom outside. She was so close. There
was only one door between me and her. If she turned her face towards me,
they would discover that she was the one in the pictures in my phone. So, I
looked down and left the airport. I did not want to have any eye contact with
her, because she just managed to go through, and I did not want her to come
back for me. I did not look at her at all. It was impossible for me to do anything
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different. I would never tell them that this was my mother. (Rajaa and Shadi,
Stockholm, July 2016)
Mother and son provide a poignant picture of refugees’ stress and anxiety at border control.
Her words and tears expressed the predicament of a desperate mother who has to act as a
stranger, while watching her younger son, whom she journeyed long and hard to be with, is
prevented from departing. Shadi acted as an adult who protected his mother by totally ignoring
her. His performance reflected a maturity and masculinity unexpected from a 17-year-old
stranded by himself in a foreign country for months.

Anxieties about Family Members
Rajaa and Shadi’s distressing experience are shared by many refugees with children. The
majority of parents whom I interviewed told me that they had few expectations in Sweden for
themselves but undertook such terrifying journeys for their children’s sake. Indeed, their hope of
better lives for their children led sometimes to difficult choices that actually made their journey
messier and more precarious. Some families were so desperate that they sent just one child to
Sweden with relatives or friends, as Wassim and Rajaa did. They assumed quicker processing for
an unaccompanied minor requesting family reunification. In 2015, more than 96,500 such
children arrived in Europe, with 35,000 of them going to Sweden; in 2016, 63,300 reached
Europe, including only 2,200 for Sweden -- a 94-per-cent drop (Eurostat, 2017). In Sweden,
unaccompanied minors enjoy access to rights including education, health care, and legal
facilities. According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Sweden adheres to,
they are entitled also to be reunited with their parents. The Swedish Migration Agency searches
for relatives while examining a child’s asylum application so as to reunite the young person with
his/her family in the country of origin or other safe country outside Sweden. If reunion elsewhere
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proves impossible and the minor receives refugee status in Sweden, the authorities may grant
residence permits to the family (Swedish Migration Agency, 2018). Yet the high number of
arrivals in 2015 resulted in a backlog of cases and delays in processing applications, and hence
long separations for many families (Human Rights Watch, 2016g).

Similarly, many refugees who journeyed solo, hoping to reunite with their families in Sweden
have had long separations, some still continuing to this day. Mahmoud, for example, whom I
introduced in chapter three, decided to leave Syria to avoid his oldest son, Mazen’s, being
conscripted. He could not pay for the whole family’s travel, so made the agonizing decision to
leave his wife and children in Syria while he took Mazen, 18, and Samer, the youngest, who
was 8, (he had heard from other refugees that having his youngest child with him would
expedite family reunification).

Mahmoud and his two sons experienced a horrific sea journey from Egypt to Italy and were
travelling by train from Milan towards Sweden when French police stopped them and arrested
Mazen, detaining him for a few nights. After Mazen’s release, the three continued towards
Sweden until German police stopped them. Mahmoud managed to avoid fingerprinting, but when
the police found out about Mazen’s detention in France, they said that he had either to seek
asylum in Germany or be returned to France. Mahmoud, who had begun this journey to save
Mazen from the war in Syria, was forced to leave him, alone, in Germany and to push on with
Samer, because family reunification in Germany is long and difficult. The two reached Sweden
in August 2013 and reunited with other family members 13 months later. However, Mazen was
forced to stay in Germany, separated from his family, with no hope of reunification.
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Refugees with older children feel increased pressure to reach Sweden before their offspring
turn 1819 and may pay excessive amounts to get there in time. Some could not cover travel for
the whole family and left partners and younger children behind. Others, worrying about their
children’s safety en route, particularly for the girls, decided to leave them at home and later seek
family reunification in Sweden. Youssef, who I introduced in chapter three and who chose the
Libyan route, serves as a poignant example. Youssef chose to leave his wife and children in
Damascus with the hope of reaching Sweden and reunifying them all before their daughter
turned 18 as she will not be treated as a minor and will be excluded from the family reunification
application. Youssef’s boat from Libya broke into pieces, and 49 people died before Italian
rescue teams arrived. Once in Sweden, Youssef became concerned about the long processes for
residency and family reunification. He told me that he contacted his lawyer and case manager at
the Swedish Migration Agency every day to expedite his applications. Reunification took more
than three years. The new Swedish rules on asylum and protection, mentioned in the
Introduction, came into effect in the summer of 2016. Family reunification for refugees from
Syria who arrived after November 2015 became very complicated and almost impossible.

Humiliation

The stories show that throughout the journey, refugees are subject to various forms of
humiliation. As I mentioned above, refugees shared with me their feelings of humiliation, which
began as early as their first illegal crossing of a border. I heard similar expressions of humiliation
from Arad’s wife, introduced in chapter three, who crossed into Turkey with her husband and

According to the Swedish Migration Agency, “The following are counted as family members: husband, wife,
registered partner or cohabiting partner, and your children under the age of 18 years. Other relatives and
children that are 18 years or older cannot join you in Sweden if you have been given a temporary residence permit.
If you are under 18 years, your parents are counted as your closest family.” (Swedish Migration Agency, 2018).
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their two sons. She could not stop her tears when she recalled their reaching Turkey totally
exhausted and covered with mud. These harsh conditions, paired with the shame of being illegal,
overwhelmed some refugees. For example, Safieh shared with me her intense feelings while en
route from Turkey to Greece with her husband. Told by the smugglers to speed up, they had to
walk through the shallow water and board a yacht after spending three nights in the forest hiding
from the Turkish police. She was soaked and her leg was almost broken when a smuggler pushed
her up to the yacht:

Then I started crying because I was too frustrated. I was weeping loudly and
asking how we ended up like this. Why God is doing this to us. I almost lost
it. (Safieh, Stockholm, July 2016).
To her surprise, their arrival in Oslo, Norway, involved new forms of humiliation. At the
police station:

One police officer grabbed my handbag in a nasty way. They sterilized
everything. I felt so bad. I cried because it was humiliating. We had never
dealt with the police before, and have never been at a police station. Why did
we end up like this? We did not do anything wrong to be treated like this. I
could not control myself. (Safieh, Stockholm, July 2016)
Other refugees had similar experiences in Italian ports. In chapter four, I discussed Rami and
Fares’s outrage and humiliation after their boats were rescued and the Italian police received
them at Catania. Qamar and her husband also felt great shame at the Italian port:

When they received us, they covered their faces with masks and wore gloves
as if we were infected. We were very humiliated and annoyed by this
treatment … When we arrived to Sicily, they took our pictures and gave us
numbers as if we were criminals. I was so mad and humiliated again. I felt
ashamed. They gave us covers and blankets but left us to sleep outside in the
cold weather and in our wet clothes. (Qamar, Stockholm, July 2016)
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The same sorts of feelings affected Rasha, the Syrian widow from chapter three who
journeyed to Sweden through Turkey and the Balkan route with her three children: a girl, 15, and
boys 13 and 9. She shared with me her frustration over their treatment by the Greek army at a
military base on one of the Greek islands: “They treated us badly as if we were criminals or
dangerous people. There were guns pointed at us all the time. We did not escape the war in our
country to end up like this” (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016).

Confusion

The precarious nature of the journey stresses refugees emotionally, which can generate deep
guilt and regret. As a result, many have conflicting emotions about their decisions and their
journeys. Most refugees I interviewed feel such confusion, particularly those who travelled with
their families and who felt guilt about imposing the harrowing journey on them. For example, in
chapter three, we learned that Fares did not plan his journey and was still confused about its
development, “My journey has been a complete shock for me. After all this time, I am still
confused about its events. I have not yet understood how did it happen, how it developed and
how I managed through it all” (Fares, Stockholm, July 2016).

This confusion problematizes the notion of agency and reflects the messy and precarious
refugee journey/survival act. The confusion also may signal refugees’ profound guilt and shame
for imposing these conditions on their families. Yamen, for example, left Syria for Libya and
travelled thence to Italy with his four-year-old daughter. His wife and other children made their
way to Sweden through Turkey. Yamen’s words reveal his confusion and guilt vis-à-vis his
daughter:
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Maybe it was right and maybe it was wrong. I do not know. I am not sure. I
am not sure what was right and what was wrong. I am confused about the
whole experience and about the decisions I made during the journey. I could
not evaluate my decisions at the time. For example, the smugglers I chose
were too bad, but I did not know that at the beginning. No one can judge me
since I was too desperate. I was totally trapped. (Yamen, Hässleholm,
Sweden, June 2016)
This complex mixture of confusion, guilt, and shame about the journey’s decisions and
conditions illustrates its transformative effect, which targets mainly a refugee’s positionality and
identity.
I propose that these feelings en route reflect in refugees’ bodies and psyches the terrible
human price they pay for the crisis of protection and the resulting exclusionary policies.
Focusing on the emotional dimension of the refugee journey may help us to reform government
policies and international structures on migration. This method re-humanizes and reindividualizes refugees by presenting them as individuals with diverse experiences and
aspirations. It challenges the “universalization” and “standardization” that dominate
representation of refugees in official narratives as a faceless, homogeneous group of powerless
people, but it may also pose a threat to the political, economic, and social identity of the global
north (Johnson, 2011). Such “re-individualization” necessitates further examination of the
transformative elements of the journey as explained by refugees. Refugees experience these
elements during various stages of their journey, and they last after arrival at the new
destinations, which rarely marks the end of their journeys.
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Transforming Refugees’ Positionality
In addition to refugees’ fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion during the
journey, the stories in this research show dramatic changes in their positionalities and roles
within their families and communities, which reshape their perceptions of selves and others.
Refugee studies say little about these transformations, as the literature about the refugee journey
in general is minimal, as we saw in chapter two. Through my work, I aim to narrow this gap and
contribute to the literature by focusing on refugees’ stories and their intimate perceptions about
the journey and its transformative impact, which will help us grasp the emotional toll and human
cost of the global crisis of protection. For this work I focus on the loss of roles refugees
experience en route, especially those of protector and provider.
Loss of Protector’s Role

To understand the loss of role as protector, which affects mostly male refugees, we need to
explore how violence and precarity during wartime, displacement, and journey often shake
refugees’ self-image and perception of life, upsetting their familial and social roles. Yet women
too experience similar changes in their positions as mothers, wives, daughters, and members of
the community. I discuss those shifts in the coming sections with a particular experiences of
refugee mothers. As with other transformative elements of the journey, this topic is
undertheorized in the literature. Nombasa Williams (2011), for example, refers to the absence of
masculinities conceptualization in migration studies and proposes that the challenges facing
refugee males during displacement can illuminate gender dynamics in refugee communities and
men’s profound role in sustaining their families’ well-being:
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An understanding of masculine identities must be included if gender analysis
is to be used as a tool for understanding the dynamics of refugee parenting,
refugees’ representations of gender relations -- particularly the ways in
which youth and men are challenged by new identity creation and
reconstruction of their understandings of their gender roles as fathers,
husbands, protectors, and providers. (2011: 107)
To further understand refugee men as protectors, I draw on the logic of masculinist
protection, as it explains the journey’s transformative influence on individuals and families as
well. In her work on the logic of masculinist protection in feminist theory, Iris Marion Young
(2003: 4) links being male head of family to the role of protector:

The gallantly masculine man is loving and self-sacrificing, especially in
relation to women. He faces the world’s difficulties and dangers in order to
shield women from harm and allow them to pursue elevating and decorative
arts. The role of this courageous, responsible, and virtuous man is that of a
protector.
Connecting masculinity with protection also speaks to Jullie Peteet’s (1994: 34) definition of
Arab masculinity as she explains:

Arab masculinity (rujulah) is acquired, verified, and played out in the brave
deed, in risk-taking, and in expressions of fearlessness and assertiveness. It
is attained by constant vigilance and willingness to defend honor (sharaf),
face (wajh), kin, and community from external aggression and to uphold and
protect cultural definitions of gender-specific propriety.
These accounts of manhood, rooted mainly in lack of fear and ability to protect self and
community, hint at how refugee males may perceive and internalize powerlessness, victimhood,
and vulnerability during the journey partly as assaults on their masculinity and manhood. The
stories in this dissertation indicate that experiences of violence early in wartime may feel like an
assault on their masculinity. Violent and precarious conditions humiliate and devalue men (and
women), diminishing their ability to protect themselves, their families, and their communities.
This shift became particularly intense in cases of detention and torture, as with Fares, who shared
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his feelings with me about the hesitation he felt during his first intimate meeting with his wife
after his release. His words reflected his concerns about his positionality as a husband and a man.
I revisit Fares’s words here, as they reflect the humiliation he felt for being subject to torture and
unable to protect himself. But, most important, he doubted his ability to regain his wife’s respect:

What should I show her? The blisters of my skin, the cigarette burns on my
legs, on my back, and on other parts of my body? She is too young to
understand this … How could I describe the humiliation I experienced in
prison? Would she still see me as the man who could protect her from the
whole world? Would she still be able to respect me? (Fares, Stockholm, July
2016)
The sometimes-extreme violence and precarity during their journey may further shake
refugees’ perceptions about their fearlessness. The stories in chapter four show refugees, at
certain points, unable to defend their families from “external aggressions” by smugglers, police,
and border security. Wassim and his family’s story -- travel together to Egypt and then separate
and perilous journeys to Europe -- provides a profound case of such conditions. Wassim
experienced various forms of humiliation at the Egyptian police station while seeking his son
Shadi’s release. Wassim felt powerless as he was forced to silently watch police officers harass
his wife: “My wife was sexual harassed in front of me while I kept silent. I used to cry every day.
I could not control my tears while I was standing there” (Wassim, Stockholm, July 2016).
Wassim’s broken voice here reminds us how the trauma shattered his perception of himself as a
husband and as a man.
The stories also demonstrate how encounters with smugglers restricted refugees’ ability to
protect selves and families. Refugees using the Libyan route received the worst treatment. Fares
recalled the gathering house in Zuwara:
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The smugglers treated us like dogs. We were all stressed, and we started
fighting with each other. The wives were mad and started fighting with their
husbands, blaming them for the conditions we ended up at. They questioned
our decisions and called us criminals. Except for my wife. She was silent all
the time. She did not express her emotions, but I could feel that she was dead
inside. She was dead … (Fares, Stockholm, July 2016)
Fares’s words show how smugglers’ brutality could cause family and group conflicts and
further undermine refugees’ roles and positionality. As happened to other refugees, this brutality
and uncertainty continued throughout the journey. Refugees faced countless moments of
constrained agency, unable to act or to respond to threats. Men who value brave deeds and risktaking lost their roles as protectors when they could not look after their families while at the
mercy of armed smugglers or during nightmarish experiences at sea. Upon arrival at EU ports,
refugees also could not prevent their families from being treated as carriers of disease and filth.
The stories show how such instances of powerlessness scarred refugees and undermined their
positionalities as they failed to protect selves and families.
Yet these stories also reveal moments of accomplishment and self-assertion. In fact, refugees’
journeys may involve multiple moments of agency where they act fearlessly and create their own
spaces and trajectories (Squire, 2017). I discussed the notion of agency in previous chapters and
pointed it out in refugees’ decisions to leave despite their desire to stay or, at the very least,
remain close to home. By leaving, they challenge their own feelings and risk their own and their
families’ lives by setting out on journeys towards foreign destinations in an atmosphere of
violence and precarity. Yet, and as I explained in the previous chapters, many of these moments
of agency are, in fact, acts of survival. Ammar, Rami, Khaled, and Fares’s words in chapter four
reveal that they had no intention of acting politically but rather sought desperately to continue
their journeys towards their intended destinations. To accomplish their goals, they had to create
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their own trajectories through the disastrous conditions of the journey. Accordingly, and as I
argued above, these performances of agency are acts of self-assertiveness that need examination
apart from the notions of intentionality and free choice.
Loss of Provider’s Role

The examples above indicate the extent to which many refugees experience social
transformations during the journey that affect their self-awareness, roles, and positionalities
within their families. But at their destinations, refugees experience another transformation, in
losing their roles as providers. Refugees who arrive in EU states as asylum seekers take on a
long, frustrating asylum process that lasts months, even years. During this period, refugees may
not work and have to depend on the welfare system in their new communities, leaving them poor
and dependent. They stop being breadwinners and providers (Heelsum, 2017; Moztic, 2018).

The impact of this loss is particularly intense for middle-class refugees with high academic
credentials. Not only are they illegal, but their new country may not recognize their professional
credentials. After surviving the journey, and despite feeling safe in Europe, many professional
refugees cannot acquire the social acceptance they aimed for when they decided to leave their
home regions. In her work on forced migration and uprootedness, Elizabeth Colson (2003: 8)
observes:

Since people define themselves in terms of the roles they play and it is thus
that they are evaluated and valued, the loss of role structures means that they
cannot know who they are or who anyone else is until new roles are
constructed and people assigned to them. It takes time to assess the loss of
old roles or their transformation.
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The shift in positionality due to loss of role still attracts little interest in the refugee literature,
despite some recent studies about highly skilled refugees in Europe (Heelsum 2017; Mozetic
2018; Pietka-Nykaza 2015; Smyth and Kum 2010; Valenta and Thorshaug 2012). Anja van
Heelsum (2017), for example, investigates the aspirations and frustrations of refugees who
arrived in the Netherlands during 2015-16: “Refugees very much aspire to work and become a
full member of the local community but are not allowed to work and live isolated in refugee
shelters. Even though the Syrians are often better educated and seem better prepared for life in
the Netherlands, they experience many obstructions” (2017: 2148).
In the UK, Emilia Pietka-Nykaza explores refugee doctors and teachers’ perspectives on reentering their professions (2015) and notes generally: “Studies into refugee experiences in the
labor market show that refugees are one of the most disadvantaged groups when compared to
other ethnic minority groups or to the indigenous local population” (2015: 525). Her findings
confirm what I heard from professional refugees I interviewed in Sweden about institutional
barriers that exclude professional refugees from resuming their professions, thus changing their
positionality and role within their families and their new communities. These barriers include
their need to master professional language and their wait for verification of their qualifications.
Pietka-Nykaza explains, “Assessment and accreditation of refugee doctors’ and teachers’
overseas qualifications represent an example of institutional barriers, as refugees’ professional
qualifications and work experience are not recognized as equivalent to the UK standards” (2015:
525). Pierka-Nykaza summarizes the major impediments for refugee professionals: “Experiences
of forced exile, restrictions attached to the legal status of asylum seeker, labels attached to
refugee status and lack of accreditations of pre-migration qualifications and work experience
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have an impact on resources and choices available to refugees to re-enter their professions”
(2015: 526).

In her work on highly skilled refugees in Sweden, Katarina Mozetic (2018) focuses on
refugee doctors’ self-perceptions and identity formation. Mozetic differentiates between selfidentification and others’ categorization of this group and notes that “refugee” is a form of
institutional categorization imposed on them that does not reflect their identities as professional
doctors:

Their profession is positively connoted and seen as a source of strength. It
means providing for oneself while at the same time actively contributing to
society. Being a refugee is, on the other hand, burdened with negativity. It is
therefore a term that they reluctantly use in relation to themselves. Instead,
“refugee” is a label that is appointed to them. (Mozetic, 2018: 249)
This argument speaks to Colson’s observation: “Self-definitions derived from work are at risk
when professional skills are ignored in a resettlement area or camp or they [refugees] are denied
the right to practice or work in old occupations as immigrants” (2003: 10).

The experience of many refugees I interviewed in Sweden confirms these analyses of
professionals in a new land. During my field research, I met with many of them, including
doctors and engineers, who were shocked by the requirements of the Swedish job market,
especially as it did not recognize their academic and professional credentials and years of
experience. Most of them were deeply depressed and frustrated by their marginalized social
positions, as they lost their former roles of providers and sense of accomplishment. Most felt
unable to maintain their roles within their families and in their new localities. For many, this
frustration meant their journey had not ended, since they did not receive the acceptance for
which they had aimed when they left Syria. This condition was particularly painful for refugees
204

in their fifties or older, who were already struggling to master basic Swedish -- the first step in
the long and complicated process of seeking academic recognition. Such depressing
circumstances pushed a doctor from the Yarmouk area, who owned and managed a well-known
medical center there, to describe his journey and his more than five years in Sweden as “a total
disaster.”
Through such social marginalization and loss of role, refugees become a “disposable
commodity,” or, as Khosravi (2011: 3) puts it, “Sent back and forth between sovereign states,
humiliated, and represented as polluted and polluting bodies, stateless asylum seekers and
irregular migrants are excluded and become the detritus of humanity, leading wasted lives.”
While these refugees’ inability to integrate into their new localities relates to the discussion of
positionality transformation in Europe and elsewhere, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Positionality of Refugee Women
During their journeys, refugee women have their own moments of transformation and agency.
Like male refugees, they are subject to various forms of violence and precarity, and as I
explained above, they experience transformation through their multiple positionalities as
mothers, wives, or sisters. The stories of Jenna, Qamar, Rajaa, Rana, Rasha, and Safieh,
discussed above, show how the violence and insecurities during wartime and throughout the
journey transformed the lives of these refugee women. They left their homes out of fear and
desperation for their own and their families’ lives. They undertook precarious journeys with their
families, where many of them experienced intense vulnerability and victimhood. The
transformations are particularly intense when women journey with their children but not their
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spouses. Their positionality as mothers, focusing around their role as caregivers, expands to
include main decision makers and only protectors of their children during the difficult journey.

The story of Rasha, the young widow who journeyed to Sweden with her three children,
presents a superb example. During their perilous 23-day journey, she was the only guardian for
her youngsters: “It is not their fault that I am suffering. I brought them to this world, and I
should be responsible for them” (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016). Rasha made her journey in
October 2015, the month of one of Europe’s highest rates of refugee arrivals (Reuters, 2015).
She and her children trekked the Balkan route together with a massive group of about 4,000
refugees. In addition to the humiliating treatment at borders and camps, Rasha worried about her
children’s safety, and particularly her own and her daughter’s. Rasha was not able to sleep for
much of the journey:

I do not know how I managed and from where I got my strength. But I recall
that the tears in my youngsters’ eyes pushed me to stay strong and to continue
… I was supposed to be strong for them … They saw life through me, and I
had to be strong for them … I used to talk to them about tomorrow and about
the things that we will do together when we arrive … I used to tell them that
they will sleep peacefully and will not be scared any more. I used to promise
them with a new, good life. That was their hope, and therefore I had to be
strong. I had no other choice. (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016)
As with Safieh, reaching Sweden did not end Rasha’s anxiety. After their fraught journey, the
four of them reached Malmö in November 2015:
When I arrived there, I collapsed … I could not believe that we have made it
to safety. I kept wondering, so that was it. Can we now relax after all these
years of war and after such a journey where we experienced cold, hunger, and
humiliation? (Rasha, Laxå, Sweden, July 2016)
Rasha and her children were sent to a reception center in Hasselfors, six hours’ drive north of
Malmö. They found themselves in a basketball stadium, full of mattresses, with no dividing
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walls or even curtains, so no privacy.20 They stayed there for more than five weeks, surrounded
by hundreds of men of different nationalities:
During that period, I used to sit at a corner and cry … I could not do anything.
That was the moment when I had a deep regret for making the journey. I felt
that I did not deserve all this humiliation … I kept asking myself, why should
I be treated like this? Was it because I am Syrian? Was that a crime? I did
not choose my nationality. I did not choose my fate. It was not my fault that
my country went through a war … It was not my fault. (Rasha, Laxå,
Sweden, July 2016)
Despite her deep frustration and regret, Rasha was able to summarize what other refugees
have shared with me about why they made such a journey. She ended her interview by stating:
I do not want anything for me … I do not want a citizenship. I do not want a
luxurious life … I do not want any of this. All I want is to give my children
a chance to live and achieve their dreams … I am here only for them and
because of them … I am here so their dream can come true. (Rasha, Laxå,
Sweden, July 2016)
Hania, a Palestinian mother from Syria who journeyed to Sweden with her six children,
shared a similar sense of responsibility. Her husband had already landed in Sweden, but she
could not wait for family reunification, so she decided to travel with her children through Turkey
and the Balkan route in 2015. Because of her limited finances and large family, her journey was
more difficult and precarious than other interviewees’. Many smugglers refused to assist her, and
the ones who did were manipulative and deceptive. At the Hungarian border, the seven were
detained, like thousands of other refugees. Hania was determined to reach Sweden but, to avoid
ending up in Germany, had to evade fingerprinting by Hungarian police. She could not afford
being smuggled through the country’s border, so paid €60 for someone in the camp at the

20

Although any woman would find such treatment humiliating [as would men], refugees in general are often
criticized for raising such “unnecessary” complaints. This complaint is rooted in the dominant representation of
refugees as “others” who should be grateful for whatever they have been offered (Nayeri, 2017).
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Hungarian-German border to scrape her bodily fingerprints with a sharp rasp and then burn
them repeatedly with a heated iron rod and obliterate them. When I asked her about the process
and how painful it was, she explained that she would do anything to get her children safely to
Sweden. As we finished her interview, Hania expressed great satisfaction and pride: “At the end,
I did everything by myself. My husband did not face any of the difficulties I had during my
journey. He travelled by himself where he crossed to Greece and flew from Athens with no
children” (Hania, Laxå, July 2016). This sense of accomplishment and assertiveness, however,
clearly came at a very high price.

During my interviews, I met with a number of mothers who, at some point on their journey,
had to send children ahead to Sweden with smugglers. Most became stranded at certain points.
For example, Rana, who crossed from Turkey to Greece with her mother and her ten-year-old
son, was separated from her mother during the journey and was stranded for months in Athens.
All the smugglers she dealt with told her she could not continue the journey with her son. Thus
she chose to send him with a smuggling network to family friends in Copenhagen. The friends
then sent him to another family in Sweden, where he waited for her. Rana explained her
decision:

I was so scared and nervous about the whole thing. I had a fight with my
husband, who was against the idea of sending our son with these people ...
He was far away from the stress that I was going through. He looked at things
differently. Whereas I was very hesitant but also very desperate. I was so
afraid but, at the same time, I was desperate to get out of Greece. I was
trapped. My husband asked me for guarantees. He told me that he needed to
know the lady who is taking our son, but I did not have any guarantees. How
could I provide him with guarantees? Should I go to the police and tell them
about the lady who is taking my son with her? ... See what I have done? I left
a son in Erbil and I sent the other with a smuggler to Copenhagen. (Rana,
Stockholm, July 2016)

208

Rana’s tears at this point of the interview reflected the regret, pain, and shame she
internalized as a mother for leaving one son at home and sending the other with smugglers to
Copenhagen. Through her tears, Rana explained how smugglers instructed her son how to lie
about his identity and how to behave:

They taught him about his [new] Greek name and his new family during the
journey to Copenhagen. They told him that the lady was his mom and the
other girl was his sister. They also told him about how to behave at the airport
in case he was asked anything by the security officers. They told him to smile
and to act as if he was shy. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
To add to her distress, Rana was stranded in Greece for six weeks after he left. This period
was hard on her son:

First, he was happy in Copenhagen, but he started to get emotionally stressed.
He used to ask me [on phone] to come to him every day. He did not expect
that I will be away from him for that long period. Our friend did not tell me
about his emotional problems at the time. She told about everything later
when I arrived in Sweden. She did not tell me that she used to find him in the
living room at the middle of the night crying. (Rana, Stockholm, July 2016)
As I explained in chapter three, Sweden did not end her journey, as she still awaited her
husband and their other son.

I heard similar stories from other mothers who were stranded in Greece who did the same as
Rana. Jenna and her husband, Karam, are Palestinian refugees from Syria who travelled to
Turkey with their three children and crossed into Greece in October 2013. Their plan was to fly
from Athens to Sweden, but they ended up stranded. After several failed attempts at the airport,
they decided to hire smugglers to take their oldest son, who was 8, to Sweden. Jenna told me
about her concerns and fears:
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He departed Athens on December 27, and it took him one day to reach
Sweden, but we felt it was like hundreds of years. It has been a long time
since that date, but we are still confused and unable to understand how we
dared to take that decision and to send him by himself. But life is cruel, and
we often have to take decisions that are as hard as death. Sending our son to
Sweden was better than keeping him in Greece, where we were suffering
from hunger and desperation. He used to cry every time we called him. He
missed us a lot, and we missed him too … We felt like dying. (Jenna,
Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016)
Later, the couple sent their daughter, who was 9, to Italy and then to Sweden through
Denmark with the help of another smuggling group. Jenna recalled that their daughter’s trip was
long and hard, as she was travelling with a Romanian family who did not speak Arabic, so
communication was impossible. Jenna and her youngest child were able to cross as tourists from
Greece into Italy. On 2 January 2014, they arrived in Sweden, where she was reunited with her
other two children. Six weeks later, Karam left Greece on a truck, hiding between large slabs of
marble, crossed to Italy, and proceeded to Sweden. He rejoined his family after a journey of
about six months.
As their words make clear, the shift in mothers’ positionality in these stories intertwined with
their deep guilt and shame over their children’s risky journey. These sentiments reflected
changes in their role as mothers, protecting their children and teaching them about values. Their
handing their offspring to smugglers undermined these roles.
Encounters with smugglers clearly render refugees’ situations more precarious, but refugee
women feel particularly vulnerable. For example, the transfers from the small dinghies to the
larger fishing vessels in Egypt and Libya were difficult for all refugees, but especially for
women, being pushed and grabbed by strange men in the dark sea. These often-traumatic events
harmed many of them emotionally and physically and could end tragically, as the following story
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indicates. My prime source for it is a family friend whom I trust and who personally journeyed to
Sweden through Egypt. I was not, however, able to verify it from other sources because of its
sensitivity and lack of documentation.

In the summer of 2013, Egyptian smugglers took 250 Syrian and Palestinian refugees,
including 40 women, to a gathering point on the coast near Alexandria. They separated the men
and women and took the men and the older children to a fishing vessel in the sea. The women
and the remaining children, 5 and younger, were taken in small boats to a tiny, uninhabited
island, 35 miles (22 km) from the shore. There, the smugglers took the money and the gold from
the women, raped most of them, abandoned them on the island, and informed the coast guard of
their presence. The coast guard arrested the women and children and detained them for more
than 40 days in a police station in Alexandria. The women were released but not deported back
to Syria, because the ministry of interior was keen to avoid possible public outrage. As the events
unfolded, the men of the group were on their way to Italy and remained unaware of the tragedy.

These disturbing details remind us of the shocking violence and brutality some refugees
experience en route, shattering their perceptions of selves and lives. Such journeys may result in
deaths, which shake up survivors’ lives. The story of Rahma, a young Palestinian mother from
Syria, is telling. Rahma was pregnant when she made her journey from Syria to Turkey, hoping
to reach Sweden with her three-year-old son. She and the boy were boarding a rubber boat
(balam) and crossing to Greece when a ship hit them. The balam broke into two pieces, and a
number of refugees went missing, including Rahma’s son.
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I met Rahma in Hässleholm, Sweden, three years later, and she was still looking for her son.
She described that horrible night:

After one hour of our departure towards the Greek island, our rubber boat was
hit by a big ship, and it went into two pieces. I became unconscious, but I
remember having my son in my lap at that moment. When they rescued us, I
was cold and blue, so they thought that I was dead. They put me with the dead
bodies until someone discovered that I was still alive. When I woke up, I
could not remember anything. I forgot my name, I forgot that I was pregnant,
and I forgot that my son was with me. I was not able to talk. I was extremely
dehydrated … Later on, I discovered that my son was not rescued and his
body was not found at the shore. They took us to a prison while I was
screaming and crying that my son is lost … No one paid attention to me.
(Rahma, Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016)
Rahma told me that she is convinced that one of the families on the boat rescued her son. But
she wept as she explained: “It was too dark at the gathering point. I was not able to see a thing. I
was not able to see the face of my son … It was too dark … too dark” (Rahma, Hässleholm,
Sweden, June 2016). Rahma’s words and tears capture the trauma affecting many refugees, their
lives unraveled by the loss of loved ones en route and by their inability to find their bodies or
trace their fates. When Rahma showed me her son’s photograph, I could comprehend her
despair. The look in his eyes was calling for a rescue. The picture brought to mind Jenny
Edkins’s work on missing persons:

The line between presence and absence cannot be drawn clearly, certainly not
for some time for those whose relatives or friends cannot be found after a
disaster, and maybe not at all for any of us. Photographs are interesting in this
context. A photograph appears to record a moment that has inevitably passed,
but in itself, as a photograph, it is equally clearly present. The eyes in the
photograph still gaze determinedly directly at us, undaunted by the
impossibility of the look. The photograph “is” the person. (Edkins 2011: 16)
Similar horrors have been occurring on the shores of Europe and other global frontiers. We
can trace them through the thousands of bodies of those who did not survive the perilous journey

212

in the seas and are found washed up along the shores or left inside the sunken boats. The worldfamous picture of Alan Kurdi, the three-year old Syrian boy whose body was found washed up
along the shore of Turkey in September 2015, captured one of the thousands of tragic events that
reflect the high human cost of refugees’ journeys. These harrowing events are also relived in the
stories of the survivors, who relive their painful memories through their transformed lives. After
this nightmarish incident, Rahma crossed to Greece after many failed attempts and continued her
journey to Sweden, where she delivered a baby girl. Her resilience and determination as a young
mother were remarkable, especially given her haunting uncertainty about her son’s fate.

Transforming of Refugee Identity
The transformed positionalities of refugees, as we saw in the previous section, intertwine
closely with changes to their identity. Malkki (1992: 37) observes: “Identity is always mobile
and processual, partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a
status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories, et cetera.” Malkki captures the fluidity of
refugees’ identity as their shifting internal identification of self combines with outsiders’
(re)categorization of them. The stories in this dissertation speak to this understanding and show
how refugees’ notion of what it means to be a refugee – or refugeeness – keeps altering during
their journeys. In times of war, refugees go from being citizens or residents of their home
countries into displaced individuals who strive for protection elsewhere. The absence of this
protection in their home communities and neighboring countries pushes refugees to undertake
journeys to destinations beyond their regions. Their journeys are often difficult, as this
dissertation details, and render them illegal subjects, whom authorities punish and criminalize for
challenging the structures of control represented by the sovereign regime of borders (Schuster,
2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2015) ). Along with this process, refugees’ decisions and actions
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transform them from powerless victims to political actors who may display substantial agency
and perhaps create their own paths to safety and protection (Scheel and Squire, 2014). On
reaching their destinations, refugees become asylum seekers who claim the right of protection
through temporary or permanent residency. Many become citizens of their new countries.

Through their words, I have shown how refugees negotiate, even shape, their complex new
identity, starting with their initial act of leaving and then in their choices of routes and
destinations. Yet the decision to leave often produces emotional scars that last through their exile
and in turn influence their perceptions of self, home, and belonging -- intimate parts of their
identity. Colson (2003: 15) argues that the scars of displacement disrupt refugees’ memory and
stay with them even after the war in their countries ends. She notes, “Whatever the outcome,
people resent uprooting, find it traumatic, and in the long run look back in grief and with an
anger that lasts longer than the war or the dam that forced them out.” For refugees who feel
compelled to undertake journeys towards foreign destinations in search of protection, their
precarious journeys heighten their sense of grievance. When they add the journey’s fear,
exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion to their sense of uprootedness, all that pressure
may shatter and perhaps reconfigure their identity.
Qamar journeyed to Sweden with her husband and five children, and she summed it up, “We
were kings in our country. Here we are just beggars” (Qamar, Stockholm, July 2016). Karam,
who went to Sweden with his wife and three children, expressed similar sentiments:
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It breaks my heart that back home we had everything and now we became
refugees who have nothing and who are starting from scratch. (Karam,
Hässleholm, Sweden, June 2016)
The words of Qamar and Karam reflect refugeeness as degradation, poverty, and dependence,
disconnected from the past. In his reflection on exile, Edward Said (2000: 173) portrays such a
state:

Exile is strangely compelling to think about but terrible to experience. It is
the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between
the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted …
The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of
something left behind forever.
Said, however, differentiates between exile as an emotional state of loneliness and isolation,
and the narrow political definition of “refugee,” a legal term in international conventions on
refugees and protection, which we met in chapter one. Khosravi points to the same limitations of
the political definition:

To have a chance of getting refugee status, one must have the ability to
translate one’s life story into Eurocentric juridical language and to perform
the role expected of a refugee … Only those few who could ‘translate’ their
local stories into Eurocentric judicial language had a chance. (Khosravi
2011: 33-4)
So, in order to gain legal and political recognition as “protected refugees,” uprooted
individuals, who have escaped war and survived displacement, have to undertake precarious
journeys in search of acceptance and protection. They then must, in Khosravi’s view, translate
their traumatic experiences into “Eurocentric” legal frameworks. Alexandria Innes frames this
process in the “subjectivity of fear”:
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Yet, the refugee definition establishes fear as part of the refugee identity – a
subjective feeling. To assess whether someone feels the right kind of fear to
be genuinely a refugee means subjecting that person’s narrative account to a
positivist knowledge framework. The person’s own knowledge and
experience fearing persecution is [sic] only recognized if it meets the
established framework. (Innes 2016: 270)
Peter Nyers (2006: 12) also addresses the shortcomings of such legal frameworks: “The
juridical definition of the refugee is less important than the pervasively shared cultural
conception of what the experience of displacement – or “refugeeness” – involves.” The
definition and the legal frameworks do not acknowledge the fear, exhaustion, anxiety,
humiliation, and confusion that refugees experience during their search for protection, as I
discussed above in this chapter. They fall short in front of refugees’ traumatic journeys and do
not recognize the human cost refugees pay to reach destinations that accept them as “protected
refugees” only after they meet certain legal and political criteria.

The transformative notion of refugee identity involves other forms of complexity presented
by the re-formation of memory. Colson notes the tension between identity and memories in
exile: “Resettlement does not wipe out memory, but rather provides a medium through which it
is reworked, and the memory of shared experience of uprooting helps to create new forms of
identity” (Colson 2003: 9). The relationship between identity re-formation and memory is
profound in Palestinian refugees from Syria. Their new displacement during the Syrian war has
reconceptualized their collective sense of identity, belonging, and loss (see chapter two), but the
words of Issam, the Palestinian refugee from Syria, who travelled with his wife, Qamar, and their
five children to Sweden through Egypt, reveal the personal significance of identity and memory:
“The Swedish citizenship will not change us from Palestinians to Swedes. We will remain
Palestinians, and we will always belong to our native roots” (Issam, Stockholm, June 2016).
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I explained above that Syrian refugees do not appear to share the same sentiments as
Palestinians, since they have not yet re-mastered this collective sense of identity and belonging
after their displacement. This is a result particularly of how the current conflict, often perceived
as a civil war,21 has sharply divided their own communities. The hostility has destroyed Syrians’
common sense of identity and thus made them less able to share feelings of grievance and loss. I
explained in chapter two that these divisions have increased the pain and vulnerability of the
Syrian experience in exile.
In addition to memory formation, the change in refugee identity also influences refugees’
perceptions of place and home. Khosravi addresses the “multi-place” identity of people in exile:
Exile is when you live in one place and dream in another … A life in exile is
like being condemned to purgatory, a state between life and death, a limbo
between here and there … In exile, the past exists side by side with the present
… Exile is only parenthetic of life, though it lasts and lasts, though I know
return is only a myth, a never-to-be-realized dream, though I know there is no
home to go back to. Even though the house is there, the home is gone. I am
not the same person … However, the dream keeps me hoping. It liberates me
from the unbearable burden of alienhood. (2011: 74)
Khosravi understands the illusion of return as a survival tool in the midst of uprootedness.
Yet, for most of the refugees I interviewed, the house is no longer there. By losing their houses,
these refugees have also lost the dream of return. The illusion of return cannot help them through
the alienation of their exile. In her work on the meaning of home for Palestinian families, Bree
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Many commentators see the Syrian war as a regional sectarian conflict pitting Sunni Muslims, supported by
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, against Alawites and other minorities, supported by Iran. Others perceive it as a
proxy war between the United States and Russia. Yet another group considers it a civil war between the Syrian
governments, with its supporters, against its opponents. Regardless of the adopted narrative, I believe that the
ultimate result of the war is the destruction of the country and the sharp divisions between its own people.
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Akesson (2014) explores the impact of losing home on families and children in the occupied
Palestinian territories. She frames this loss as a loss of right and explains that, for Palestinians,
“when a home is destroyed, the physical structure is lost in addition to the entire emotional
essence of home, including aspects of centeredness and self-identity” (Akesson, 2014: 17). Yet,
she notices that such loss contributes to the formation of Palestinians’ collective identity,
particularly for residents of Palestinian refugee camps, who “identify with their villages and
towns of origin even if they have lived in exile for two or three generations” (ibid.).
This connection between forming identity and losing one’s home is experienced by
Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk. In chapter two I explained that most of Yarmouk’s
inhabitants had to leave their homes in December 2012 and have been prevented from returning.
A military operation in April 2018 destroyed much of the district and reduced most of its
buildings to rubble. The loss of Yarmouk has felt tragic to all of its people, both those who
remained in Syria and those who left. For those who made the journey to Europe, the loss has
complicated their perceptions of identity and place (Colson, 2003). They have lost their second
home, Yarmouk, after their people lost their first diasporic home, Palestine. They also lost the
illusion of return that could have helped them in their exile. In this sense, “refugeeness”
represents a state of being, because going home has become literally and physical impossible
(Khosravi, 2011; Said, 2000). A friend of mine, who had a house there, mourned the loss of
Yarmouk on his facebook page:
Wind is what we are left with now … We stood in silence, watching in denial
our massive loss. Our dreams are now lost … Our hearts are broken … Our
childhood memories are scattered. Even in our worst nightmares, we could
not imagine to see Yarmouk in rubbles [sic]. How lonely it was without its
people. (facebook, 26 May 2018)
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These words capture the pain of loss, the sense of uprootedness, and the deep grievance I
personally felt when I watched my own house in Yarmouk destroyed and looted. As the wife of a
Palestinian refugee and a mother of two Palestinian children, and despite our Canadian
citizenships, I now feel that we have been uprooted yet again. Our “multi-place” identity and our
sense of belonging are more fragmented than at any time before, as we are Canadians with
homes that have been lost in both Syria and Palestine. We are now the “Adam of two Edens,” as
portrayed by Mahmoud Darwish, the popular Palestinian poet:
I’m the Adam of two Edens lost to me twice.
Expel me slowly. Kill me slowly. (Mahmoud Darwish, 2000)

Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the emotional impact of the refugee journey on refugees’ own
perceptions of themselves and others, and of life in general. I have explored some of the feelings
that refugees often experience during their journeys in search of protection, including fear,
exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion. As in previous chapters, my work has drawn on
the intimate expressions of individuals who have shared their stories with me. They have chosen
to do so because they consider me a member of their own community who has also experienced
a journey. In the second section of the chapter, I discussed the transformative impact of the
journey on the positionality of refugees and examined the ambivalence of refugees’ roles within
their families and communities. I examined these powerful elements at work in various phases of
the journey and focused on refugees’ loss of role as protectors and providers. The experiences of
professional and female refugees reflected vividly this emotional and life-altering impact of
refugees’ journeys. Finally, I examined the reshaping of refugee identity and its impact on
refugees’ re-formation of memory, perception of home, and sense of belonging. I focused on
219

Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk, who are reliving their statelessness during the current Syrian
conflict.
The stories indicate that refugees’ decision to leave their home region for other places flows
from their aim to move from invisibility, as victims of war and as marginalized, displaced
persons, to social and political visibility, with protection, social acceptance, and better access to
human rights. Many of the people with whom I spoke initially perceived the journey as such a
passage, from rightlessness to a state of rights and protection. Yet, in the absence of legal and
safe routes, and with restrictive border practices that deter refugees, their crossing may expose
them to severe violence and precarity. They actually disappear again as illegal subjects who must
avoid control, while experiencing intense fear, exhaustion, anxiety, confusion, and humiliation.
The refugee journey thus becomes emotional, even shattering, and often traumatic. We see
refugees arrive at their destinations with a heavy burden -- agonizing memories of loss and
grievance as a result of the war they have fled. They also carry other forms of trauma from the
journey itself. For this reason, and despite their moments of political agency en route, the oftendisastrous circumstances of their journeys radically unsettle their perceptions of role, identity,
self, and life in general. These scars affect refugees’ ability to integrate within their new
localities and mean that, for many, arrival there does not end their journey. Mountz (2017: 78)
explains this long-lasting influence: “The trauma of displacement, migration, and detention
travels well beyond the material infrastructure of detention, traversing space and time
transcarcerally and transnationally in myriad ways.” Refugees’ journeys develop as intense
emotional experiences that engender confusing alterations in positionality and identity, reflecting
the appalling global crisis of protection and its high human cost. By examining the emotional toll
and transformative impact of the refugee journey, I complete my analysis of this journey
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according to the conceptual framework I proposed in chapter two. Informed by refugees’ stories
and their real experiences during their search for protection, I showed how the refugee journey
evolves as an act of survival and resistance that is messy and complex and has an intense
emotional, even transformative impact on refugees’ lives and decisions.

221

Conclusion
Research Overview
I began this dissertation by challenging the dominant official narrative in the global north
about the events of 2015 in Europe. I proposed that the arrival of more than one million refugees
on the shores of Europe reflected not a “refugee crisis” or “migration crisis,” as some media
outlets and governments called it, but a global crisis of protection. This crisis of protection had
been developing in the global south for years because the international refugee regime have
failed dramatically to protect refugees and because many governments in the global north have
wilfully neglected, even renounced their international commitments towards refugees. I argued
strongly that this regime failure and countries’ reluctance to resettle refugees have forced many
refugees, who are escaping war but not finding sufficient protection in their home regions, to
think of journeying elsewhere to secure their safety and rights. Such decisions and actions,
however, often take place under precarious conditions, because many governments in the global
north have sought to contain refugees in their home regions and deter their entry to the global
north. Such practices exponentially increase the human cost of border crossing, where many
refugees’ journeys end sadly, even tragically.

Many survivors of the often-harrowing journey reach their intended destinations bearing a
weighty burden of painful, sometimes-traumatic memories and grievances that shatter their
identities and deeply affect their lives in their new localities. To examine this crisis of protection
further, I explored in this dissertation these three core questions:

-

Why is this a crisis of protection, not of migration?

-

How and why did this crisis develop in the shadow of the international refugee regime?

-

How does the refugee journey actually reflect and pay the human cost of this crisis?
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To answer these crucial and intertwined questions, I examined in chapter one the nature of the
crisis and outlined many states’ perspectives on governing refugees. I showed how the
limitations of the international refugee regime have allowed this crisis of protection to occur at
such an intense scale. I illustrated the links between this crisis and the reluctance of many
governments in the global north to honour their international commitments to refugees and hence
to protecting refugees. I then examined how these states seek to contain and deter refugees from
the global south. I showed how such practices have actually altered the norms and practices of
protection, as outlined in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.

In chapters two to five, I shifted my approach and added further complexities to this study by
showing how the regime of protection looks from the ground up -- from the perspectives of the
people most affected: refugees, specifically those from Syria. To do so, in chapters two to five,
I positioned refugees as my prime source of knowledge, which flows from their decisions to
leave their war-tron homeland and then their region, to journey to Europe in search of protection.
My aim in so doing was to let refugees reveal, through their actual stories, how the failing
protection regime and governments’ efforts to contain and deter refugees scar them en route to
Europe where they hope, a better, safer life there. I hoped thereby to shift the focus from policy
to real people, who are often invisible in international policy making. I did so through the lens of
the Syrian refugee crisis, especially through the refugees’ journeys to Sweden. I added the
discussion of Palestinian refugees, whose families have lived in displacement in Syria since
1948. Because they are stateless, these refugees experienced severe discrimination and
vulnerability during their new displacement in neighbouring countries, especially Lebanon,
Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt and during their later journeys towards Europe.
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This dissertation has explored the predicament of refugees from Syria and illustrated the
impact of regional and international responses to the Syrian crisis on their legal status and
living conditions outside Syria. I situated their individual travails within the context of the global
crisis of protection, as I showed how containment and deterrence by the global north dominated
international responses to the crisis, rendering people in the global south more precarious as they
travelled illegally in search of safety. Such policies included chronic shortfalls in international
humanitarian aid and in official resettlement, which led to inadequate protection, dramatically
worsening conditions of displacement within the region and forcing refugees to look for
destinations elsewhere.
I examined these conditions through refugees’ stories of their escape from the war in Syria
and their displacement in neighbouring countries (both stages in chapter three) and through
their journeys beyond in search of protection (chapter four). By following the storylines of
refugees, I examined their journeys on three main routes to Europe: by sea from Egypt to Italy;
by sea from Turkey to Greece, and on to Sweden by air or via the western Balkan corridor; and
by sea from Libya to Italy.
Through their stories, I showed how refugees’ journeys developed in response to this global
crisis of protection, which none the less reveal their often-striking abilities to navigate and
survive this crisis. Their decision to head out like this reveals their political agency as they push
back against the harrowing conditions first of war and then of displacement. Their stories reveal
the strong agency often required in such journeys, especially under such precarious conditions.
The stories I have narrated make visible refugees’ agency as they create unexpected scripts and
trajectories, often despite their wishes or intentions. Many refugees tried to avoid leaving their
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homes in Syria: Khaled, for instance, feared displacement like that of his parents, who lost their
home in Palestine in 1948 and became stateless refugees in Syria. Khaled finally left his home in
Daraa as security conditions in his area deteriorated, and particularly after security forces
attacked him.

The stories also showed that many refugees attempted to establish new lives in their new
localities in the region. They had no intention to travel to Europe, and only the tough conditions
of displacement changed their minds. Wassim, for example, who escaped to Egypt with his wife,
Rajaa, and their sons, established a new business there, but hostility against Palestinian refugees
after 2013 led them to leave. Fares too did not want to leave Syria but finally did so, with his
wife and son, to avoid another detention that might have resulted in his death. Fares tried to start
a new life in Libya, but the intensified fighting and extreme insecurity there finally forced his
hand, and they made a dangerous journey towards Europe and ended up in Sweden.

Stories such as these show how refugees exert agency despite the violence and constraints
that shape their decisions and actions throughout the journey. The stories reflect the
unpredictability and messiness of many journeys, with their multiple moments of departure,
stillness, and immobility (see chapter four). Many journeys unfolded as a set of chaotic loops and
non-linear movements, but sometimes with tragic ends. Their stories showed how such intense
experiences might lead to fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and/or confusion, which
dramatically transform their notions of identity, self, and positionality, and hence their
perceptions of home, belonging, and life in general.

Informed by these stories and by my personal experience of exile and uprootedness, I
developed a conceptual framework for the refugee journey (chapter two). My aim was to
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contribute to scholarly debates about the crisis of protection and refugees’ predicament during
their search for protection. My approach engaged meaningfully with refugees’ actual
experiences, as I had proposed, and showed the journey itself to consist of three underresearched elements. It proved to be

-

an act of resistance and survival that demonstrates refugees’ vulnerability, and agency,
in escape and displacement (chapter three)

-

a non-linear messy, complex, and precarious passage towards protection (chapter four)

-

an emotional and transformative process that reshapes positionality and identity (chapter
five)

This framework articulates the journey through reconceptualised notions of the crisis, borders,
protection, and refuge. It engages significantly with refugees’ stories and examines their
decisions and actions, which reflect high degrees of agency intertwined with extreme precarity. It
thereby challenges dominant narratives about refugees as powerless victims or as potential
threats when they approach the global north. Instead, it represents refugees as real individuals
who resist the inhumane conditions of war and displacement by undertaking complex and messy
journeys towards foreign destinations. The framework examines particularly the emotional toll of
such journeys and illustrates its shattering effects on refugees, many of whom reach their
destinations bearing a heavy burden of fear, exhaustion, anxiety, humiliation, and confusion,
which influences their sense of belonging and their integration into their new localities.

Lessons Learned and the Way Forward
This understanding of refugees’ journeys is fundamental and crucial as the world’s attention
shifts from refugees’ crises, including that of refugees from Syria, while the crisis of protection
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still rages and haunts the lives of those who strive for safety and a better life. During 2017,
arrivals in Europe via the eastern Mediterranean decreased by 92 per cent vis-à-vis 2016
(UNHCR, 2018). This sharp drop took place while numbers of refugees from Syria increased by
14 per cent during 2017, reaching a total of 6.3 million (ibid.), as the war continued. Moreover,
Syrian refugees’ conditions remain highly vulnerable and precarious in neighbouring lands.
Those who wish to travel to Europe face harsher deterrence and containment. According to the
EU-Turkey deal of 2016, refugees who reach Greece from Turkey are now contained -- gathered
in overcrowded reception centers on the Greek islands (UNHCR, 2018). Médecins sans
frontières (MSF) reported multiple cases of self-harm and attempts at suicide among child
refugees at Moria camp on Lesvos, where more than 9,000 people were trapped for months
(and some even for years), living in terrible conditions, without any idea about their destiny
(MSF, 2018b). The crisis continues on the central Mediterranean route as well. European Union
(EU) governments such as Italy and Malta’s blocked humanitarian organizations at sea and
accused rescue teams of trafficking in humans. In June 2018, the far-right Italian government
withdrew from search-and-rescue operations and started refusing disembarkation to commercial
and NGO vessels carrying rescued refugees (Amnesty International, 2018). According to MSF
(2018a), such practices result in more drownings, as people are left stranded in unseaworthy
boats in the international waters between Italy, Malta, and Libya. Karline Kleijer, the MSF head
of emergencies, described these decisions as “outrageous and unacceptable” and noted: “The
European political decisions that have been taken during the past weeks have had deadly
consequences. There has been a cold-blooded decision to leave men, women and children to
drown in the Mediterranean Sea” (MSF, 2018a). UNHCR goodwill ambassador and prominent
writer Khaled Hosseini (2018: 3) pleads, “Where is the outrage, one wonders? Are we growing
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numb to the loss of human life? Or, maybe, numbers are to blame. Perhaps we are inspired to act
by a single tragedy, while, paradoxically, larger-scale human suffering registers as abstraction.”
Refugees’ stories, he insists, can challenge such indifference and numbness: “Stories are the best
antidote to the dehumanisation caused by numbers. They restore our empathy. Each story I hear
from a refugee helps me feel, bone-deep, my immutable connection to its teller as a fellow
human. I see myself, the people I would give my life for, in every tale I am told” (ibid.).
Hosseini’s call speaks to my argument about how refugees’ stories can generate useful
insights and connect us with refugees as real people, who experience fear, pain, and loss. Just as
Hosseini seeks to rehumanize refugees, my work encourages us to move beyond empathy to
action. I hope that it may inspire us as scholars and policy-makers to re-animate refugees as real
people rather than simply objects of policy and research analysis.

As I prepared this dissertation, the chronic absence of refugees as real individuals in
scholarly literature and policy discourses haunted me. Academic research tends to treat refugees
as objects or data that explain how such groups interact, engage, and respond to governing
structures in their regions or in receiving states. Refugees’ human experiences during the
journeys, the details of their daily struggles, and the emotional toll of such experiences are still
largely missing and undertheorized in migration and refugee studies. This yawning void limits
our ability as scholars and policy-makers to grasp refugees’ real predicaments and aspirations.
They are missing too from policy discourse, where they surface as abstract numbers. They
appear usually as faceless and nameless, with “ungrievable” sufferings, or as illegals when they
challenge states’ borders in an “unauthorized” manner. Refugees are “others,” whose pre-war
lives and deeds are ignored, and whose hopes and dreams are questionable. Such an absence
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reflects policy-makers’ reluctance to treat refugees as equal individuals worthy of protection that
offers the “independence and dignity which enable refugees themselves to decide how they wish
to cope with their predicaments” (Hathaway, 2007: 364).

It is because of the absence of refugees that I have chosen not to conclude this dissertation
with policy recommendations for refugee protection. I do not want to override their voices by
focusing on policy frameworks again. I feel no need to reproduce what other research projects
have already accomplished. As I noted above, since Europe’s summer of 2015, several research
projects have documented and examined migrants and refugees’ journeys, especially via the
Mediterranean (Amnesty International, 2018; Crawley et al., 2018; Squire et al., 2017; UNHCR,
2018). Their final reports propose sweeping policy recommendations to facilitate safe and legal
pathways for those in need of protection, rights-oriented border practices, and protecting human
rights en route. For example, Amnesty International (2018) challenges practices that violate
human rights at sea, with often-harrowing results. It urges EU states to deploy enough rescue
vessels, create regional disembarking arrangements, allow NGOs to continue rescues at sea, decriminalize irregular entry, and stop outsourcing border control. It insists on reform of the Dublin
Regulation system to reduce pressure on front-line EU members and ensure that all signatories
protect asylum seekers. The UNHCR report Desperate Journeys (2018) recommends similar
changes, especially re safe and legal pathways to international protection through resettlement
for unaccompanied children. Squire et al. (2017) conclude Crossing the Mediterranean by Boat
with calls for safe and legal pathways and improved reception centers. It urges states to replace
deterrence with interventions that address why people undertake these journeys.
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I agree with most of these recommendations and hope that such interventions may challenge
state efforts in the global north to decontextualize refugee crises in the global south by blaming
refugees for their own hardships. A proxy war involving many local, regional, and international
players has caused the Syrian refugee crisis, for example. Most of those players ignore their
responsibilities towards the people of Syria, who are trapped between a brutal war and structures
of protection and border controls that lock them in unbearable circumstances. Those who want
better lives must consider “unauthorized” journeys as “illegal” figures who travel through
precarious conditions and are portrayed as a threat to deter and securitize. Nevertheless, many of
these recommendations seem to me unlikely to end the crisis. They fail to see refugees as real
individuals who deserve to be treated as equal as other people in the global north. Only, I
believe, by humanizing policies and research can we make a real difference. A radical shift of the
analysis would circumvent refugees’ “otherness” and the binary of victims/criminals. This would
require serious and meaningful engagement with refugees’ stories and narratives about their
actual experiences during war, displacement, and search for protection. This gestalt shift would
allow ‘us,’ as academics and policy-makers, to see and treat refugees as people who have
diverse backgrounds, experiences, and hopes and dreams, as we do, and who deserve to live
like us. I explore this form of engagement below.

Future Research
Building on my findings in this dissertation and my argument for more humanized policies
and academic research that disrupt the “otherness” of refugees and rather engage with them as
equal humans, I propose three other areas of inquiry for future research informed more by
refugees’ narratives and actual experiences:
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-

refugees’ integration in countries of resettlement

-

the impact of refugees’ differential experience of their journeys and its effect on their
integration

-

the ethics of writing about refugees

Integration of refugees: My research opens up future inquiry into how the journey continues
after arrival. As I noted above, my research has focused on refugees’ experiences before and
during their actual journeys towards Europe, but I have not here been able to examine their
experiences in their new localities – a notable, follow-through element of the journey. For many
of the refugees I interviewed, arrival in Sweden started a new stage of their journey, with
different kinds of challenges and changes. Many of them talked to me about missing their home,
community, and life back in Syria. They spoke of the challenges of learning a new language,
finding a job, or simply coping with new spaces and new norms of life. Hearing about this tells
me that it is vital to examine refugees’ individual experiences in their new localities to
understand the barriers and challenges they face as uprooted individuals with a heavy burden of
emotional scars who are none the less willing to adapt. This inquiry will illuminate the journey
of refugees as a whole and how it shapes their lives and trajectories. It would explore integration
in terms of refugees’ individual and communal accomplishments and the barriers they often face.

To further humanize policies and research, this inquiry should look first at whether and how
refugees reconstruct and reaffirm notions of identity, home, and belonging and at these notions’
influence on their relationship with their new localities and on their ability to integrate. In fact,
refugees’ experiences of integration constitute a pressing topic for refugees and policy-makers as
well. This is crucial, as European liberal values of acceptance and integration have been under
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siege since the unprecedented events of 2015. The integration of refugees presents a major
challenge for receiving governments, host communities, and above all for refugees themselves. I
suggest, however, that a useful inquiry about integration starts not with institutional policies and
systematic procedures of integration and social cohesion, but with refugees’ experiences and
intimate notions of identity, home, and belonging. Future research could explore refugees’
relationship with their new localities and their integration from their own perspective. This
presumes serious engagement with refugees’ stories as a prime source of knowledge. Examining
their encounters with unfamiliar social, economic, and cultural structures may inspire new
debates and scholarly work in anthropology, sociology, and political science that focus on
insights from refugees’ actual experiences. This in turn may suggest new ways to think about
protecting and accepting refugees that flow directly from and address the realities of their
experiences, and may help humanize policies of protection and integration.
The impact of different journeys on refugees’ integration: Another area of inquiry that my
research findings suggest concerns how the journey may affect refugees’ integration
differentially. Comparing the experiences of asylum seekers from Syria with those of refugees
from Syria being resettled by the UNHCR might be very revealing. Sweden has received more
than 50,000 Syrians and Palestinian refugees from Syria. As I showed above, the majority of
these refugees arrived in Sweden “illegally” as asylum seekers during 2015. In response, the
Aliens Act of July 2016 offered temporary residency to asylum seekers, reducing chances for
them to reunite their families and creating barriers for refugees and asylum seekers to integrate in
Sweden (Folkkampnj for Asyllratt, 2016). As a response to the same crisis, Canada received and
officially resettled more than 40,000 refugees from Syria (Government of Canada, 2017). They
received permanent residency on arrival, which gave them access to social services. As a
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member of the Syrian community in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, helping to sponsoring
refugees and as a board member at Reception House of Waterloo Region, which assists
government-sponsored refugees with resettlement in Waterloo region, I am keenly aware that
resettled refugees face daunting challenges of integration and self-accomplishment.

Studying the transformative impact of the refugee journey (see chapter five) may offer a
starting point for this proposed inquiry. The journey affects various individuals’ positionalities
and roles as protectors and providers in different ways. Such an inquiry might compare the
experiences of refugees who resettle in Europe as asylum seekers after precarious journeys with
those who have been resettled in Canada. Why are some – in both destinations -- still facing
challenges of integration, such as learning the language, finding jobs, and coping with their new
lives? Refugees’ stories should offer prime knowledge for this sort of inquiry. Their own words
may tell us about the journey’s impact on their ability to integrate, their sense of belonging, and
their notion of locality while they perhaps try to reconstruct their identities in exile. This may
lead to new frameworks for protecting refugees that may help them fulfil their needs and
aspirations.

The ethics of writing about refugees: The absence of refugees as real individuals in
academia and the latter’s tendency to treat them as objects raise questions about the ethics of
working and writing about refugees and the need for new scholarly approaches that engage
meaningfully with refugees’ stories and narratives. Scholars such as Clark-Kazak (2017),
Johnson (2016), and Squire (2018) have entered this vital debate about the ethics of bringing the
narratives of migrants and refugees into qualitative research. Yet we need more academic
initiatives in migration and refugee studies to challenge the absence of refugees as real people
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and to communicate with refugees’ communities, which may generate new ways of thinking
about protecting and accepting refugees.
During my journey as a researcher, I had to explore and write about refugees’ actual
experiences while having myself been uprooted and while also acquiring knowledge through my
communication with family, friends, and community members, who shared their journey stories
with me and trusted me to treat their intimate moments with respect and dignity. I came to this
project from a policy background with a master’s degree in international public policy and long
professional experience in diplomacy and international business. Thus I started this dissertation
research by analyzing the policy discourse of refugee protection and border practices. I
struggled, however, with this approach, as it failed to capture the real scale and scope of the
Syrian refugee crisis that I witnessed through my life in Syria and through the stories I heard.
The policy discourse did not help me to – crucially -- delineate the devastating impact the crisis
had on people’s lives. I found little space in this discourse for people’s voices and words.

This is why, during my research and as I was writing this dissertation, I found myself shifting
towards other methods that allowed me to treat the stories I heard from refugees in an ethical and
meaningful way. I ended up situating refugees at the center of my work and treating their stories
as my prime source of knowledge about their journeys and aspirations and the crisis of protection
in general. In the light of my experience as a researcher, I argue that research about refugees
should be informed by their lived experiences and should aim to articulate, perhaps even help
create new global frameworks of protection that hear, understand, and involve refugees as equal
human beings.
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As I noted above in this Conclusion, research on refugees now tends more than before to
adopt an ethical approach towards refugees’ experiences. I argue, however, that a breakthrough
requires going beyond the ethics of research and entails avoiding the “otherness” of refugees. It
starts by hearing, understanding, and treating refugees as real individuals. Their stories should
serve not as abstract data that further the agenda and goals of academic researchers, but rather as
an alternative and priceless source of knowledge about lived experiences and worthy aspirations.
Genuine human research starts when we imagine ourselves in the position of refugees through
their stories and words. It succeeds when we feel their tears, loss, fear, and their hopes and
dreams. This becomes possible only when we perceive refugees as equal human beings, whose
lives are worth living and whose sufferings and deaths deserve dignified acknowledgment and
grief.
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Interview Appendix
Name

Route

Ammar

Lebanon – Thailand –
Turkey – Balkan
route - Germany
Turkey - Canada

Arrad
Fares
Hania

Issam and
Qamar
Karam and
Jenna
Khaled

Mahmoud

Rahma
Rana
Rasha

Rawan
Safieh
Salam
Wassim

Rajaa
Rami

Egypt – Libya – Italy
- Sweden
Turkey – Greece –
Balkan route Sweden
Egypt – Italy Sweden
Turkey – Greece –
Italy - Sweden
Jordan – Syria –
Turkey – Balkan
route - Sweden
Egypt – Italy –
Sweden
Turkey – GreeceSweden
Irbil – Turkey –
Greece - Sweden
Turkey – Greece –
Balkan route Sweden
Turkey – Malaysia –
Germany - Sweden
Turkey – Greece –
Norway
Turkey – Greece Sweden
Egypt – Turkey –
Greece – Sweden
Egypt – Turkey –
Greece - Sweden
Egypt – Italy Sweden

Date of
Journey
2013 -2015

Family
-

Destination
Hanover Germany

2012 - 2014 Wife and 2
Children
2012- 2014 Wife and 1
Child
2015
6 children

Kitchener Canada
Stockholm Sweden
Laxå - Sweden

2013

5 Children

2014

3 Children

2012- 2015

Sister and her
family

Stockholm Sweden
Hässleholm –
Sweden
Berlin Germany

2013

Two sons (one
stayed in
Germany)
Son

2015
2014
2015

Mother and one
son
3 children

2014

-

2014

Husband

2013

-

2013 - 2014 Wife and 2
children
(separate
journeys)
2014
Wife of Wassim
2013

Son of Wassim

Hässleholm Sweden
Hässleholm Sweden
Stockholm Sweden
Laxå - Sweden

Uppsala Sweden
Norway
Stockholm Sweden
Stockholm –
Sweden

Stockholm Sweden
Stockholm Sweden
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Shadi

Yamen
Youssef

Egypt – Turkey –
Greece – Balkan
route - Sweden
Libya – Italy Sweden
Egypt – Libya – Italy
– Sweden

2014

Son of Wassim

Stockholm Sweden

2014

Daughter

2012

-

Hässleholm –
Sweden
Hässleholm –
Sweden
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Maps of Routs and Journeys

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

References
Agier, M. (2011). Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government.
Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
Akesson, B. and Badawi, D. (2017). Experiences of Syrian Refugee Families Living in Northern
Lebanon: Preliminary Research Brief. 31 January 2017. Out of Place: Stories from Syrian
families Research. https://www.outofplaceresearch.com/resources.html
Akesson, B. (2014). We may go, but this is my home": Experiences of domicide and resistance
for Palestinian children and families. Journal of Internal Displacement. 4(2): 6-20.
Akram S. et al. (2014). Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility
Sharing. International Human Rights Clinic: Boston University.
Akram, S. M. (2011). Myths and realities of the Palestinian refugee problem: Reforming the
right of return. In Akram S M et al. (eds) International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
New York: Routledge.
Allen, W., Anderson, B., Nicholas Van Hear, N., Madeleine Sumption, M., Düvell, F., Hough, J.,
Rose, L., Humphris, R. & Walker, S. (2018). Who Counts in Crises? The New Geopolitics of
International Migration and Refugee Governance, Geopolitics. 23(1): 217-243.
Al Monitr (2014). Jordan: Jordan admits to barring entry of Palestinian refugees from Syria. 8
July 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/jordan-palestinians-syriarefugees-unrwa-hrw.html#
Almustafa, M. (2018). Relived vulnerabilities of Palestinian refugees: Governing through
exclusion. Social and Legal Studies. 27(2): 164-179.
Amnesty International (2018). Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Europe fails refugees
and migrants in the central Mediterranean.
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3089062018ENGLISH.pdf
Amnesty Intentional (2017). News: EU: Human rights cost of refugee deal with Turkey too high
to be replicated elsewhere. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/02/eu-human-rightscost-of-refugee-deal-with-turkey-too-high-to-be-replicated-elsewhere/
Amnesty International (2015). Lebanon: New entry requirements for Syrians likely to block
would-be refugees. 7 January 2015. https://www.amnesty.ie/lebanon-new-entry-requirementssyrians-likely-block-refugees/
Amnesty International (2014a). Families ripped apart as Palestinian refugees from Syria denied
entry to Lebanon. 1 July. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/families-ripped-apartpalestinian-refugees-syria-denied-entry-lebanon-2014-07-01

245

Amnesty International (2014b). Lebanon human rights. http://www.amnestyusa.org/ourwork/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/lebanon
Amnesty International (2014c). Scores of Syrian and Palestinian refugees at imminent risk of
deportation from Egypt. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/scores-syrian-and-palestinianrefugees-imminent-risk-deportation-egypt-2014-11-14
Amnesty International (2014d). Egypt: Scores of Syria and Palestinian refugees at imminent risk
of deportation from Egypt. 14 November 2014.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/11/scores-syrian-and-palestinian-refugeesimminent-risk-deportation-egypt/
Anderson, K. and Smith, S (2011). Editorial: Emotional Geographies. Royal Geographical
Society. 26: 7-10.
Andrijasevic, R. (2009). Sex on the move: Gender, subjectivity and differential inclusion.
Subjectivity Special issue: Conflicts of Mobility: Migration, labour and political subjectivities. R.
Andijasvic and B. Anderson (Guest Editors), 29, 389-406.
Arendt, H. (1951). The Origin of Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books.
Arendt, H. (1943). We Refugees. In Robinson, M. (eds.) (1996), Altogether Elsewhere. Writers
on Exile, Washington, Harvest Books.
Asylum Information Database AIDA (2016). Sweden: Treatment of specific nationalities.
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/sweden/asylum-procedure/differentialtreatment-specific-nationalities-procedure
Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (2015). Germany: halt on Dublin procedures for Syrians.
24 August 2015. http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/24-08-2015/germany-halt-dublinprocedures-Syrians
Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (2013). Sweden will grant permanent residency permit to
Syrian refugees. 3 September 2013. http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/17-10-2014/swedenwill-grant-permanent-residence-permit-syrian-refugees
Azmeh, S. (2016). Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The end of the ‘Development Rentier Fix’ and the
Consolidation of New Elite Rule. Politics & Society. 44(4): 499-523.
Barnett, L. (2002). Global governance and the evaluation of the international refugee regime.
International Journal of Refugee Law. 14 (2/3): 238-262.
Baban, F., Ilcan, S., and Rygiel, K. (2016). Syrian refugees in Turkey: Pathways to precarity,
differential inclusion, and negotiated citizenship rights. Journal of Ethic and Migration Studies.
43(1): 41-57.

246

Baban, F., Ilcan, S., and Rygiel, K. (2015). Syrians in Turkey: ‘Neither Guests nor Refugees’ –
Negotiating Citizenship and Humanitarian Assistance. Paper presented before the Conference on
Governing Migration on the Margins. Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo,
Canada. November 2015.
BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (2015). Palestinian
Refugees from Syria: Ongoing Nakba, Ongoing Discrimination. Report, BADIL Resource
Centre for Palestinian Residency, Issue no. 57, Bethlehem, Palestine.
http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/badil-new/publications/periodicals/al-majdal/al-majdal57.pdf
Banki, S. (2013). Precarity of Place: A Complement to the Growing Precariat Literature. Global
Discourse 3 (3–4): 450–463.
BBC (2015a). Migrant crisis: Four arrests over Austria lorry deaths. 28 August 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34083337
BBC (2015b). News: Europe gets 8,000 refugees daily. 25 September 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34356758
BenEzer, G. and Zetter, R. (2015). Searching for Directions: Conceptual and Methodological
Challenges in researching refugee journeys. Journal of Refugee Studies. 28(3): 297-318.
BenEzer, G. (2002). The Ethiopian Jewish Exodus: Narratives of the migration journey to Israel
1977-1985. London: Routledge.
Betts, A. (2013). Regime Complexity and International Organizations: UNHCR as a challenged
institution. Global Governance 19 (1): 69-81.
Betts, A. (Eds.) (2011). Global Migration Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Towards a critique of the governmentality of unease.
Alternatives 27 (2002), special issues: 63-92.
Bloch, A. and Schuster, L (2002). Asylum and Welfare: Contemporary debates. Critical Social
Policy 22(3):393-414.
Brand L (1988). Palestinians in Syria: The politics of integration. Middle East Journal 42(4):
621-637.
Brigden, N. and Mainwaring, C. (2016). Matryoshka Journeys: Im/mobility during migration.
Geopolitics (2016). 21(2): 407-434.
Brown, W. (2010). Walled states, waning sovereignty. New York: Zone Books.

247

Bundy, C. (2016). Migrants, Refugees, History, and Precedent. Forced Migration Review:
Destination: Europe 2016: 51: 5-6.
Butler, J. (2009). Frames of war. London: Verso.
Casas, M. et al., (2010). Stretching Borders Beyond Sovereign Territories? Mapping EU and
Spain’s Border Externalization Policies. Geopolítica(s), (2)1: 71-90.
Castles, S. (2003). The International Politics of Forced Migration. Development, 46(3): 11-20.
Castles, S. and Loughna, S. (2004). Globalization, Migration and Asylum. In George, V. and
Page, R. (eds.) Global Social Problems. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysis (Lifos) (2016). Thematic Report:
Palestinians and Syrians in Libya. 23 February 2016.
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1041798/1788_1461175197_lifos.pdf
Center for Refugee Solidarity (2015). Innocence Detained: A child in an Egyptian Prison, “The
case of Youssef Mohamed Aden”. December 2015, Malmö, Sweden.
http://www.refugeesolidarity.org/publication/report/egypt/a-child-in-an-egyptian-prison
Ceyhan, A. and Tsoukala, A. (2002). The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies:
Ambivalent discourses and policies. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 27 92002), Special
Issue: 21-39.
Chimni, BS (2004). From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a critical history of
durable solutions to refugee problems. Refugee Survey Quarterly (2004). 23(3): 55-73.
Chinmi, BS. (1998). The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A view from the South. Journal of
Refugee Studies. 11(4).
Clandinin, D. and Rosiek, J. (2007). Mapping a Landscape of Narrative Inquiry: Borderland
Spaces and Tensions. In Clandinin D. (eds.). Handbook of Narrative Inquiry: Mapping a
Methodology. Thousand Oaks, Ca: SAGE Publications.
Clark-Kazak, C. (2017). Ethical Considerations: Research with people in situations of forces
migration. Refuge: Canadian Journal on Refugees. 33(17).
CNBC (2015). Politics: Macedonian army starts building fence on Greek border. 28 November
2015. http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/28/macedonian-army-starts-building-fence-on-greekborder.html
Colson, E. (2003). Forced Migration and the Anthropological Response. The Journal of Refugee
Studies. 16(1): 1-18.

248

Connelly, F. M. and Clandinin, D. J. (2006). Narrative Inquiry. In Green, J. L. et al. (eds.).
Handbook of Complementary Methods in Education Research. Washington, DC: American
Education Research Association.
Collyer, M. and King, R. (2015). Producing transnational space: International migration and the
extra-territorial reach of state power. Progress in Human Geography. 39(2): 185-204.
Collyer M, Düvell, F and de Haas H (2012). Critical approach to transit migration. Population,
Space and Place. 18: 407-414.
Collyer, M. and de Haas, H. (2012). Developing dynamics categorizations of transit migration.
Population, space and Place. 18: 468-481.
Collyer, M. (2010). Stranded migrants and the fragmented journey. Journal of Refugee Studies.
23 (3): 273-293.
Collyer, M. (2007). In-Between places: Trans-Saharan transit migrants in Morocco and the
fragmented journey to Europe. Antipode: 669-690.
Crawley, H., Düvell, F., Jones, K., McMahon, S., and Sigona, N. (2018). Unravelling Europe’s
‘Migration Crisis’. Bristol: Policy Press.
Cresswell, T. (2010). Towards a Politics of Mobility. Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space, 28(1): 17–31.
Cresswell, T. (2006). On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World. New York: Taylor
and Francis Group.
Crisp, J. (2001). Mind the Gap. UNHCR, Humanitarian Assistance and the Development
Process”. UNHCR Working Paper No. 43 (May 2001). P 6.
http://www.unhcr.org/3b309dd07.html
Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (2016). Closing Borders, Shifting Routes: Summary of Regional
Migration Trends Middle East – May 2016. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/closing-bordersshifting-routes-summary-regional-migration-trends-middle-east-may-2016
Dauphinee, E. (2010). The Ethics of Autoethnography. Review of International Studies. 36(3):
799-818.
De Genova et al. (2015). “New Key Words: Migration and borders”. Cultural Studies. 29 (1):
55-87.
De Genova, N. (2014). Ethnography in Europe or anthropology of Europe? Social Anthropology.
22(3): 293-295.

249

De Genova, N. (2004). The legal production of Mexican / Migrants “illegality”. Latino Studies
2004. 2: 160-185.
De Hass, H. (2008). The Myth of Invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to
Europe. Third World Quarterly. 29(7): 1305‐1322.
De los Reyes, P (2016). Personal interview at the Department of Economic History, Stockholm
University. 18 August 2016.
Düvell, F. (2018). The ‘Great Migration’ of summer 2015: analyzing the assemblage of key
drivers in Turkey. Special Issue: Against the evidence: Europe’s migration challenge and the
failure to protect. 30 May 2018. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 1-14.
Düvell, F. (2012). Transit Migration: A blurred and politicized concept. Population, Space and
Place. 18, 415-427.
DW (2013). Europe: Sweden open doors for Syrian refugees. 7 September 2013.
http://www.dw.com/en/sweden-opens-doors-to-syrian-refugees/a-17072567
Edkins, J. (2011). Missing: Persons and Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Escobar, Arturo. 2008. Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (2017). ECRC Weekly Bulletin: European
Development: French-German proposal for Common European Asylum System and returns
reduces protection to minimum. 24 February 2017. http://us1.campaignarchive2.com/?u=8e3ebd297b1510becc6d6d690&id=dd7eaa6479#note
European Council on Refugee and Exiles (ECRE) (2016). “The United Nations Summit for
Refugees and Migrants – a failed opportunity for much needed reform?” 23 September 2016.
http://www.ecre.org/the-united-nations-summit-for-refugees-and-migrants-a-failed-opportunityfor-much-needed-reform/#
European Commission (EC) (2017a). Policies: Migration and Home Affairs: Schengen Area.
Updates on 13 March 217. http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-andvisas/schengen_en
European Commission (EC) (2017b). Migration and Home Affairs: Temporary Protection. 16
March 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporaryprotection_en
European Council (EC) (2016). EU-Turkey statement. Press release, 18 March 2016.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/

250

Eurostat (2015). News Release: Asylum Decisions in the EU.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6827382/3-12052015-AP-EN.pdf/6733f080c072-4bf5-91fc-f591abf28176
European Resettlement Network (2016). Focus on Syria. http://www.resettlement.eu/news/focussyria
Eurostat (2017). Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors: 63 300
unaccompanied minors among asylum seekers registered in the EU in 2016. Over half are
Afghans or Syrians. News Release 80/2017.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8016696/3-11052017-AP-EN.pdf/30ca22060db9-4076-a681-e069a4bc5290
European Parliament (2017). EU Migrant Crisis: Facts and Figures. 30 June 2017.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-migrantcrisis-facts-and-figures
Faist, T (2008). Migrants as Transnational Agents: An inquiry into the newest round of the
migration-development nexus. Population, Space and Place, 14, 21-42.
Feket, L (2009). A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe. London.
Pluto Press.
Feldman, Ilana (2018). Trump’s full spectrum assault on Palestinian Politics.
Middle East Research and Information Project MERIP. December 2018
https://merip.org/2018/12/trumps-full-spectrum-assault-on-palestinian-politics/
Fisk, R. (2017). When did protest against Assad govt turn to war in Syria? 2 September 2017.
Dawn https://www.dawn.com/news/1355464
Fisk, R., Cockburn, M., Sengupta, P. (2016). Arab Spring Then and Now: From hope to despair.
Mango Media and the Independent. Florida, US.
Folkkampanj for asylratt (2016). The proposed new measures: Their implications. June 2016.
http://www.folkkampanjforasylratt.se/en/info/atgarderna/
Fox News Politics (2015). Politics Home: Amid “disaster of biblical proportion,” administration
reportedly to accept more 5,000 refugees. 10 September 2015.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/09/09/amid-disaster-biblical-proportions-administrationreportedly-to-accept-5000.html
Gamlen, A. and Marsh, K. (2011). Introduction: Modes of Governing Migration. In Gamlen, A.
and Marsh K (eds.) Migration and Global Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Limited.

251

Garelli, G. and Tazzioli, M. (2013). “Challenging the Discipline of Migration: Militant Research
in Migration Studies: An Introduction”. Postcolonial Studies. 16(3): 245-249.
Gatrell, P. (2013). The Making of Modern Refugee. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Ghosh, B (2007). Managing Migration: Towards the missing regime? In Pecoud A and
Guchteneire P (eds.) Migration Without Borders: Essays on the free movement of people. US:
UNISCO and Berghan Books.
Gill, N., Caletrio, J., and Mason, V. (2011). Introduction: Mobilities and Forced Migration.
Mobilities. 6(3): 301-316.
Government of Canada (2017). #WelcomeRefugees: Canada resettled Syrian refugees. 4 May
2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcomesyrian-refugees.html
Government of Lebanon and the United Nations (2015). Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP)
(2015-2016). 15 December 2015. data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=7722
Gubrium, J. F., and Holstein, J. A. (2009). Analysing Narrative Reality. Los Angeles: Sage.
Habib, J. (2018). Wall Art and the Presence of Absence. Review of International American
Studies. 11(1): 175-189.
Habib, J. (2013). On the Matter of Return: Autoethnographic Reflections. In Markowitz F
(2013). Ethnographic Encounters in Israel: Poetics and Ethics in Fieldwork. University of
Indiana Press.
Habib, J. (2011). Property Rites: Narrating Palestinian Presence, in Property Rights
Contestation and Autonomy. Eds. Coleman W and Prudham S. University of British Columbia
Press.
Habib, J. (2007). We were living in a different country: Palestinian Nostalgia and the Future
Past, in Dan Rabinowitz and Daniel Monterescu (eds), Mixed Towns, Trapped Communities:
Historical Narratives, Spatial Dynamics, Gender Relations and Cultural Encounters in
Ethnically Mixed Towns in Israel/Palestine. Ashgate Publishing, pp 65-84.
Harding, S. (1993). Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity”? In
Alcoff, L and Potter, E. (1993) (eds.). Feminist Epistemologies. New York: Routledge.
Hassan, A. and Biörklund, L. (2016). The Journey to Dreamland Never Ends: A Refugee’s
Journey from Somalia to Sweden. Refugee Survey Quarterly. 35(2): 116–136.
Hathaway, J. (2016). A global solution to a global refugee crisis. European Papers. 1 (1): 93-99.

252

Hathaway, J. (2007). Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to ‘Date’? Journal of
Refugees Studies 20 (3): 349-369.
Hathaway, J. (2001). Temporary Protection of Refugees: Threat or Solution? In Handmaker, J. et
al. (2001). Perspective on Refugee Protection in South Africa. Pretoria, South Africa: Lawyers
for Human Rights, 2001.
Hathaway, J. and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015). Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative
Deterrence. Journal of Transnational Law. 53(2): 235-84.
Hayden, P. (2009). From exclusion to containment: Arendt, sovereign power, and statelessness.
Societies Without Borders. 3(2): 248-269.
Heelsum, A. (2017). Aspirations and frustrations: experiences of recent refugees in the
Netherlands. Ethics and Racial Studies. 40(3): 2137-2150.
Hinnebusch, R. (2015). Conclusion: agency, context and emergent post-uprising regimes.
Democratization. 22(2): 358-374.
Hosseini, K. (2018). Refugees are still dying. How do we get over ours news fatigue? The
Guardian. 17 August 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/aug/17/khaled-hosseinirefugees-migrants-stories
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2017). Lebanon: Refugees in Border Zone at Risk: Arsal
Conditions Pressure Them to Return to Syria. 20 September 2017.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/20/lebanon-refugees-border-zone-risk
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016). World Report. European Union: Events of 2015.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/european-union-0
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016a). Syria: Events of 2016. https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2017/country-chapters/syria
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016b). World Report 2016: Lebanon events of 2015.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/lebanon
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016c). European Union: Refugee response falls short. 27
January 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/european-union-refugee-response-fallsshort
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016d). EU policies put refugees at risk: An agenda to restore
protection. 23 November 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/eu-policies-put-refugeesrisk
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016e). The Refugee Summit: A failure of vision. 20 September
2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/20/refugee-summit-failure-vision
253

Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016f). EU: Don’t send Syrians back to Turkey. 20 June 2016.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/20/eu-dont-send-syrians-back-turkey
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2016g). Seeking refuge: Unaccompanied minors in Sweden. 9
June 2016. https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/09/seeking-refuge/unaccompanied-childrensweden
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2015). EU: Mixed messages on boat migration: Augmented
search and rescue, but focus still on preventing departure. 23 April 2015.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/23/eu-mixed-messages-boat-migration
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2014a). Palestinian barred, sent to Syria. Human Rights Watch, 5
May 2014. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/05/lebanon-palestinians-barred-sent-syria
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2014b). Palestinians escaping Syria turned away. Human Rights
Watch, 7 August 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/07/jordan-palestinians-escaping-syriaturned-away
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2014c). Not welcome: Jordan’s treatment of Palestinians escaping
Syria. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/jordan0814_ForUPload_0.pdf
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2013). Egypt: Syria refugees detained, coerced to return. Human
Rights Watch, 11 November 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/10/egypt-syria-refugeesdetained-coerced-return
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2012). World Report 2012: Syria. https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2012/country-chapters/syria
Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2011). The EU’s Dirty hands: Frontex involvement in illtreatment of migrant detainees in Greece. 21 September 2011.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/21/eus-dirty-hands/frontex-involvement-ill-treatmentmigrant-detainees-greece
Hyndman, J. (2000). Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Hyndman, J. and Mountz, A. (2008). Another Brick in the Wall: Neo-Refoulement and the
Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe. Government and Opposition. Vol. 43, No. 2,
pp 249-269.
Huysmans, J. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. London
and New York, Routledge.
Ilcan, S. (eds.) (2013). Mobilities, Knowledge and Social Justice. Montreal and London: McGillQueen’s University Press.

254

Innes, A. (2016). In Search of Security: Migrant agency, narrative, and performativity.
Geopolitics. 21(2): 263-283.
International Crisis Group (2011), Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII):
The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide [Internet] Damascus, Brussels, Accessed from:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/109popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-vii-the-syrian-regimes-slow-motionsuicide.aspx
International Labor Organization (ILO) (2012) Palestinian employment in Lebanon.
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---robeirut/documents/publication/wcms_236502.pdf.
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016). IOM-UN Agreement. September 19,
2016. Pdf. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/about-iom/IOM-UN-Agreement-Sept192016.pdf
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2014). “Fatal Journeys: Tracking lives lost
during migration”. Geneva.
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf
Isin, E. (2008). Theorizing acts of citizenship. In Isin, E and Nielson, G (eds) Acts of Citizenship.
London: Zed Books, pp 15-43.
IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (2012). Palestinian refugees from Syria feel abandoned.
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96202/analysis-palestinian-refugees-from-syria-feel-abandoned
Johnson, H. (2016). Narrating Entanglement: Rethinking the local/global divide in Ethnographic
migration research. International Political Sociology. 10: 383-397.
Johnson, H. (2014). Borders, Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, H. (2013). The Other Side of the Fence: Reconceptualizing the camp and migration
zones at the borders of Spain. International Political Sociology. 7:75-91.
Johnson, H. (2012). Listening to Migrant Stories. In Salter, M and Multu, C (eds.) (2012).
Research Methods in Critical Security Studies. New York: Routledge.
Johnson, H. (2011). Click to Donate: Visual images, Constructing Victims and imagining the
Female Refugee. Third World Quarterly 32(6): 1015-1037
Johnes, R. (2016). Violent Borders: Refugees and the right to move. London. Verso.

255

Jordan Times (2014). UNHCR provides Interior Ministry with 108 iris scanners for refugee
registration. 7 July 2014. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/unhcr-provides-interiorministry-108-iris-scanners-refugee-registration
Kaytaz, E. S. (2016). Afghan Journeys to Turkey: Narratives of Immobility, Travel and
Transformation. Geopolitics. 21(2): 284-302.
Khalil A (2009). Palestinian refugees in Arab states: A rights-based protection. Migration Policy
Centre. CARIM Research Report; 2009/08.
Khosravi, S. (2017). Precocious lives: Waiting and hope in Iran. University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia.
Khosravi, S. (2011). Illegal Traveler. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.
Koser, K. (2010). Introduction: International Migration and Global Governance. Global
Governance, 16,301-315.
Koslowski, R. (eds.) (2011). Global Mobility Regimes. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Koslowski, R. (2005). International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics. New
York: Routledge.
Krasner, S. (1983). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences. In Krasner, S.
(eds.).International Regimes. Ithaca. Cornell University Press.
Kunz, R et al. (eds.) (2011). Multilayered Migration Governance: The promise of partnership.
Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
Kushner, T. and Knox, K. (1999). Refugees in an Age of Genocide. London. Frank Cass.
Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) (2016). Government of Lebanon and the United Nations
15 December 2015. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/44246
Loyd, J. and Mountz, A. (2014). Managing migration, scaling sovereignty on islands. Island
Studies Journal. 9(1): 23-42.
Lui, R. (2004). The International Government of Refugees, in Larner, W. and Walters, W. (eds.)
Global Governmentality: Governing international spaces. New York: Routledge.
Macklin, A. (2005). Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-US Safe Third Country
Agreement. The Columbia Human Rights Review. 36:365.
Macklin, A. (1996). Opening the Door to Women Refugees: A First Crack. In Giles, W. et al.
(eds.), Development and Diaspora. Dundas: Artemis Enterprises.

256

Mail Online (2015). News: How Bulgaria keeps migrants out - with 50 miles of razor wire:
Fence along Turkish border that is 15ft tall and 5ft wide said to have kept out 500 people in a
month. 3 August 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3183352/How-Bulgaria-keepsmigrants-50-miles-razor-wire-Fence-Turkish-border-15ft-tall-5ft-wide-said-kept-500-peoplemonth.html
Mainwaring, C. (2016). Migrant Agency: Negotiating borders and migration controls. Migration
Studies. 4(3): 289-308.
Mainwaring, C. (2014). Negotiating the Journey Examining Irregular Migration across the
Central Mediterranean. International Studies Association ISA (2014), Toronto.
Malkki, L. (1996). Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dihistoricization.
Cultural anthropology 11(3): 377-404.
Malkki, L. (1995). Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu
Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Malkki, L. (1992). National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of
National Identity among Scholars and Refugees. Cultural Anthropology. 7(1): 24–44.
Marrus, M (1985). The Unwanted. New York. Oxford University Press.
Mazower, M. (2009). No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of
the United Nation. New Jersey. Princeton University Press.
McNamara, D. (1997). Statement by Dennis McNamara, director of the division of international
protection, to the forty-eighth session of the executive committee of the high commissioner's
programme (16 October 1997). Refugee Survey Quarterly. 16(4): 56-60.
McNevin, A. (2011). Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the
Political. New York. Columbia University Press.
McNevin, A. (2006). Political Belonging in a Neoliberal Era: The Struggle of the Sans-Papeirs.
Citizenship Studies. 10(2): 135-151.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2018a). Drowning skyrockets as European governments block
humanitarian assistance on Central Mediterranean. 12 July 2018. https://www.msf.org/drowningskyrockets-european-governments-block-humanitarian-assistance-centralmediterranean?fbclid=IwAR1O8gVtGzCHRdPgt_ANawRidTqeB5t5fXjeXcrOvD24iZXzzhAvd
GqPIqs
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2018b). Self-harm and attempted suicides increasing for child
refugees in Lesbos. 17 September 2018. https://www.msf.org/child-refugees-lesbos-areincreasingly-self-harming-and-attempting-suicide

257

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2013a). Misery beyond the war zone: Life for Syrian refugees
and displaced populations in Lebanon. Geneva.
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=6627
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (2013b). Special Report: Syria two years on: The failure of
international aid. Geneva.
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=6669&cat=specialreport&ref=footer-features
Mercy Crops (2016). Quick facts: What you need to know about the Syria crisis. 5 February
2016. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-whatyou-need-know-about-syria-crisis
Mezzadra, S. (2015). The proliferation of borders and the right to escape. In Jansen Y, Celikates
R, and de Bloois J (eds.). The Irregularization of Migration in Contemporary Europe.
Detention, Deportation, Drowning. London – New York, Rowman & Littlefield.
Mezzadra, S. (2004). The Right to Escape. Epherma 4(3): 267-275.
Mezzadra, S. and Nielsen, B. (2003). Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor.
Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
Migration Policy Institute (2015). Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now and What
Next? 24 September 2015. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe%E2%80%99smigration-crisis-context-why-now-and-what-next
Milner, J. (2008). New Challenges in International Refugee Protection: Canada’s Role. Presented
at the Canadian School of Public Services. Ottawa. 9 October 2008.
Moroşanu, L. (2015). Researching Coethnic Migrants: Privileges and Puzzles of “Insiderness”.
Forum Qualitative Social Research (FQS). 16(2), Art 15.
Mountz, A. (2017). Island detention: Affective eruption as trauma’s disruption. Emotion, Space
and Society. 24: 74-82.
Mountz, A. (2011). The Enforcement Archipelago: detention, haunting, and asylum on islands.
Political Geography. 30: 118-128.
Mountz, A. (2011). Where asylum-seekers wait: Feminist counter-topographies of sites between
states. Gender Place and Culture. A Journal in Feminist Geography. (3):381-399.
Mountz, A. (2010). Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border.
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Mozetic, K. (2018). Being Highly Skilled and a Refugee: Self-perceptions of non-European
physicians in Sweden. Refugee Survey Quarterly. 37: 231–251.
258

Nayel, M. (2013). Palestinian refugees are not at your service. The Electronic Intifada, Beirut, 17
May 2013. https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinian-refugees-are-not-your-service/12464
Nayeri, D. (2017). The ungrateful refugee: We have no debt to pay. The Guardian. 4 April 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/dina-nayeri-ungrateful-refugee
New York Academy of Medicine (2016). Gray Literature Report: What is Gray Literature.
http://www.greylit.org/about
New York Times (2015). Europe: Eastern Bloc’s Resistance to Refugees Highlights Europe’s
Cultural and Political Divisions. 12 September 2015.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/world/europe/eastern-europe-migrant-refugeecrisis.html?_r=0)
Nyers, P. (2015). Migration Citizenships and Autonomous Mobilities. Migration, Mobility, &
Displacement. 1(1):23-39.
Nyers, P. (2006). Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency. New York and London:
Routledge.
Nyers, P. (2003) Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation
Movement. Third World Quarterly. 24 (6): 1069–1093.
Nyers, P. (eds.) (2009). Securitization of citizenship. London: Routledge.
OCHA (2017). Humanitarian Funding Update. January 2017.
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/gho_update_january_2017.
pdf
Orchard, C. and Miller, A. (2014). Forced Migration Policy Briefing 10: Protection in Europe for
refugees from Syria. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.
Papadopoulos, D., Stephenson, N. and Tsianos, V. (2008). Escape routes: Control and
Subversion in the Twenty First Century. London: Pluto Press.
Papadopoulos, D. (2016). The two endings of precarious movement. In A. Bove, E. Armano, and
A. Murgia (eds.) (2016). Mapping Precariousness, Labour Insecurity and Uncertain Livelihood:
Subjectivities and resistance. Farnham: Ashgate, pp 17-35.
Pappé, I. (2018). Finding the truth amid Israel’s lies. Electronic Intifada. 30 May 2018.
https://electronicintifada.net/content/finding-truth-amid-israels-lies/24531

Pappé, I. (1998) Fifty Years through the Eyes of "New Historians" in Israel. Middle East Report.
207 (summer, 1998): 14-17+23

259

Paret, M. and Glesson, S. (2016). Precarity and Agency through a Migration Lens. Citizenship
Studies. 20(3-4): 227-294.
Parliament of Australia (2012). “The ‘Pacific Solution’ revisited: a statistical guide to the asylum
seeker caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island”. 4 September 2012.
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pu
bs/BN/2012-2013/PacificSolution
Perrra, A. (2016). From the Arab Spring to the Damascus Winter: The United States, Russia, and
the New Cold War. Contemporary Review of the Middle East. 3(4): 363-386.
Peteet, J. (2005). Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps. University of
Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia.
Peteet, J. (1994). Male gender and rituals of resistance in the Palestinian intifada: a cultural
politics of violence. American Ethnologist. Journal of the American Ethnological Society. 21(1):
31-49.
Piętka-Nykaza, E. (2015). I Want to Do Anything which Is Decent and Relates to My
Profession’: Refugee Doctors’ and Teachers’ Strategies of Re-Entering Their Professions in the
UK. Journal of Refugee Studies. 28(4): 523–543.
Piterberg G (2001) Erasures. New Left Review 10, July – August 2001.
Puvimanasimghe, T. et al. (2014). Narrative and Silence: How former refugees talk about loss
and past Trauma. Refugee Studies. 28(1): 69-92.
Refugee Council (NRC) (2016). News: Five reasons why the EU Turkey Deal still is not a good
idea. 20 September 2016. https://www.nrc.no/news/2016/september/five-reasons-why-the-euturkey-deal-still-is-not-a-good-idea/
Relief Web (2017). UNHCR Syria Situation Response: Urgent Needs. 1 June 2017.
https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unhcr-syria-situation-response-urgent-needs-1june-2017
Relief Web (2014). Palestinians from Syria: Syria needs analysis project. ACAPS.
http://www.acaps.org/reports/downloader/palestinians_from_syria_march_2014/77/syria
Reuters (2016). World News: Hungary to build second fence on Serbian border to keep out
migrants. 26 August 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungaryidUSKCN1110F9
Rygiel, K., Babna, F., and Ilcan, S. (2016). The Syrian Refugee Crisis: The EU-Turkey ‘deal’
and temporary protection. Global Social Policy. 16(3): 315–320.

260

Rygiel, K. (2014). In Life Through Death: Transgressive Citizenship at the Border. In Isin, E. F.
and Nyers, P. (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies. London and New York:
Routledge.
Rygiel, K. (2012). Governing Mobility and Rights to Movement Post 9/11: Migration through
detention. Review of Constitutional Studies. 16(2).
Rygiel, K. (2011). Bordering Solidarities: Migrant activism and the politics of movement and
camps at Calais. Citizenship Studies 15 (1): 1-19.
Rygiel, K. (2010). Globalizing Citizenship. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Said, E. (2000). Reflections on Exile in Reflections of Exile and Other Essays. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Said, E. (1992) The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books.
Said, E. (1986). On Palestinian Identity: A Conversation with Salman Rushdie. In Said E (1994)
The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994. New
York. Pantheon Books.
SBS (2013). News: Sweden grants blanket asylum to Syrian refugees. 6 September 2016.
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/09/06/sweden-grants-blanket-asylum-syrian-refugees
Scheel, S. and Squire, S. (2014). Forced Migrants as ‘Illegal’ Migrants. In Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, F.
et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp 188-199.
Schuster, L. (2011). Dublin II and Eurodac: Examining the (Un) Intended (?) Consequences.
Gender, Place and Culture. 18(3): 401-416.
Schuster, L. (2011). Turning Refugees into ‘illegal migrants’: Afghan asylum seekers in Europe.
Ethnic and Racial Studies. 34 (8): 1392-1407.
Schuster, L. (2002). Rights and Wrongs Across European Borders: Migrants, Minorities and
Citizenship. Citizenship Studies. 6(1).
Schuster, L. and Solomos, J. (2002). Rights and Wrongs across European Boarders: Migrants,
Minorities and Citizenship. Citizenship Studies. 6(1): 37-54
Schuster, L. (2011). Turning Refugees into ‘illegal migrants’: Afghan asylum seekers in Europe.
Ethnic and Racial Studies. 34 (8): 1392-1407.
Shah, A. (2017). Ethnography? Participant observation, a potentially revolutionary praxis.
Journal of Ethnographic Theory. 7(10): 45-59.

261

Sheller, M. (2018). Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. Verso
Books.
Sheller, M (2014). Mobilities Justice. Wi: Journal of Mobile Culture. (8):01.
Sheller, M. (2011). Mobility. Editorial Arrangement of Sociopedia. Sociopedia.isa.
http://www.sagepub.net/isa/resources/pdf/mobility.pdf
Sigona, N. (2012). Deportation, non-deportability and Precarious lives. Anthropology Today. 28
(5):22–23.
Smyth, G. and Kum, H. (2010). When They don’t Use it They will Lose it’: Professionals,
Deprofessionalization and Reprofessionalization: the Case of Refugee Teachers in Scotland.
Journal of Refugee Studies. 23(4): 503–522.
Soguk, N. (1999). States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft. Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Soykan, C. (2012). The New Draft Law on Foreign and International Protection in Turkey.
Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration. 2(2): 38-47.
Sparke, M. (2006). The Neoliberal Nexus. Political Geography, 25(2): 151–80.
Spiegel Online (2015). Mother Angela: Merkel’s refugee policy divides Europe. 21 September
2015. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-of-chancellor-merkel-divideseurope-a-1053603.html
Spijkerboer, T. (2007). The Human Cost of Border Control. European Journal of Migration and
Law. 9: 147-161.
Squire, V. (2018). Researching precarious migrations: Qualitative strategies towards a positive
transformation of the politics of migration. The British Journal of Politics and International
Relations. 20(2): 441–458.
Squire, V. et al. (2017). Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat: Mapping and Documenting
Migratory Journeys and Experiences Final Project Report. Warwick. May 2017.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316856219_Crossing_the_Mediterranean_Sea_by_Boa
t_Mapping_and_Documenting_Migratory_Journeys_and_Experiences
Squire, V. (2017). Unauthorized migration beyond structure/agency? Acts, interventions, effects.
Politics. 37(3): 254-272.
Squire, V. (eds.) (2011). The Contested Politics of Mobility: Border zones and
Irregularity. London and New York: Routledge.

262

Striel, M. (2016). A Sea of Struggle - Activist border interventions in the Mediterranean Sea.
Citizenship Studies. 20(5): 561-578.
Swedish Migration Agency (2016). New law that affects asylum seekers and their families. 20
July 2016. https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/New-laws-in2016/Nyheter/2016-07-20-20-July-2016-New-law-that-affects-asylum-seekers-and-theirfamilies.html
Tazzioli, M., & Garelli, G. (2018). Containment beyond detention: The hotspot system and
disrupted migration movements across Europe. Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space. 0(0): 1–19.
Tazzioli, M. (2015). The Politics of Counting and the Sense of Rescue. Radical Philosophy.
Commentary July / August 2015.
The Economist (2015). Europe Refugee Crisis: Germany impose border control. 14 September
2015. http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21664583-move-taken-reduce-flow-migrantsundermines-europes-free-movement-policies-germany
The Guardian (2017). Hungary: Hungary to detain all asylum seekers in container camps. 7
March 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/07/-hungary-to-detain-all-asylumseekers-in-container-camps
The Guardian (2016). Sweden sends sharp signal with plan to expel up to 80,000 asylum seekers.
16 January 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/28/sweden-to-expel-up-to80000-rejected-asylum-seekers
The Guardian (2015a). Migrants attack Macedonian police as construction of Greek border fence
begins. 28 November 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/29/migrants-attackmacedonian-police-as-construction-of-greek-border-fence-begins
The Guardian (2015b). Hungary closes Serbian border crossing as refugees make for Austria on
foot. 4 September 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/04/hungary-closes-mainborder-crossing-with-serbia
The Guardian (2015c). Sweden slams shut its open-door policy towards refugees. 24 November
2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/sweden-asylum-seekers-refugees-policyreversal
The Independent (2016). Sweden sees record numbers of asylum seekers withdraw applications
and leave 25 August 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisisasylum-seekers-sweden-applications-withdrawn-record-numbers-a7209231.html
The Telegraph (2015). Germany drops EU rules to allow in Syrian refugees. 24 August 2015.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11821822/Germany-drops-EUrules-to-allow-in-Syrian-refugees.html
263

The White House (2017a). “Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
to the United States”. Office of Press Secretary. 27 January 2017.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nationforeign-terrorist-entry-united-states
The White House (2017b). “Executive Order: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
to the United States”. Office of Press Secretary. 6 March 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states
The World Bank (2017). The visible impacts of the Syrian War may only be the tip of the
iceberg. Press Release. 10 July 2017. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2017/07/18/the-visible-impacts-of-the-syrian-war-may-only-be-the-tip-of-the-iceberg
The World Post (2015). World Post: Why Greece Shut The Shortest, Safest Route For Migrants
And Refugees. 24 September 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-turkey-borderfence_us_55f9ab73e4b0d6492d63ec12
United Nations (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, Article 1D, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html
United Nations (UN) (2016). Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth. UN SecretaryGeneral Op-Ed: Refugees and migrants: A crisis of solidarity. UN, 9 May 2016.
http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2016/05/secretary-generals-op-ed-refugees-migrants-crisissolidarity/
United Nations (UN) (2016a). Question of Palestine: Division for Palestinian rights: The origin
and evolution of the Palestine problem: 1917-1988. Available at:
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/57C45A3DD0D46B09802564740045CC0A
United Nations (UN) (2016b). Question of Palestine: Report of the United Nations Conciliation
Commission for Palestine. Available at:
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/AFDEF7B30101C6A2852560EB006DB365
United Nations (UN) (2016c). UNCCP, Analysis of Paragraph 11 of the General Assembly’s
Resolution of 11 December 1948, May 15, 1950. Available at:
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/AFDEF7B30101C6A2852560EB006DB365

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2018). Global Trends: Forced
Displacement in 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2018a). Desperate journeys.
Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe's borders. . January – August 2018.
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65373#_ga=2.86979032.1996503545.15455737
66-176700752.1529789091
264

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017a). Syrian Regional Refugee
Response. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017b). UNHCR warns funding
cuts threaten aid to Syrian refugees, hosts. 4 April 2017.
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/4/58e347288/unhcr-warns-funding-cuts-threaten-aidsyrian-refugees-hosts.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017c). Syrian Regional Refugee
Response: Jordan. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017d). Syrian Regional Refugee
Response: Turkey. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2016). Syrian Regional Refugee
Response. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2016a). Global Trends: Forced
Displacement in 2016. https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015). News: Over one million sea
arrivals reach Europe in 2015. 30 December 2015.
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe2015.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR (2014a). The UNHCR’s Asylum
Trends 2013: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries. Geneva.
http://www.unhcr.org/5329b15a9.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2014b). Governments at Geneva
meeting agree to take in 100,000 Syrian refugees. UNHCR, 9 December 2014.
http://www.unhcr.org/548737926.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2010). Convention and Protocol
related to the status of refugees. December 2010.
http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-statusrefugees.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2000). The State of the World’s
Refugees 2000: Fifty years of humanitarian action.
http://www.unhcr.org/publications/sowr/4a4c754a9/state-worlds-refugees-2000-fifty-yearshumanitarian-action.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1997). “Statement by Denis
McNamara, Director of the Division of International Protection, tot eh forty-eight session of the

265

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s programme”. Refugee Survey Quarterly,
16(4):56–60.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1984). Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/45dc19084.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1974). OAU Convention:
Governing the Specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa.
http://www.unhcr.org/45dc1a682.html
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) (2013). Shattered lives: Challenges and priorities for
Syrian children and women in Jordan.
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Shattered_Lives_June10.pdf
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2016a). Palestine refugees. http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2016b) General Assembly resolution 302 1949. http://www.unrwa.org/content/generalassembly-resolution-302
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2016c). Where we work. http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2015a). The crisis of Yarmouk Camp. https://www.unrwa.org/crisis-in-yarmouk
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2015b). Lack of funds forces UNRWA to suspend cash assistance for housing for Palestinian
refugees from Syria in Lebanon. 22 May 2015. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/pressreleases/lack-funds-forces-unrwa-suspend-cash-assistance-housing-palestine-refugees
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2014a). Syria crisis. http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2014b). Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon. http://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2014c). Palestinian refugees from Syria in Jordan. http://www.unrwa.org/prs-jordan
United Nations Relief and Working Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
(2002). Yarmouk (Unofficial refugee camp). 30 June 2002.
https://web.archive.org/web/20070629185659/http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/syria/yarmouk.
html

266

US News (2015). News: Security concerns surround Europe’s refugee crisis. 17 September 2015.
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/17/security-concerns-surround-europes-refugeecrisis
Valenta, M. and Thorshaug, K. (2012). Asylum-Seekers' Perspectives on Work and Proof of
Identity: The Norwegian Experience. Refugee Survey Quarterly. 31(2): 76-97.
Van Dam, N. (2017). Destroying a Nation: The civil war in Syria. London and New York.
I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd.
Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015). Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitics Security and Beyond. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wall, M., Campbell, M., and Janbek, D. (2017). Syrian Refugees and Information Precarity. New
Media and Society. 19(2):1-15.
Walters, W. (2015). Reflections on Migration and Governmentality. Journal fur kritische
Migrations – und Grenzregimeforschung 1(1).
Williams, N. (2011). A Critical Review of the Literature: Engendering the Discourse of
Masculinities Matter for Parenting African Refugee Men. American Journal of Men’s Health.
5(2): 104-117.
World Vision (2013). Under Pressure: The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host
communities in Lebanon. http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/emergency-presskitsyria-refugee-crisis
Young, I. M. (2003). The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security
State. Signs. 29(1): 1-25.

267

